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'Every man's hand almost was against his brother, at least his heart, little 
regarding anything that should cement and might have a tendency in it to 
cause us to grow into one. All the dispensations of God, his terrible ones -
he having met us in the way of his judgement in a ten years' civil war, a very 
sharp one - his merciful dispensations, they did not, they did not work upon 
us but we had our humours and interests; and indeed I fear our humours were 
more than our interests. And certainly as it fell out, in such cases our 
passions were more than our judgements.' 
Oliver Cromwell to the first Protectorate Parliament, 4 September 1654. 
Preface 
The aim of this study is to provide a summary depiction of the main political 
developments in Central America over what may yet transpire to be the most 
complex and dynamic period of its modern history, the years 1987 to 1993. 
The fact that this survey is organised in three parts - an analytical essay; a 
select chronology; and some appendices - makes clear that it is not a work 
of closely considered and integrated scholarship. However, because much of 
the information reproduced here has only been available either in specialist 
publications or - more frequently - in piecemeal fashion, even a very 
synthetic and artisanal assessment would seem to be justified. 
The essay that follows begins with a region-wide focus, considering the 
principal developments between 1987 and 1993 with respect to economy and 
society as well as US policy, the course of diplomacy and its impact on the 
armed forces, human rights and elections. There then follow three rather 
more focused sections that consider the varying experience of 'pacification' 
in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala - the three countries that suffered 
civil wars in the 1980s. 
Those who consult the notes will see that I have relied very heavily on the 
weekly Central American Report, which is published in Guatemala City by 
Inforpress Centroamericana. I am particularly grateful to the Inforpress team, 
which has maintained an exemplary publication through very taxing times. 
Tony Bell, Victor Bulmer-Thomas and Rachel Sieder have been extremely 
generous with advice, loans of material and comment, but none is responsible 
for the probable errors and definite oddities that follow. 
November 1993. 
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The Pacification of Central America 
Overview 
The 1980s were miserably harsh years for Central America. Precise and 
reliable figures will never be available for measuring the human cost of the 
region's three civil wars. A fair but conservative estimate would be 160,000 
people killed and two million displaced during the decade; it is the scale, not 
the precision, that impresses.1 The longest of these conflicts - that in 
Guatemala - began over thirty years ago and remains unresolved as of 
October 1993. However, the Guatemalan crisis of May/June 1993 gave at 
least some grounds for expecting serious efforts towards peace - if only in 
the sense of a cessation of hostilities - despite the numerous false dawns that 
have afflicted that country since the counter-revolution of June 1954. 
Should such efforts take hold they would build on the resolution of the civil 
wars in Nicaragua (1981-90) and El Salvador (1980-91), where laborious and 
intricate negotiations terminated conflicts of great brutality and bitterness. As 
the succession of meetings, confusion of proposals and muddle of events 
came to dominate the coverage of these countries' affairs in the metropolitan 
media interest in them naturally began to decrease. The tendency was, of 
course, abetted by the simultaneous collapse of communism and the outbreak 
of other civil wars, the terrifying images of which should serve to remind us 
of the merits of what Cromwell called 'settling and healing', even if this is 
achieved in unheroic manner, at the cost of dreams, and through the 
concession of often vital interests. 
I am here using the rather ungainly word 'pacification' because - at least 
in English - it carries a feeling of temporality, an attachment to mood and 
some sense of approximation, maybe even interchangeability, between 
subject and object.2 At the same time, it is not a word as fraught with casual 
overuse and normative subversions as is 'democracy'. One should, though, 
be mindful of the fact that this is a word that appeared in English, Spanish 
and French between 1460 and 1483, at a time of civil war and conquest, for 
which it was quite frequently employed as a euphemism as well as signifying 
the ending of war, assuaging of discontented parties and negotiating of 
settlements.3 Cortes employed it in both senses, and Las Casas contrasts the 
native Americans' 'pacific possession' of their lands to 'conquest' in his 
invective against the excesses of Cortes and his like. 
In 1573 Phillip II banned the use of the word 'conquest' from official 
accounts of 'discovery' in the Americas and elsewhere.4 Three years later 
the provinces of the Low Countries signed 'The Pacification of Ghent' as a 
treaty in union against the Spanish crown. Whilst the Esquipulas II regional 
peace treaty of August 1987 lacks Ghent's warlike articles against the 
outsider, it is certainly similar in its concern for internal accord and 
settlement. Moreover, the Esquipulas treaty opened a six-year period during 
which fighting was gradually brought to a halt on terms that fell short of 
outright victory for any of the (local and external) protagonists, and although 
the settlements that followed derived from much negotiation and diplomacy, 
they were also influenced by sharp military exchanges right up to the end. 
Such an observation applies best to the cases of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. In Guatemala peace will not be the result of any military stalemate 
between the guerrillas of the Union Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 
(URNG) and the army of the state, which has succeeded in a strategic 
subjugation of the radical challenge whilst failing to eliminate the rebels or 
eradicate the popular sympathy often felt - but rarely displayed - towards 
them. In the cases of Honduras and Costa Rica there has been nothing 
approaching civil war, but since these are small countries with close 
relations, events elsewhere have pressed, both directly and as relayed through 
US policy, sharply on their domestic affairs. Hence, although we will 
concentrate here on the main sites of conflict, some attention must be paid to 
Honduras - where, after all, the great bulk of the Nicaraguan Contras were 
stationed - and Costa Rica, which, despite possessing a civic culture so 
adjusted to the rule of law that notions of 'pacification' might seem abusive, 
has experienced important internal stress in addition to playing a key role in 
regional diplomacy. 
The issue of whether this still incomplete process of negotiation, 
demilitarisation and institutional reform is tantamount to 'democratisation', 
let alone 'redemocratisation', is not a central concern here. The range of 
democratic theory from slogan to sophistry has become so great that any 
serious effort to apply it to a region such as Central America would require 
a lengthy peregrination through the definitions. However, definition does 
provide more than consolation for those unhappy with the intricacies of 
history or the menace of fickle opinion. So, for the purposes of drawing a 
provisional margin we might note the observation (made in the context of a 
review of Central America) by John Peeler that, 
'contemporary everyday usage ... interprets ... democracy as a 
regime with near universal adult suffrage, periodic competitive 
elections in which opposition parties have a reasonable chance to 
win, and widely respected freedoms of speech and political 
organisation ... such a polity (is) a liberal political system 
legitimized by the appearance of a democracy.'5 
A somewhat looser, but more explicitly critical, understanding is given by 
Richard Fagen, who sees democracy as involving 'effective participation by 
individuals and groups, a system of accountability, and political equality'.6 
This, plainly, might well be very different from the pattern of liberal 
democracy currently being instituted in Central America and elsewhere, but 
it is scarcely a recipe for the formalist collectivism so comprehensively 
disgraced by its practice in the Soviet bloc. 
Many conservative commentators are inclined to dismiss critiques of 
liberal democracy - or democracy as liberalism - as more or less stealthy 
reformulations of a redundant class-based politics. Yet in recent years it has 
been less a class than a cultural critique of the universal pretensions of 
liberalism that has attracted most attention.7 In terms of historical analysis 
this approach has been compellingly developed for Italy by Robert Putnam, 
whose emphasis upon varied traditional forms of cultural participation 
revives some of the 'political culture' arguments raised by Almond and Verba 
and quite widely considered redundant by the 1980s.8 In terms of advocacy 
it could find few more succinct proponents than Yoweri Museveni, unelected 
president of Uganda, who resists the metropolitan campaign for liberal 
democracy in Africa on the simple grounds that 'multiparty democracy works 
in Europe where social divisions are horizontal, based on class. In Africa the 
divisions are vertical, based on tribe. Multi-party democracy in Africa leads 
to tribalism and division.'9 
Such a comment does not properly apply to Central America - with the 
exception, perhaps, of parts of highland Guatemala - but it serves as a useful 
qualification to the tendency to triumphalism which now so often attends the 
propagation of liberal democracy and which has been particularly shrill in the 
case of Central America, where this was long projected by Washington as a 
conflict with communism. Indeed, this tendency is now so strong that it 
extends well beyond right-wing circles and has, I sense, contributed to the 
diminished interest in Central American affairs as these are seen to 'conform 
to type'. 
Caution, clearly, is required, even in the wake of extraordinarily brutal 
autocracies. The much quoted observation by Adam Przeworski that 'the 
process of establishing a democracy is a process of institutionalizing 
uncertainty' is both true and necessary.10 However, for poor people 
scratching a living in poor countries wracked by violent conflict, existence 
is already so shot through with uncertainty that such a proposition is neither 
as risky nor as attractive as the observation implies. In such cases the 
utterance of judicious pieties as if there were always a tomorrow faces stiff 
competition from even the most mediocre populist rhetoric of deliverance. 
Another declaration by a northern academic recently quoted approvingly 
in a volume on Central American politics runs as follows: 
'Lying is the most nefarious political offence ... Untruths destroy 
the possibility of creating common perceptions of political events, 
and therefore can fracture a political community at all levels of 
participation ... Political falsehoods create many social events out 
of one empirical occurrence, threaten community cohesion by 
opening up the possibility of value conflicts ... tend to produce 
erratic politics, and this ... impoverishes individuals and 
societies.' 11 
One need be neither a postmodernist nor a Jesuit to see that all sorts of 
difficulties lurk beneath the surface of this quite plausible, if rather insolent, 
requirement of honesty in public affairs. Montaigne, who, of course, lived 
a good part of his life in the midst of war, cautions us thus: 
' ... as soon as you have established the frontiers of truth and 
error with that fine brain of yours and then discover that you must 
of necessity believe some things even stronger than the ones 
which you reject, you are already forced to abandon these 
frontiers.' 
He ends the same essay with an even tougher stricture: 
'Vainglory and curiosity are twin scourges of our souls... The 
former makes us stick our noses into everything; the latter forbids 
us to leave anything unresolved or undecided.'12 
It is not that there can be any serious disputation about the need for 
candour and transparency in public life everywhere, but rather that this 
requirement is still tightly latched to quite markedly puritan notions of 
personal conduct. These are in themselves highly contestable, but they 
become positively oppressive in circumstances under which for the simple 
purposes of daily survival ordinary folk have learned how to stay silent, 
dissemble, manifest ignorance and tell untruths. What, after a decade of 
clandestinity, death squads, raids and interrogations, is a secret? When do 
secrets become lies, even in the cultural sense celebrated by Rigoberta 
Menchu?13 
In a recent suggestive essay that confronts the kind of complacency that 
concerns me here, Laurence Whitehead has excluded Central America 
(together - for distinct reasons - with Mexico and the Caribbean) from a 
South American pattern of 'democracy by default'. The major features of that 
broad tendency - which may be seen as an unfinished 'third cycle' following 
those of 1944-48 and 1955-62 - are the absence of impulses to autocracy and 
external intervention (previously the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution); 
growing disenchantment on the part of local entrepreneurs and foreign capital 
with the statism and inefficiency of military regimes; the severe deflation of 
military confidence by the debt crisis; and the 'deradicalisation' of 
progressive forces caused by exceptionally severe repression for which they 
were utterly unprepared.14 Few of these factors may usefully be applied to 
Central America, where, as Rodolfo Cerdas has observed, authoritarian 
regimes were in no sense the product of any populist excess or reformist 
ambition that might have exhausted civil tolerance or loosened the bonds of 
tradition.15 
This is an important - but often ignored - point. Just as Central America 
did not become submerged in dictatorship during the 1970s as the result of 
any 'populist' phase of political economy identified (at that time) by 
Guillermo O'Donnell as a harbinger to bureaucratic authoritarianism, so also 
is it now patently not acquiring liberal democratic institutions as a 
consequence of developments in what Marcelo Cavarozzi calls the 'state-
centred matrix' ('import-substitution industrialisation'; the closing of the 
economy; state regulation of markets; 'moderate' inflation rates).16 The 
economies of these countries are too small to register anything more than the 
faintest echo (or flimsiest emulation) of the structures and policies established 
in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. One must look much more directly at 
politics to find the core factors in the isthmian pattern of regime transition, 
which is in a number of ways quite distinct from that in South America. 
An inescapable complicating factor in assessing this short and highly 
charged period is the strength and breadth of swings in analytical mood - as 
distinct from the events to which they are a response. This, of course, has 
been particularly marked on a global scale since mid-1989, not just at both 
ends of the political spectrum but also in that notional 'centre' which sought 
to benefit from the excessive ambition of a right made dizzy by the sight of 
a future without an antagonist as well from the debilitated left's disarray. 
Within Latin America the echoes of this erraticism are further confused by 
regional sub-patterns, which, with nearly two dozen different polities, are not 
just intricate but also prone to give, by virtue of serial repetition, an 
exaggerated impression of movement. These shifts can be on a relatively long 
cycle. In May 1989 Whitehead noted the existence of just two dictatorships 
(Chile and Paraguay) whereas 15 years earlier there had been just three 
constitutional governments (Colombia; Venezuela; Costa Rica), but he ended 
his piece by criticising the shallowness of fashionable sloganising about a 
supposed 'worldwide march towards democracy'.17 In May 1993 the 
Santiago correspondent of The Guardian, Malcolm Coad, writing two days 
after President Serrano had grasped dictatorial power in Guatemala, noted 
that this followed the impeachment of two elected presidents (Collor, Brazil, 
in December 1992; Perez, Venezuela, in May 1993), the overthrow of 
another (Aristide, Haiti, in October 1991) and the mutation of a fourth into 
an autocrat (Fujimori, Peru, in April 1992). The despondency caused by 
these developments stood in stark contrast to the euphoria prevailing only a 
few months earlier in the wake of the removal of Pinochet and Stroessner 
from (presidential) power, the ending of the Salvadorean civil war, and the 
initial mirage provided by neo-liberalism in the time-lag between the fall in 
inflation rates and that in a range of other economic indicators.18 It is 
perhaps unsurprising that comment on and speculation about Cuba manifests 
these mood-swings to a high - probably disproportionate - degree. 
There has been little conservative academic analysis of the post-Esquipulas 
period in Central America. This is to be expected; a large proportion of a 
quite modest right-wing academic output in the mid-80s was preoccupied with 
direct anti-communist tasks that are now redundant. Where there is some 
vestigial urge to espy radicalism - such as in Jesse Helms's remarkably 
successful campaign to freeze US aid to Nicaragua in 1992-3 - this has been 
supported by empirical evidence and analytical assumptions of the most 
dubious kind. The region has also largely ceased to be an echo-chamber for 
wider debates - even that over Cuba - and the local disputes between what 
we might call oligarchic corporatism (traditional conservatism) and liberal 
radicalism (modern mercantilism) are not yet sharp enough nor sufficiently 
driven by ideology to attract much attention abroad. For the traditional right 
the image of a region embracing the formalities of liberal democracy provides 
a reassuring reprise of the oligarchic and North American dominion of the 
first three decades of the century, when neither Bolshevism nor Mexican 
statism seriously impaired the view. For neo-liberals there is slight interest 
in historically poor, low inflation and open economies that offer scant 
opportunity for manifesting the empowering and enfranchising qualities of the 
market. As we shall see, privatisation campaigns have been launched in most 
countries, but these have tended to take the form of specific interests rather 
than a general ideology, predictable instances of rigged tendering, asset-
stripping and punitive expropriation provoking often powerful - if only 
sometimes successful - popular response. Whitehead's criticism of the neo-
liberal prospectus for Latin America as a whole - and even elements of his 
'social democratic' qualification - remain valid for the isthmus.19 
The general defensiveness of comment on the left abroad clearly reflects 
the downturn in interest (and solidarity) in metropolitan societies.20 More 
than three years after the Nicaraguan elections one is not taken aback to come 
across references to 'the Sandinista bourgeois elite' although there are still 
few who have the confidence to assert that, 
'(the) Sandinista decision to endanger the revolutionary process 
by holding national elections in the midst of war and economic 
disintegration was not made on the basis of an examination of the 
conditions of the working class, the peasantry, and the urban and 
rural poor ... (a) fundamental strategic mistake.'21 
James Petras and Morris Morley, the authors of this statement, are at pains 
to criticise (unnamed) 'dogmatic Marxists', but their own perspective is so 
persistently dismissive of non-economic matters that the general tendency of 
the North American left to over-react to ('bourgeois') behaviouralism is taken 
to an extreme. Matters of political economy assuredly remain crucial and 
enforce clear structural limits to the human condition in Central America, but 
the region has also thrown up remarkable instances of agency and initiative 
on both sides - the FMLN's offensive on San Salvador in November 1989; 
the Sandinistas' decision to hold elections; the Guatemalan crisis of mid-1993 
- for which structuralist explanations are of distinctly partial value. 
There has certainly been a sanctionable over-obfuscation of language by 
erstwhile radical intellectuals in a perceptible shift away from what might be 
called the 'cosmovision' of Marxism. However, this tendency is not simply 
the result of cowardice and prostitution, and it will not be dissolved by name-
calling.22 In my view, an especially important local factor for the 
disenchantment of the left (largely abroad) has been the end of fighting, 
which had served for so long as a veil for maximalism. By this I mean that 
it was (and remains) difficult to divorce from the image of people prepared 
to kill and die the idea that they can only do so for the highest ideals. The 
conflation of fighting and idealism that is often essential for combatants also 
infects committed onlookers even when, as in the case of Petras and Morley, 
they possess strong political disagreements with the people they would prefer 
to win. The disappointment when combat ceases and haggling pragmatism 
sets in is correspondingly fierce, and perhaps goes some way to explaining 
structuralist stubbornness in explanation. 
Noam Chomsky, the most distinguished North American radical writing 
on Central America - amongst other matters - stands in little danger of being 
accused of Leninist truculence despite his constant attacks on Washington's 
policies. Indeed, in one key respect, he is at complete variance with Petras 
and Morley, for his recent books contain minimal mention of resistance 
abroad to US power.23 Opponents are neither blamed nor praised, because 
they are strictly secondary in Chomsky's analytical approach and political 
concerns. Although a libertarian by conviction, he is a bona fide structuralist. 
As Jean Piaget, one of the founding fathers of that school, has commented of 
Chomsky's theory of linguistics, he does not begin his analysis with 
piecemeal evidence or procedures but universals (or 'wholeness'). Piaget is 
right that this approach 'completely inverts logical positivism' and that 'it 
does not bother (Chomsky) in the least' that this is the case24 It can be 
seriously argued that such an epistemology is equally - if not more - strongly 
evident in Chomsky's political writing, where the fundamental predicate (or 
assumption) is less conspiracy theory than the (structured) omnipotence that 
needs must lie behind this. There is no need to present or discuss 
countervailing evidence; this may be screened out as analytically irrelevant 
and politically confusing. Structural 'logic' even accounts for absences and 
silences: 'Washington failed to disrupt the 1984 election in Nicaragua by 
terror'.25 
It may be objected that Chomsky is a most unworthy target of criticism 
because of his solitary and heroic efforts to wage a campaign against US 
imperialism. However, this has been a campaign with footnotes, and one that 
addresses intellectual concerns as well as popular engagement. Intellectually, 
its reliance on inductive methods leaves it very vulnerable to charges of 
empirical clumsiness - a charge that is particularly dangerous in view of the 
extraordinary aggregation of material deployed by Chomsky to persuade his 
audience.26 Politically, the insistence upon imperialist prowess and wrong-
doing is intrinsically pessimistic and liable to demobilise the very audience 
that it is clearly intended to win over. The effect of successive illustration of 
imperial injustice may initially be cathartic in the sense that it provides a 
dissident strand of a logical positivist society with the relief of having 
evidence for its convictions. But there is also the risk - from the viewpoint 
of the left - that this becomes merely a litany, an excuse as well as an 
explanation, disturbing in its contemporary approximation to 
predestinarianism. For our present purposes, Chomsky's scrupulous aversion 
to prescribing policies alternative to those that prevail is less important than 
the fact that his method effaces precisely those features - the contradictions 
and failures of US policy and the politico-military resources of the Central 
American left - which should be at the heart of an explanation of the region's 
politics between 1987 and 1993 that puts history before polemic. 
This last point requires brief qualification because one does not need to 
subscribe either to Chomsky's marginalisation of the Central American left 
or to Petras's assertions of its insufficiencies to see that the picture is mixed. 
We will look again at the experience of the Sandinistas and the Salvadorean 
FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional) since these 
forces - the first withdrawing from office after a decade, the second entering 
the legal sphere after a dozen years - remain central to the political landscape 
of their countries. However, the record in Guatemala, Honduras and Costa 
Rica is quite distinct. 
In Guatemala the URNG, founded in February 1982, has failed to build the 
capacity for a strategic military offensive over ten years, whilst no openly 
radical organisation can exist above ground for any length of time before its 
members are liable to be executed. The result has been a parallel process of 
frequent but inconsequential schism within clandestine groups and the 
construction of 'non-ideological' civic groups - usually around human rights 
issues - in public. The 'left' as such, then, seems both weak and defensive. 
But if it has indeed remained embattled in military terms, and perforce absent 
from legal politics, these facts may well have exaggerated both the image of 
defeat and the degree to which popular forces will need to regroup before 
they can make a political impact. The remarkably strong spontaneous popular 
mobilisations of 1978, 1985, 1990 and 1993 - the first two in conditions of 
severe repression; the latter two at significant risk to participants - suggest 
greater potential than appearances might justify.27 
The experience of Costa Rican radicalism could barely be more different 
since the left has been permitted to contest open elections - up to 1975 under 
the guise of non-communist fronts; thereafter unhampered by anti-communist 
laws - and to organise with constitutional guarantees. Despite the fact that the 
Partido de Vanguardia Popular (PVP; communist party) played a key role in 
establishing Costa Rica's welfare system in the 1940s, neither it nor other, 
smaller radical organisations have made any significant impact on the 
electorate, never winning more than eight per cent of the vote for congress 
or 3.5 per cent for that for the presidency in thirty years.28 As a result, the 
PVP, set up in 1931, underwent important splits in 1983 and 1986 as first the 
Nicaraguan Revolution and then conservative economic policies taxed its 
programmatic resources. The party appeared to have regained both 
confidence and energy at its 1990 congress, but it was bouncing back from 
its worst-ever election result (9,178 votes - 0.6% of the turn-out - in 
February 1990) and subsequently failed to establish a profile in the campaign 
against the sharp neo-liberalism of the new Calderon administration.29 
The Honduran left has not even had a putative 'golden age' after which to 
hanker, has never been permitted to contest a national election, and, despite 
giving rise to three guerrilla groups in the early 1980s, lacked the logistical 
capacity for anything beyond kidnapping and low-scale sabotage.30 By the 
turn of the decade its leadership was publicly disavowing armed struggle and 
returning from exile without any negotiated settlement or real expectation of 
breaking out of the political periphery. Indeed, the Honduran left may be 
most guilty of the 'rhetorical excess' which Cerdas perceives as a critical 
weakness of regional radicalism.31 However, in turning to the more 
substantive features of this period we will find that the discursive inheritance 
of the left is but a subordinate feature. 
The Economy 
The travails of the Central American economies may be traced through 
Appendices Two to Six. During the period of most intensive conflict in the 
isthmus, 1981-92, the GDP per capita of Latin America as a whole 
contracted by 7.3 per cent whilst that of the countries of the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) fell by a full 15 per cent. It is true that 
boycotted and besieged Nicaragua's economic disaster is responsible for a 
good portion of this average - it contracted by over 38 per cent - but even if 
we set Nicaragua aside, the GDP per capita of the other economies of the 
region fell by nearly 11 per cent.32 GDP per capita growth is non-existent 
in Nicaragua; very slight and erratic from 1984 in El Salvador; very slight 
from 1987 in Guatemala; very slight and erratic throughout the decade in 
Honduras; and only modest in Costa Rica from 1987. 
The performance of individual economies and the considerable difficulties 
of regional trade were undoubtedly related to the pattern of military conflict, 
notably in Nicaragua, where this was so great that it is effectively impossible 
to distinguish and measure, but also in El Salvador, where on the eve of the 
final truce the government assessed direct damage to be $329 million, 
indirect damage $708 million, and reconstruction costs $1,826 million.33 
However, one must also identify earlier indebtedness, a crisis in the price of 
regional staples, and the general world recession as important factors. In 
1980 debt service was 16 per cent of regional exports; by 1985 it had risen 
to 46 per cent; and at the end of the decade it was still 30 per cent despite 
significant negotiation over rescheduling.34 Indebtedness, it should be 
stressed, directly affects governments' budgets, debt service accounting for 
27 per cent of that in Guatemala in 1992, 27 per cent of Costa Rica's and 33 
per cent of that of Honduras for 1993.35 The period of greatest concern to 
us (1987-93) is also marked by a collapse in the price of coffee: by 60 per 
cent between July 1989, when the International Coffee Organisation halted 
its quota system, and May 1993, when the world price for washed arabicas 
was at its lowest for 70 years.36 Given that between 1982 and 1987 Central 
America cultivated an average of 765,000 hectares of coffee and exported 8.6 
million bags a year, it is scarcely surprising that the fall in this market has 
had a severe effect.37 Overall regional losses since the collapse of the quota 
system have been put at $1 billion.38 This, too, has had a sharp impact on 
government finances as tax revenues from coffee contracted, in the case of 
El Salvador from $955 million (35 per cent of internal state revenue) in 1986 
to $253 million (eight per cent) in 1990.39 
The world market in bananas, the region's other traditional export crop, 
has not been as seriously affected, but the imposition in December 1992 by 
the European Community (EC) of a two million ton quota with a 20-25 per 
cent tariff on Latin American fruit to take effect from July 1993 represents 
a major threat. According to the Union of Banana Exporting Countries 
(UPEB) this will cost 174,000 jobs with estimated losses of 900,000 tons per 
annum, or roughly $1 billion.40 The UPEB claim is not, of course, 
disinterested and may be taken as exaggerated, but the EC's policy must 
certainly disrupt the region's economies in the coming period. 
Basic grain production was hit in the early 1990s by the fierce drought 
caused by irregularities in the El Nino current, the effect being to increase the 
trend towards imports of US wheat (nearly 600,000 tons in 1990), away from 
traditional consumption of maize (still 70 per cent of cereal production), and 
to an ever sharper food dependency ratio. Between 1970 and 1986 cereal 
imports had risen from 15 per cent to 21 per cent of total consumption (32 
per cent in Costa Rica and 27 per cent in El Salvador), not least because after 
the Nicaraguan Revolution US food aid to the other countries of the region 
increased by a factor of 15 (to $120 million in 1990).41 Between 1989 and 
1992 regional production of cereals fell by 15 per cent, imports rising by 32 
per cent.42 Since most of the latter entered under US PL480 soft food loans, 
the issue of political conditionality combines with that of food security, which 
has declined everywhere with the partial exception of Honduras. 
These shifts have been accompanied by a significant increase in 
maquiladora industry (local assembly of largely imported inputs for re-
export, usually with generous tax breaks). Nicaragua is the only country not 
to have been seriously affected by this expansion which saw maquila exports 
rise from $285.2 million in 1987 to $1,570 million in 1992?3 Indeed, The 
Economist explained the failure in June 1993 of Guatemalan entrepreneurs to 
support Jorge Serrano's coup largely in terms of the impact a US economic 
boycott would have on the non-traditional market-garden exports and 
maquiladora production, especially at a time when prices of traditional 
exports - sugar and cotton as well as coffee - were so low.44 
Another shared regional experience - shared also by Nicaragua under 
FSLN government - has been the application of orthodox stabilisation 
policies in an effort to reduce inflation. Here the region has followed a 
general Latin American pattern, one that analysts increasingly identify as 
critical to the experience of regime transition even when they are sharply 
opposed to the social costs of these policies. If we exclude Nicaragua, which 
entered a hyperinflationary spiral in 1985, the average regional figures for 
inflation are, in Latin American terms, relatively modest and stable (1987 -
12.05 per cent; 1988 - 15.6 per cent; 1989 - 16.3 per cent; 1990 - 35.65 per 
cent; 1991 - 16.67 per cent; 1992 - 12.97 per cent). Control of monetary 
policy has not been absolutely strict, but on those occasions where it has 
lapsed - Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica in 1990 - it has generally been 
rectified. The case of Nicaragua cannot be taken as directly comparable, but 
even there we should note that the strict measures imposed by the Sandinistas 
in 1988 reduced the level of inflation from 33,548 per cent to 1,689 per cent, 
and when this started to spin out of control again the following (election) year 
at 13,500 per cent, Violeta Chamorro's team cut it back very rapidly. 
After 1987, then, Central America was governed by regimes with quite 
similar goals in this area - a fact that encouraged renewed interest in 
economic integration as progress was made towards political peace-making 
under the Esquipulas accords. Here, of course, political will is very much a 
necessary rather than a sufficient condition, and a legion of obstacles, some 
mentioned already, face the successful creation of the new Central American 
Economic Community (CEC) formally established at the presidential summits 
held at Antigua in 1990 and San Salvador in 1991.45 Starting with a 
liberalisation in the trade of agricultural products - notably weak for a region 
so strongly based on agriculture - this process has advanced very much on 
the basis of free trade agreements, especially once incorporation into the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was shown to be 
unrealistic in the short-term. 
Central America has similarly echoed tendencies elsewhere in its adoption 
of privatisation policies. In Nicaragua these have been at the core of national 
life since the February 1990 elections, and we will return below to their 
negotiation in that charged period of 'concertacion'. Public sector enterprises 
under civilian control in Guatemala are many fewer - one result of the 
historically lower levels of taxation - leaving little scope for sales, the most 
important of which has been a third of the state airline Aviateca in 1989.46 
Costa Rica is at the other end of the scale, but the complicated legal status 
and strong political influence of the state's quasi-autonomous corporations 
and their subordinate enterprises have presented many barriers, even to the 
Calderon administration for which privatisation was a key policy. In this case 
it took the insistence of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank that sale be a condition for release of final structural adjustment loans 
before the National Assembly approved the privatisation of Cementos de 
Pacifico and Fertilizantes de Centroamerica in March 1993. Both companies 
were operating at a profit but carried large debts and had previously belonged 
to the sprawling CODESA public corporation that is closely identified by the 
private sector with the interventionist excesses of the 1970s47 
The political impact of privatisation in Honduras has been sharper, partly 
because of the enthusiasm of the National Party (PN) government of Rafael 
Callejas elected in November 1989, partly because the 60 companies 
controlled by the state holding company (CONADI) were more vulnerable to 
US conditionality and military ambition, and partly because it came to affect 
not just the ownership of individual rural properties but also the general legal 
basis for the tenure of land. Legislation to permit sales of specific state 
enterprises was first passed in February 1989, but the Liberal Party 
administration of Azcona de Hoyo resisted the much-touted privatisation of 
the national cement company, making this an election issue and enhancing the 
profile given to it by Callejas once he took office. There is, then, some irony 
in the fact that when the cement company was finally sold off, in September 
1991, it was to the (eminently public) Instituto de Prevision Militar, 
infuriating COHEP, the national business association.48 Moreover, the 
Honduran case demonstrates that privatisation is by no means a cost-free 
process of flogging off nationally owned assets at prices readily determined 
by market forces. Within six months of Callejas's inauguration the cost of 
legal fees and discounted prices in selling CONADI enterprises was over L45 
million ($10 million) - a matter that also raised popular protest.49 
Government proposals to privatise the massively indebted public health 
system in mid-1991 were soon overtaken as an issue by the general 
agricultural law, passed in March 1992, which effectively halted state 
intervention, strictly limited the grounds for expropriation, and made 
generous concessions to foreign investors. The law signalled the end of a 
highly variable but sometimes critical state commitment to agrarian reform 
which had lasted for thirty years.50 The subsequent auctioning of 
cooperatives in the Bajo Aguan area aggravated conflict between campesino 
organisations but only encouraged Callejas both to introduce a general law 
facilitating privatisation and to prepare for the sale of profitable public sugar, 
power and telephone firms.51 It is extremely doubtful if Callejas was able 
through this policy to reduce the prebendary qualities of the Honduran state 
by much and he seems to have been inadvisably zealous in imposing 
privatisation on the land question despite the deep division of the popular 
movement in the countryside. As so often in Honduran politics, it was less 
a case of a concerted conflict than of aggregate effects and tendencies 
diminishing room for manoeuvre. 
Outside of Nicaragua, El Salvador is the country where privatisation and 
the pursuit of free market policies have had the highest profile in recent 
years. With leftist forces effectively excluded from legal politics during the 
1980s, open policy debates very much revolved around disputes between the 
Christian Democrats (PDC), who fiercely defended the nationalised agencies 
and companies hastily assembled in league with the USA in the first years of 
the civil war, and the radical right headed by ARENA, which, supported by 
powerful entrepreneurial interests, not only championed free markets but also 
inveighed against the corrupt practices that had come to infect the public 
sector. This latter campaign struck a chord with the public, and, in fact, after 
ARENA came to office in June 1989, Alfredo Cristiani began his programme 
not with the banks and coffee wholesaling agency so important to the 
merchant elite, but on the land.52 Here the revival and great advertisement 
of the 'land to the tiller' programme of titling small plots provided a 
relatively uncontroversial and popular (50,000 titles without any 
expropriations in 30 months) introduction to the much more contested sale of 
the country's six banks nationalised in 1980 and, to even sharper popular 
discontent, public outpatient services in the capital's main hospital53 
Despite demonstrations, Cristiani announced at the end of 1991 a second 
stage of this programme targeting sugar, cement and electricity companies as 
well as the San Bartolo free trade zone, which accounted for nearly a third 
of traditional exports.54 However, disputes within ARENA, the political 
costs of some 10,000 job losses, and the removal of services such as food 
regulation (at a time of cholera) as well as the poor records of the companies 
slated for sale greatly reduced the programme's impetus after mid-1992, even 
to the extent that the National Privatisation Commission was closed a mere 
five months after its establishment.55 The only profitable public enterprise 
sold in that year was the Hotel Presidente; others were either contracted out 
or simply closed down. It may well be that the establishment of the San 
Salvador stock exchange in April 1992 - in the midst of the implementation 
of the first phase of the peace agreement - marked the apogee of the 
mercantilist campaign opened in 1989. Henceforth the response of unions and 
opposition parties no longer so daunted by repression will at least require a 
much more detailed and expansive justification for such actions. It is also 
possible that the country's principal capitalist groups have obtained sufficient 
assets and fulfilled enough of their initial ideological ambitions in this area 
for public policy subsequently to be less emphatic and conflictive. 
Even the qualified privatisations realised by Central American 
governments in the early 1990s have extended the gap between a restricted 
private affluence and a generalised public squalor that was already 
formidably wide. Here, once more, Central America conforms to the sub-
continental pattern insofar as the establishment of liberal democratic systems 
has occurred at a time of deepening poverty for the mass of (potential) 
citizens, and in some key respects that transition has accelerated 
pauperisation. In fact, even the strictly average GDP per capita growth rate 
for the region between 1987 and 1992 is lower, at 0.4 per cent, than was that 
for the period 1980-87 (0.41 per cent).56 
With the signal exception of Costa Rica, the Central American countries 
embarked upon the process of pacification with indices of infant mortality, 
life expectancy at birth, access to potable water, malnutrition, percentage of 
GDP invested in housing, illiteracy, and persons per doctor that were worse 
than those for Latin America as a whole.57 Nearly 18 months after the 
election of Violeta Chamorro the state of Nicaragua's poor was still the worst 
in the isthmus, with some 50 per cent of the labour force un- or 
underemployed and over 69 per cent unable to meet basic food needs.58 
Elsewhere the modest official figures for open urban unemployment between 
1987 and 1992 (Costa Rica: 5.3 per cent; El Salvador: 9.0 per cent; 
Guatemala: 7.9 per cent; Honduras: 8.4 per cent) obscure the much deeper 
reach of 'marginalisation' and impoverishment. This is true even of Costa 
Rica, where in 1990-91 some 27,821 families were classified poor for the 
first time, an 18.4 per cent increase. In Honduras, the other country not 
directly immersed in conflict, the College of Economists assessed the number 
of the country's inhabitants living in poverty to have risen from 67 per cent 
to 73 per cent between 1989 and 1992.59 
It is not just the economic crisis but also the civil wars that have uprooted 
families or traditional bread-winners from their homes, deprived them of 
familiar employment and thrown them into the euphemistically termed 
'informal economy'. This, moreover, has been more than a national and 
regional process, many thousands fleeing as economic or political refugees 
to the USA during the 1980s. The greatest concentration has been from the 
three countries at war - El Salvador; Guatemala; Nicaragua. In the case of 
El Salvador there were, according to conservative estimates, 690,000 
immigrants in the USA in 1989. That year their remittances of dollars home 
exceeded $759 million - 15 per cent of GDP and three times the revenue 
from coffee exports. Figures from the same source for Guatemala have 
50,000 immigrants remitting $248 million in 1989; and for Nicaragua 
255,000 remitting $59.8 million.60 
This is a comparatively new phenomenon: in 1980 remittances from some 
170,000 Salvadorean immigrants in the USA amounted to just $74 million (or 
6.2 per cent of total exports). Over the subsequent decade, family remittances 
to these three countries covered two-thirds of the fall in export revenue and 
foreign investment - a most impressive demonstration of the degree to which 
labour has become a regional export.61 
Women 
Such a development has not gone unnoticed on the streets of Los Angeles or 
Washington.62 However, less attention has been paid to its impact on 
domestic and family structures and activity in Central America itself. The 
sources for this are still slight and very uneven, but it would seem clear that 
it has encouraged greater involvement of women in public labour even though 
the growth of female participation in the regional labour force has constantly 
outstripped that of males since World War Two: 3.47 per cent against 2.68 
per cent in 1950-70; 4.28 per cent against 2.72 per cent in 1970-80; and 4.4 
per cent against 3.06 per cent in 1980-90.63 Women now officially comprise 
31 per cent of the regional labour force, and the figure would be appreciably 
higher if the 'informal' sector were included. (Recent attempts to measure 
this put women at 57 per cent of 'informal' workers in Nicaragua, 53 per cent 
in El Salvador and 38 per cent in Costa Rica).64 It is probable that migration 
of all types has increased the extent to which women have become heads of 
household; in the case of El Salvador this is estimated to be 33 per cent; in 
Managua 30 per cent; in Guatemala City 21 per cent. 
There is perhaps no area where these phenomena conjoin in more critical 
fashion than in the field of health and child care - rarely high on the agenda 
of political analysts but increasingly recognised as a factor at the core of 
'public opinion' when that public lacks both state provision and private 
means. (Here the example of Cuba may well have been over-sloganised, but 
it behoves marketeers to explain why Caribbean communism should have 
taken the route of 'health in one country', even before ethical, fiscal and 
operational crisis struck the US public health system so resoundingly.) 
According to UNICEF, by the end of the 1980s 100,000 of the one million 
Central Americans born in 1983 were dead, largely because of cuts in health 
spending, and an equal number wounded or incapacitated as a more direct 
result of the civil wars. If all the countries had achieved an infant mortality 
rate equal to Costa Rica's - 24 per 1,000 live births, instead of the regional 
rate of 93-190 lives would have been saved daily. This contrast is sharpened 
further still by the fact that in Guatemala 11 women died for every 10,000 
live births, and only a quarter of sexually active Guatemalan women use 
contraception.65 By 1990 Guatemalan public health was on the verge of 
collapse. Despite nominal increases in both budget and share on overall 
government spending, the real allocation for 1990 barely exceeded that of 
1986. The capital's Roosevelt Hospital, once famed throughout Latin 
America, had effectively run out of supplies, could not replace staff, and was 
being systematically pillaged by politically appointed administrators. This 
pattern was evident in the rest of the country's 35 hospitals, which owed over 
$5 million to suppliers whilst the Health Ministry was $22 million in debt and 
Congress refusing to release sufficient funds.66 
Another facet of such pressures - and their political importance - may be 
found in the scandal of child-trafficking in Honduras. The discovery in April 
1993 of the frozen body of a minor in a freight wagon at Cortes, the cadaver 
apparently being intended for organ transplants, brought to a head an 18-
month campaign by Deputy Rosario Godoy de Osejo over child-trafficking 
rings, principally for illegal adoption abroad, in which she implicated the 
Callejas presidency.67 According to official figures, 800 Honduran children 
went missing in the 1990s, many in 'fattening houses' run by lawyers prior 
to adoption. These would seem to be made necessary by the fact that 57 per 
cent of all Honduran children are malnourished and 70 per cent suffer 
respiratory diseases. It is also telling that a trade (in human beings) so closely 
associated elsewhere in Latin America with the children of victims of military 
repression should be on the upsurge in Honduras under a constitutional 
administration. In this case a country that had experienced relatively few 
adult disappearances for political causes in the 1980s was subjected to a 
shock of shame and outrage which greatly exceeded that traditionally 
provoked by its habitually high levels of official swindling and preferment.68 
In the light of developments of this type Central American women have 
unsurprisingly taken a higher political profile in recent years. It is certainly 
the case that this profile is still publicly centred on their role as widows or 
relatives of victims of repression. One might usefully extend this description 
to Violeta Chamorro, but it takes on a greater sense of resilience in the 
examples not only of Rigoberta Menchu but also of Nineth de Garcia, leader 
of the Guatemalan Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), and Rosalina Tuyuc of 
CONAVIGUA, the national widows' association. Whilst perhaps no more 
than 15 per cent of the URNG's fighters are women, the figure was at least 
30 per cent for the FMLN, amongst whose principal leaders have been Nelida 
Anaya Montes (FPL; died 1983), Nidia Diaz (PRTC), and Ana Guadalupe 
Martinez (ERP).69 Moreover, as the FMLN transforms itself into an 
orthodox political party one might expect a continued autonomous voice from 
organisations of relatives of the victims of repressions such as FECMAFAM 
as well as from returned refugees, 53 per cent of whom were women. 
Nonetheless, one is mindful of the experience of Nicaragua, where after 
more than a decade of radical administration, advances made by women were 
quite modest, not least insofar as only three held ministerial posts under the 
FSLN.70 As Daniel Ortega noted in his report to the first Sandinista 
congress in July 1991, despite the introduction of a divorce law and 
legislation regulating the responsibilities of fathers, 'one has to recognise 
that . . . we were not able, for a number of reasons, including ideological 
ones, to articulate as a party a concrete programme consistent with our 
ideas'.71 In this respect, it is worth observing that the forerunner of the 
national womens' organisation AMNLAE was an explicitly anti-dictatorial 
body (AMPRONAC), not dissimilar to the more recent bodies established 
elsewhere, and that AMNLAE itself had no proper leadership elections until 
March 1991. From 1987 the FSLN leadership promoted the slogan 'women 
are not a sector', which militated directly against a feminist agenda, dodged 
the issue of equal pay, and became increasingly mealy-mouthed about 
abortion - always a controversial matter, even for a president whose wife, 
Rosario Murillo, has nine children (and at least one maid).72 This, however, 
must be set against the decidedly reactionary ethical positions of the 
Chamorro government, which was far more conservative on social policy 
than in its political alliances. 
Cholera 
The cholera epidemic that struck Peru in January 1991 and had reached 
Guatemala by July of that year was exceptional by any standards, Central 
America not having suffered a major outbreak since 1856. Frequent use of 
the phrase 'time of cholera' in articles and books cashes in on the popularity 
of Gabriel Garcia Marquez's novel Love in the Time of Cholera (1985), set 
in the last great South American outbreak of 1895 and, in Gerry Martin's 
words, an 'unmistakable portrait...of the end of an era'.73 However, the 
borrowed titles have not been completely spurious, for cholera has 
historically carried cataclysmic connotations and often attended moments of 
political change as well as social decomposition, not least in Britain in 1832 
and 1848 but also in Guatemala in the late 1830s.74 The image of an 
exceptionally potent disease capable of killing an adult within a few hours has 
no doubt fortified a sense of helplessness and fatalism. However, as early as 
1849 The Economist called it a 'disease of society' and doctors in Melbourne 
mistakenly feared that only an outbreak of cholera would prompt the 
construction of sewers. The connection between the disease and the quality 
of water was decisively established with the publication of John Snow's On 
the Communication of Cholera in 1855, and it has rarely been difficult to 
trace the speed of subsequent epidemics to poor sanitation, lack of potable 
water, and insufficient personal hygiene, even if the immediate cause is often 
in green vegetables or shallow-water fish, both commonly sold in Central 
American streets.75 These factors are largely dependent on infrastructure 
that is either very poor or entirely absent in most of this region, as evidenced 
by the figures for the share of the population with direct access to water: 
Guatemala 38 per cent; El Salvador 52 per cent; Honduras 50 per cent; 
Nicaragua 45 per cent; Costa Rica 96 per cent. As a result of this, the 
expectations in early 1991 were that the particularly fierce El Tor strain of 
cholera that had affected 170,000 Peruvians and killed more than 1,200 in the 
space of nine weeks would put some 600,000 Central Americans at risk.76 
By mid-January 1992 the region had registered somewhat less than 10,000 
cases with under 200 deaths, by far the majority occurring in Guatemala.77 
However, in the first fortnight of May there was a sharp resurgence. The 
number of cases doubled in Honduras (to 30) and quadrupled in Nicaragua 
(to over 100) whilst those in El Salvador rose by 1,000 (ten deaths) and in 
Guatemala by an equal amount (a total of 70 deaths).78 Costa Rica registered 
its first five cases. The question why this sharp increase took place is of 
interest and might also alert us to the scope of explanation beyond 
inadequacies in infrastructure. This itself was immediately criticised, not just 
in terms of lack of potable water and sewerage but also for the failure of 
mayors and local authorities to spend sufficiently - or in some cases at all -
on chlorination. On the other hand, it is probable that nearly a year after the 
initial outbreak the populace had ceased to observe precautions tedious even 
for those with a domestic water supply. With relatively few cases, cholera 
had apparently lost its terror. Possibly more important still, the second 
outbreak took place after Holy Week, a time of holidays, travelling, 
indulgence and, of course, large crowds at Easter processions. Finally, one 
might suggest that the long lull aggravated the confusion caused by an 
infection that, after incubation of 12 to 48 hours, shocks with its rapid 
development of acute diarrhoea, dehydration and loss of voice. As with child 
diarrhoea - so closely linked to malnutrition - this may be rapidly treated 
without specialist help using oral rehydration salts, a formula of salt, sugar 
and potassium developed in the mid-1970s. However, whilst supply of salts 
was in most countries adequate, this was not the case in terms of the level of 
popular health education, which was just as important, for instance in 
persuading mothers to continue breast-feeding children with diarrhoea or 
rural communities that they should not cover up suspect cases out of either 
shame or a desire to protect the market for their garden produce. 
As with AIDS, which first appeared in 1985 and killed nearly a thousand 
Central Americans over the following seven years, cholera was preventable 
at a low price, and whilst it affected many more people, it was eminently 
curable.79 The record of the epidemic of the early 1990s is as mixed as the 
political conditions under which it occurred. On the one hand, there is 
inadequate infrastructure, very low health and education budgets, and a 
significant level of elite disdain and popular superstition. Against this, there 
has been important regional coordination and appreciable energy invested by 
health professionals and activists in campaigns of the type pioneered in Cuba. 
Perhaps most notable of all, as in most of Latin America, there has been very 
little political agitation around the management of the epidemic. 
The Military 
All three civil wars of the 1980s lasted for at least eight years, and each 
involved frequent operations across at least one international frontier. The 
armed forces or police of all the regional states became embroiled to a 
greater or lesser degree, as did those of the USA, Cuba, Mexico and 
Argentina. For a while, in the mid-1980s, the threat of a truly regional war 
was strong. Appendix Nine tabulates this escalation. The number of troops 
in Central America rose from approximately 48,000 at the end of the 1970s 
to nearly 200,000 in 1985. At the same time, notwithstanding a quite 
effective arms embargo imposed on both Guatemala and Nicaragua by the 
USA, there was a notable increase in weaponry, equipment and aircraft in the 
region. Although we lack reliable information for contemporary possession 
of weaponry, it is clear that the process of regional demilitarisation has been 
slow and most uneven. In 1991 official regional troop strengths still stood at 
179,000 despite some slimming down of the Costa Rican paramilitary forces 
and the radical reduction of the Ejercito Popular Sandinista by over 30,000. 
The main reason for this lack of movement was the expansion of the 
Salvadorean, Guatemalan and Honduran armed forces at a time when the 
armed threats against them were either diminishing or nonexistent. 
In the case of El Salvador this is explained in part by the imminence of a 
negotiated demilitarisation in which elite battalions would be 'traded' for 
FMLN units in a process of linked demobilisation, which eventually took 
place throughout 1992. However, in all these countries one observes a fierce 
reluctance on the part of the high command to cede the considerable powers 
accumulated over the previous decade not simply in terms of public prestige, 
hardware and economic holdings but also over civil society at large, as 
applied through the traditional mechanism of conscription. As late as mid-
1990 the Guatemalan and Honduran armed forces were forcibly conscripting 
hundreds of youths in sweeps undertaken with little apparent care for the 
response of either public opinion or the law.80 The fact that President 
Callejas had formally declared the last Nicaraguan Contras to have left 
Honduran soil on 18 April 1990 made the subsequent pressganging seem to 
be nothing more than a deliberate assertion of the military's fuero - or de jure 
as well as de facto independence. 
The extent to which the USA had encouraged the militarisation through aid 
is fully evident in Appendix Eight. However, after the demobilisation of the 
Contras even the Bush administration, which had insisted upon keeping the 
Nicaraguan rebel force intact throughout 1989, became annoyed with the 
Honduran military. This may have been because the high command in 
Tegucigalpa had generally become too accustomed to Pentagon support 
during Reagan's anti-Sandinista crusade, enabling them both to play the anti-
communist card and to seek comparability with the aid given to their rivals 
in the Salvadorean military who faced a genuine guerrilla threat. However, 
senior Honduran officers appear to have been constructing a business empire 
well beyond the customary corporate perquisites of housing, hospitals and 
insurance. In June 1989 popular protests obliged President Azcona de Hoyo 
to rescind after a week his decree granting over 1,000 officers life-long rights 
to a car, chauffeur, bodyguard and health care abroad, not least because the 
military had already cornered a third of the national budget.81 Later in the 
year the over-valuation of the dollar on the important San Pedro Sula black 
market threatened to cause a major financial upset until the intervention of 
Colonel Reinaldo Andino Flores, commander of the 105th Infantry Brigade, 
who not only effectively set the national exchange rate for the Central Bank 
but also countermanded the central government's prohibition of informal 
trading in dollars. Neither the executive nor congress made any official 
statement.82 Congress also did not dare impede the chief of the armed 
forces, General Luis Alfonso Discua Elvir, from having the republic's laws 
altered so that he could serve a second term from the start of 1993. 
One possible reason for this was that Discua now presided over such an 
extensive economic network that few politicians felt able to cross him. We 
have already noted the ability of the military's business corporation, IPM, to 
buy the profitable national cement company in the face of the protests of a 
capitalist class alleging incorrect expenditure of taxpayers' money. In 
addition to this, IPM had already acquired a bank, an insurance company, a 
radio station (classical music) and a funeral parlour.83 IPM's 1992 profits 
were estimated at $40 million, and talk of an 'armed bourgeoisie' extended 
well beyond the circles of liberal intellectuals. The Voice of America stated, 
'Honduras is an army with a country, not a country with an army', and US 
Ambassador Crescencio Arcos engaged in sharp public exchanges with 
Discua over the need to reduce the size and cost of the military.84 
Eventually, early in 1993, Washington lost patience and cut aid to the almost 
nominal sum of $2.7 million. 
As Appendix Eight indicates, pressures of this type were not applicable in 
Guatemala or Nicaragua, which had anyway substantially reduced its army. 
In the case of Guatemala a military institution also possessed of important 
economic interests and capable of sustaining a major counter-insurgency 
campaign without much US support will undoubtedly resist any settlement 
along the lines agreed for El Salvador at the end of 1991, and, as we will see, 
it is likely to be internal rather than external pressure that will loosen what 
are as much ideological and operational convictions as economic interests. 
A more general problem, with or without a formal process of 
demobilisation, is the surfeit of weaponry circulating in Central American 
society, the extensive motivation and capacity to commit crime, and the 
tenuous hold of professional police forces in the region. This is true even of 
Costa Rica, where well-supported charges of torture were levelled against the 
OIJ specialist police unit in 1989, and where by mid-1991 it was possible to 
identify eleven different public police and paramilitary bodies, incorporating 
a staff of some 20,000, as well as 15 private security firms.85 Yet this 
apparent erosion of the civic and neutralist ethic of the post-1948 Costa Rican 
state failed to halt a series of armed actions and kidnaps, such as that of 18 
members of the Supreme Court held for three days in April 1993 by five 
masked men who pretended to be Colombian drug-traffickers but were, in 
fact, hoping to raise funds so that one of their number, an ex-police officer, 
might get a liver transplant.86 
In Nicaragua it has been estimated that early in 1992, after two years of 
demobilisation covering some 60,000 troops (including 33,000 Contra and 
'Recontra' fighters of the 'Resistance') there were still 100,000 people either 
possessing or with direct access to automatic weapons. Crime was rising six 
times faster than the birth rate, and more than a hundred people had been 
killed in armed clashes over the previous six months.87 By mid-1993 a state 
of near rebellion reigned in the northern and central zones of the country, 
requiring major and highly controversial operations by the army to contain 
armed bands composed of veterans of both sides in the civil war of the 1980s. 
In such a context it is hardly surprising that elements of the EPS might 
illegally sell SAM missiles to comrades in the Salvadorean FMLN or, indeed, 
that the FMLN itself might maintain in Managua substantial caches of these 
missiles and other weapons after the deadline had passed for the surrender 
and destruction of these within El Salvador under the peace agreement.88 In 
fact, inside El Salvador itself the agreed dismantling of the repressive 
Guardia Nacional and Policiade Hacienda paramilitary forces in March 1992 
had the predictable effect of triggering an upsurge in crime, for which the 
very partially trained and lightly armed civilian police being set up was 
poorly prepared.89 Nor should one forget those exceptional cases of police 
officers who honourably performed their duty in the face of insuperable odds 
and sometimes at the cost of their lives at the hands of 'colleagues'. Amongst 
these one ought to mention at least Jose Miguel Merida Escobar, chief of the 
Guatemalan police's homicide division, who was killed by a death squad in 
August 1991 having implicated an army agent attached to the president's 
office in the murder of the anthropologist Myrna Mack, stabbed to death in 
September 1990.90 Another officer, Vilma Arevalo, narrowly escaped such 
a fate in the wake of inquiries into the March 1990 murder of Nahaman 
Carmona, one of many Guatemalan street children done to death in a wave 
of vigilante violence so naturally spawned by years of political repression91 
United States Policy 
Central American politics cannot be properly understood as a simple 
reflection of US power. Yet neither is it possible to comprehend regional 
affairs without close reference to Washington's policies, however secretly 
these may be formulated or clumsy their implementation. Moreover, it is 
worth reminding ourselves that 'Washington' amounts to a great deal more 
than the White House or even the often theatrical exchanges between 
executive and legislature.92 The Iran-Contra scandal, which broke in 
November 1986 and had the effect of accelerating peace plans within the 
region, underlines the important role of executive agencies such as the CIA 
and the National Security Council (NSC), especially when legislative 
constraints encouraged the presidency not just to indulge in 'covert 
operations' - barely remarkable in Central America during the 1980s - but 
to make an important strand of foreign policy dependent precisely upon those 
operations (sale of missiles to Iran with transfer of the resulting revenue to 
Nicaraguan Contra forces, support for whom was invigilated and legally 
restricted by the US Congress). In addition, one should note the enhanced 
influence of the Department of Defense in a region where diplomacy was 
often a veil rather than an authentic instrument of policy, where three civil 
wars were being fought and US military aid of $1.8 billion had been 
disbursed over a dozen years. 
During the period that concerns us here Central American politicians of all 
colours were confronted with a particularly testing balance of forces in 
Washington. Whilst it is certainly the case that the Iran-Contra affair 
damaged the second Reagan administration's Central American policy by 
diminishing its prestige with the US public, international opinion and a 
Democrat-controlled Congress, it should not be forgotten that this occurred 
in the broader context given by the establishment of the reformist Gorbachev 
regime in the USSR. The motions towards detente made by Moscow 
increased Washington's confidence precisely at a time when it had been badly 
wrong-footed over Nicaragua. As a result, the Reagan government was 
distinctly reluctant to amend, let alone withdraw from, a set of notably 
aggressive policies developed for the region. Moreover, as William 
Leogrande has noted, 
'Reagan's minimum and maximum objectives in Nicaragua were 
the same. The continued existence of the Sandinista government 
was simply unacceptable; nothing short of its removal would 
do.'93 
The consequence was a form of stand-off, which prevailed between the 
signing of the Esquipulas accord in August 1987 and the inauguration of 
George Bush in January 1989. During this period Washington was unable to 
halt regional negotiations but it proved readily capable of limiting their scope 
and, indeed, the expectations vested in them. However, when Bush came to 
office, 'he was prepared to accept co-existence if the Sandinistas would live 
up to their commitments under the Esquipulas accord'.94 As we shall see, 
this more qualified approach - the fact that there was some modest space 
between Bush's minimum and maximum aims - revived the possibilities of 
diplomatic and political initiative that had previously been nullified by 
Reagan's consistent subjection of these unavoidable formalities to an 
ultimatumist veto. 
The first tangible expression of the shift was in the signing of the 
'Bipartisan Accord on Central America' with the Democratic leaders of 
Congress in March 1989, just a few weeks after Bush's inauguration. This 
deal was brokered by the new Secretary of State, James Baker, who had a 
reputation for 'taming the ideologues' under Reagan, and the new Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bernard Aronson, who was largely ignorant of Latin 
American affairs but as an erstwhile speechwriter for Walter Mondale as well 
as being an active supporter of Contra aid represented a safe but moderate 
replacement for the pugnacious cold warrior Elliott Abrams. In essence, this 
agreement recognised both the implausibility of maintaining Reagan's 
Nicaraguan policy and the fact that this had dangerously curbed US flexibility 
elsewhere in the isthmus. The 'bottom line' deal was that the Contras would 
be kept in place and provided with 'humanitarian' aid in Honduras until after 
the Nicaraguan elections in February 1990. During this period of just under 
a year the White House would liaise closely with Congress, giving a clear 
signal that it accepted the possibility of a settlement with Managua, where, 
perhaps predictably, Daniel Ortega called the agreement a 'terrorist 
package'.95 
Both the strength of Reagan's policy and the depth of divisions over the 
Contras even before the revelations in November 1986 of Colonel North's 
secret activities meant that some form of domestic rapprochement over 
Nicaragua was required once Reagan was gone. This was not, though, 
necessary for El Salvador, where bipartisan consensus had been much 
stronger, in part because the USA was trying to maintain rather than 
overthrow a government, in part because it had organised the holding of a 
string of elections as well as pumping in huge quantities of military aid (but 
relatively few advisers and no infantry), and in part because one of those 
polls had yielded in Jose Napoleon Duarte a president who was a faithful US 
ally and an open (if impotent) opponent of the ultra-right. All these factors 
made for the plausible presentation of, and occasionally even the belief in, 
a country governed by altruistic centrists equally distanced from and besieged 
by reactionary extremists in the landed oligarchy and army and their radical 
counterparts in the FMLN, aided and abetted through the familiar ideo-
logistical supply-line from Morazan to Managua to Havana to Moscow. One 
of the earliest and fiercest (but never seriously substantiated) charges made 
against the Sandinistas by the Reagan team was that they were exporting 
revolution by backing the Salvadorean FMLN. Throughout the 1980s such 
accusations varied in emphasis and were gradually replaced by direct attacks 
on Managua's internal regime, but they still appeared in the 1989 Bipartisan 
agreement, and they did help to furnish Democrats with a convenient basis 
for hawkishness as they reaped domestic political advantage by assailing the 
administration over the Contras. 
The widespread violation of human rights in El Salvador had troubled 
Congress in the early 1980s, and for a while it required Reagan to certify that 
the position was improving before each tranche of military aid was approved. 
But the president had soon unilaterally ceased doing this, and as the war 
settled into a familiar low-intensity pattern without widely-publicised 
massacres of the type witnessed in 1979-83, there were few efforts to stage 
an authentic debate, still less to challenge the administration's realpolitik or 
the Pentagon's operational needs between 1984 (when Duarte was elected) 
and 1989. The event that terminated this concordat was the FMLN's 
completely unexpected offensive of November 1989 which rocked the regime 
in El Salvador and provoked a brutal backlash from the armed forces that 
shocked international opinion but failed to defeat the rebels. We will return 
to this briefly below, but it is worth noting here the impact of the fighting 
within the USA, where Senators John Kerry and Edward Kennedy proposed 
a bill in January 1990 to cut off military aid entirely despite the fact that 
similar moves in both Houses had failed at the height of the offensive when 
images of slaughter were much starker . (Although so also was the possibility 
of precipitating military defeat by withholding funds, a preoccupation 
rehearsed in January 1981.)96 
The Kerry-Kennedy 'end the war' bill was replaced by another, drafted by 
Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd, who had long criticised Reagan's 
policy but been persuaded by the Bush team to give the new Salvadorean 
government of Alfredo Cristiani the opportunity to exercise the electoral 
mandate it had won in the Spring of 1989.97 Dodd now drew up a bill 
designed to make US aid conditional upon an improvement in the 
government's human rights record and tangible progress in negotiations with 
the FMLN. In August 1990 what had become known as the Dodd/Leahy bill 
survived attempted amendments by the administration in committee and froze 
one-half of US military aid of $85 million to El Salvador, making the entire 
amount subject to withdrawal should San Salvador refuse to engage in peace 
talks with the rebels but also providing for its complete restoration should the 
FMLN do likewise, direct operations against civilians or receive logistical 
support from other countries.98 On 19 October 1990 the US Senate voted 75-
24 in favour of the reduced package, and although the Bush administration 
chafed, it had to accept the congressional initiative. A policy that had been 
based on bipartisan agreements even under Reagan had effectively come 
under the authority of the legislature. This, however, was by no means 
simply the result of a more flexible team in the White House since there was 
now broad agreement across Washington (including the Pentagon) over the 
desirability of a settlement in El Salvador. Such a state of play resulted not 
simply from the military balance of forces within that country but also from 
the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in February, which had provided a 
clear regional confirmation of the shifts in the global order. Perhaps most 
important from the North American perspective was the fact that these 
readjustments occurred in the wake of the US invasion of Panama on 20 
December 1989, the consequences of which for Central American affairs 
remain extremely vital notwithstanding the disconcertingly peculiar political 
circumstances that surrounded it. 
The Panamanian Crisis 
William Leogrande's assessment of the invasion of Panama as being as 
successful for Bush as had been that of Grenada for Reagan is perfectly 
justifiable from both domestic and foreign policy perspectives; at least in the 
short-term.99 It does, however, mask a number of features of the two and a 
half year Panamanian crisis that presented Washington with considerable 
difficulties and occasionally acute embarrassment. This was true even after 
Christmas 1989, when US troops, having lost less than two-score men and 
secured most of the country, had General Noriega bottled up in the Vatican's 
embassy, protected only by the Nuncio and three nuns as he sought asylum. 
There, in front of a rapidly expanded press corps, the US forces blasted out 
high-volume rock music for 72 hours without interruption - an initiative 
described by a military spokesman as 'a way of introducing ambient sound 
to ensure the security of military communications'.100 Whilst both the 
action and the excuse were characteristic of General Maxwell Thurman, the 
US commander, they reflect a wider failure of US nerve and sophistication. 
Such a reaction was also evident in the doling out of 44,000 Combat 
Infantryman Badges (when only 2,500 troops actually engaged in combat) and 
the award to soldiers evacuated with sprained ankles of medals that in World 
War Two had been given only to troops experiencing at least 30 days and 
nights of combat.101 Perhaps, though, it was the spectacle of the most 
powerful government on the globe indulging in almost mediaeval 
demonisation of the Panamanian tyrant that was as telling as it was 
unedifying. 
Noriega, it may be remembered, was said by Pentagon sources to practise 
voodoo with vats of animal blood and entrails, to wear red underwear in 
order to ward off the evil eye, and to keep a witch's diary and a portrait of 
Hitler, in addition to manifesting the normal catalogue of deviant sexual 
practices and sadistic impulses attributed to wartime enemies.102 Of course, 
some propaganda of the most momentary value is to be expected under such 
circumstances, and there can be no doubt that Noriega was a most unsavoury 
person with a clutch of exotic tastes.103 However, his crimes are in no sense 
comparable to those of Saddam Hussein of Iraq - seven civilians were killed 
by Panamanian security forces during the six years he commanded them -
and his unfortunate dermatological condition already provided opponents with 
an easy enough target for abuse. Ugly, manifestly insecure and often clumsy 
in his political dealings, Noriega was never of such imposing stature or 
inscrutable demeanour that the possession of vermilion singlets might be 
deemed a decisive debility, even if they were donned for occult purposes. 
It is, of course, the case that in Panama Washington confronted a variant 
of the problem that it had itself contrived to present its opponents elsewhere 
in the region: how to reveal and exploit the contradictions of an authoritarian 
regime with a democratic facade and some space for legal opposition. 
However, the possibilities for opposition in Panama until 1988 were at least 
as great as those in Mexico, and certainly better than in Guatemala and El 
Salvador for the previous 15 years. Moreover, Washington had long 
acquiesced in the cavalier use by both General Omar Torrijos and Noriega of 
'front-men' as presidents (Demetrio Lakas, 1972-78; Aristides Royo, 1978-
82; Ricardo de la Espriella, 1982-84; Jorge Illueca, 1984; Nicolas Ardito 
Barletta, 1984-85; Erick Delvalle, 1985-88). The USA raised no complaint 
at the fact that the May 1984 election, which Ardito Barletta formally won by 
less than 2,000 votes, was palpably fraudulent.104 Neither was there any 
serious attempt to defend Ardito Barletta, when, in the face of his complaints 
at the brutal murder of leading oppositionist Hugo Spadafora, the president 
was ousted by Noriega in September 1985, despite the fact that this was the 
first Latin American coup of the Reagan administration and Ardito Barletta 
was a conservative close to Washington.105 Such acquiescence had very 
deep roots and was not readily reversed. When, during the course of 1986, 
this became inevitable the retreat was necessarily conducted under the 
broadest cover of propaganda and distraction. 
The fact that the problem was always presented as one about a man -
Noriega - rather than a system is understandable and, indeed, partly justified 
because as head of military intelligence from 1970 to 1983 and commander 
of the FDP since 1983 Noriega ran and represented the system in a more or 
less clandestine fashion. The virulence of the ad hominem attacks made by 
Washington from 1988 must, though, be related to the fact that it was 
revealed to have indulged Noriega's involvement in activities that were either 
illegal or advantageous to forces that the US government considered its foes. 
This was made plain by rapid but diligent journalistic investigation, 
subsequently vindicated by a trial that was scarcely 'fair' but amply supplied 
with hard evidence. Although there had been some inconclusive evidence 
linking Noriega to drug-dealing even as early as 1971, such activities were 
well-known to the DEA in mid-1982, when the General established ties with 
the Medellin cartel, and conclusively demonstrated by mid-1986, when 
Noriega's pilot Floyd Carlton started to testify to US officials.106 The DEA, 
however, continued to collaborate with Noriega and sent him letters 
congratulating him on his performance as late as May 1987. In similar vein, 
whilst the Carter administration immediately took Noriega off the CIA 
payroll, he was put back on under Reagan even though Vice-President 
George Bush, as President Ford's director of the CIA in 1976, possessed 
first-hand knowledge of Noriega's running of agents inside the US military 
and his ties with Cuba. The 'realist' understanding was that Washington 
could control the former and benefit from latter.107 Equally, the fact that 
Torrijos and Noriega had run guns to the Sandinistas in the late 1970s and, 
much more provocatively, to the Salvadorean FMLN in the 1980s was not 
viewed as disqualifying Noriega from overtures in 1985 by Colonel Oliver 
North for help in training the anti-Sandinista Contra forces.108 
There is little challenge in criticising the limited reward of such realpolitik 
or in discerning the wider damage caused by its assertively amoral 
presumptions. What is of greater interest for our purposes is the manner in 
which the USA came to 'divorce' its dictator in terms of Central American 
politics as a whole. The first important point here is that this derived from a 
split in the US right between those, led by Senator Jesse Helms, who were 
determined to attack almost any Panamanian leader following the 1977 canal 
treaty but had an excellent target anyway in Noriega, and those, such as CIA 
Director William Casey, who perceived the operational advantage of 
cooperating with Noriega as far outweighing any other consideration. Thus, 
in September 1986, just weeks before the Iran-Contra scandal blew up, 
Helms, who had been lobbied by the Spadafora family, refused to remove a 
relatively innocuous anti-Noriega amendment to the Intelligence 
Appropriations Bill.109 Moreover, he was soon supported in this by none 
other than Senator John Kerry, a man of almost totally opposed beliefs, 
because the Democrat could see that although Helms was striving to rewrite 
the history of the isthmus, he had chosen to do so over an issue that had cost 
US liberals much support in the 1980 election and yet could now be 
transformed into an anti-dictatorial campaign with which progressive opinion 
needed to be aligned. This was particularly the case in the wake of the 
overthrow of Marcos in the Philippines and Duvalier in Haiti in February 
1986.110 
In June 1986 The New York Times had published an article by Seymour 
Hersh that revealed much detail on Noriega's past but did not explore the 
links with North and the Contras which were precisely the ones that Noriega 
leaked in response to the Helms amendment in September.111 This reaction 
certainly advanced the revelations which so hurt the Reagan government, but 
it also sparked off a crisis for Noriega himself. It now seems that whilst all 
Central American politicians and senior military officers appreciate the 
divisions and cross-currents that prevail in Washington, Noriega 
misconstrued these and reacted against the 'right-left' alliance of Helms -
Kerry-Hersh by attacking the clandestine capers of the reactionary North-
Casey-Pointdexter grouping, not least perhaps because this last gentleman 
had travelled to Panama in December 1985 to admonish Noriega over his 
activities.112 In fact, Noriega's support for the Contra cause had been 
distinctly tepid from the start, for although Torrijos had been closely linked 
to Eden Pastora, who had left the Sandinistas in 1981, Noriega had naturally 
tighter ties with the Nicaraguan intelligence chief Tomas Borge, who was one 
of the strongest figures in the Sandinista regime and also friendly with 
Cuba.113 Henceforth, Noriega would be much more closely associated with 
Managua and Havana than with the counter-revolutionaries, and this, together 
with anti-oligarchic rabble-rousing, gave his government a leftist tint over its 
final two years. Washington suddenly found itself with a second opponent in 
the region as the image of Torrijos was revived. 
As Table One shows clearly, the Reagan administration was unable to 
solve the Noriega problem in short order. Indeed, during Reagan's last year 
in office Noriega not only survived extraordinary economic pressure, strike 
movements, attempted coups and a most clumsily applied carrot-and-stick 
policy on Washington's part; he even appeared to have fortified his 
position.114 This was achieved in no small part by maintaining formal 
democratic activity and holding the elections scheduled for May 1989. Here 
we might note a parallel with the experience of Nicaragua, from which 
Noriega distracted much unwanted US attention during the first 18 months 
after the Esquipulas accord. In both cases US pressure and the deployment 
of surrogate forces failed to shift an unfriendly regime and reflected poorly 
on Washington's authority within its own sphere of influence. Indeed, on the 
eve of his departure from office Reagan threatened that the USA would 
renege on the canal treaty if Noriega didn't quit - a reminder that whilst he 
had won the 1980 election in no small measure by attacking Carter's 
weakness over Nicaragua and Iran, he had previously campaigned even more 
vehemently against the treaty signed with Torrijos in 1977. 
When Bush came to office in late January 1989 Panama was the regional 
state over which the new president could least afford to be flexible both 
because of his own past associations with Noriega and because the existence 
of the canal introduced 'supra-ideological' factors where compromise was 
inadmissible. Nonetheless, it is perfectly possible that had Noriega permitted 
the opposition to win the May 1989 poll, a rapprochement of the type 
proposed several times over the previous year could have been secured, even 
though the February 1988 Grand Jury indictment was always going to make 
this embarrassing. By May 1989, however, the logic of dictatorship had 
tightened, and by October both local conditions - the Giroldi coup attempt -
and the rapidly shifting international scenario - near warfare between the 
state and the Medellin cartel in Colombia; the rapid collapse of the Soviet 
bloc - made intervention both necessary and a compelling option for the US 
administration. Noriega, then, acted as a lightning rod for the Bush 
government at a crucial moment in the negotiations between Managua and the 
Contras and just as the FMLN were preparing their offensive on San 
Salvador. In one sense Panama 'became' part of Central America, and in 
another it served as a proximate distraction. 
Both senses seem likely to remain valid, and not only because the 
important anomalies in Panama's status as a nation-state derived from the 
canal will persist until the end of the century. In geo-political terms Panama 
has been brought much closer to the rest of the region by the 1989 invasion 
and the subsequent reconstitution of its domestic affairs on terms comparable 
to those elsewhere. Similar problems exist, for instance, in terms of tense 
civil-military relations, the very fragile rule of law, and diminished 
ideological appeal on both the right - widely viewed as white-skinned sepoys 
of the gringos - and the left, which frittered away much of the political 
potential provided by US control of the canal in supporting the distinctly 
fairweather 'bonapartism' of Noriega as well as Torrijos. This might work 
to the benefit of a quite unusual force in Ruben Blades's Papa Egoro - a 
population formation that could only be nationalist and simultaneously exhibit 
strong pan-Caribbean features by virtue of being Panamanian. 
Table 1 
The Crisis in Panama, 1987-1989 
1987 
June 
1 FDP High Command announces retirement of Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera, second-in-
command. 
5 Diaz accuses Noriega of rigging 1984 poll and ordering murder of Dr Hugo 
Spadafora in 1985; riots; constitution suspended. 
9 Establishment of business-led National Civic Crusade (CCN) opposition movement. 
26 US Senate resolution calls for Noriega to stand down and for new elections; US 
embassy attacked. 
29 Commercial and school strikes against Noriega called by CCN. 
July 
1 OAS resolution calls on US to cease interference in internal Panamanian affairs, as 
guaranteed under 1977 Canal treaties. 
27 Col. Diaz arrested after assault on his house; formally retracts charges. 
August 
8 US military and economic aid suspended. 
31 Anti-Noriega strike movement fizzles out. 
1988 
February 
5 US Grand Jury, Florida, indicts Noriega on narcotics and racketeering charges; 
State Department not previously informed. 
10 Jose Blandon, former consul in New York, gives detailed testimony against Noriega 
to US Senate sub-committee. According to Assistant Secretary of State Elliott 
Abrams, Noriega is 'clinging to power by his fingertips'. 
26 After talks with USA, Pres. Erick Delvalle tries to remove Noriega as FDP 
commander and is himself promptly deposed ; National Assembly appoints Manuel 
Soli's Palma in his stead, but USA continues to recognise only Delvalle as legal head 
of state. 
March 
11 USA withholds payments to Canal Commission and freezes assets of Panamanian 
state in USA. 
16 News of abortive police coup provokes anti-Noriega riots and two-week general 
strike; FDP purged. 
19 State of emergency declared; banks closed (for nine weeks); 'Dignity Battalions' 
formed by Noriega, who holds secret talks with US envoys. 
20 US Secretary of State Shultz publicly urges Noriega to go into exile. 
22 Noriega offers to resign but insists upon choosing his own time. 
April 
1 Anti-Noriega strikes fizzle out. 
5 1,300 US troops sent to bolster 10,000-strong Canal garrison. 
8 Reagan uses 1977 Emergency Powers Act to impose economic sanctions. 
24 Soli's appoints leftist cabinet; Church requests end to US sanctions. 
27 US disowns plans to oust Noriega and suggests compromise. 
May 
9 Banks reopen; State Department official Michael Kozak holds secret talks with 
Noriega, offering to drop charges if he leaves country. 
The Crisis in Panama, 1987-1989 
July 
27 Reagan declares that covert destabilisation of Noriega regime has been authorised; 
CIA plan for coup blocked by US Senate Intelligence Sub-Committee out of fear that 
it would involve Noriega's murder. 
September 
15 Miami judge restricts information on charges against Noriega during US election 
campaign. 
1989 
January 
3 Encouraged by Washington, CCN decides to contest May elections. 
19 Reagan threatens to renege on 1977 treaty if Noriega remains in power. 
May 
7 Elections; widespread allegations of fraud to deny victory to ADOC candidate 
Guillermo Endara; protests repressed. 
10 Electoral tribunal annuls election results on grounds of public disorder and 
irregularities. 
11 2,000 US troops sent to Canal Zone. 
14 Pres. Bush declares that the FDP should 'do everything they can to get Mr Noriega 
out of there...I would add no words of caution'. 
17 OAS foreign ministers condemn election fraud and send investigative mission; 
opposition strike collapses. 
August 
16 Extensive US manoeuvres in Zone. 
31 Council of State dissolves National Assembly and names provisional government 
headed by ex-Attorney General Francisco Rodriguez; OAS mediation abandoned. 
October 
2 Gen. Maxwell Thurman named new head of US Southcom. 
3 Coup attempt by Major Moises Giroldi fails; US forces provide only limited 
support; Giroldi and others executed. 
December 
15 National Assembly declares war on USA and names Noriega 'maximum leader'. 
20 24,000 US troops invade in 'Operation Just Cause'. 
24 Noriega seeks asylum in Papal Nunciature. 
1990 
January 
3 Noriega surrenders to US forces, is shipped to Miami and indicted on drugs charges. 
Equally, Panama's peculiar economic position cannot readily be adjusted to 
those of the CACM/CEC states because of the key role of its banks. Perhaps 
most important of all, Panama's role in drug-trafficking has evidently not 
diminished since the invasion, placing it to the fore of what was for most of 
the Bush presidency a core issue in US domestic and foreign policy. 
Drugs and Corruption 
The National Drug Control Strategy launched on US television by President 
Bush in September 1989 had the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru and 
Bolivia as its key Latin American targets. Even though the Berlin Wall was 
still in place when Bush made his address, one can catch the movement in US 
priorities in the increase of Washington's military aid to these coca/cocaine 
producing countries from $81.5 million ($73 million to Colombia) in 1989 to 
$142.2 million in 1990 (with $141.3 million requested for 1991) when that 
to Central America was being reduced from $132 million to $107 
million.115 However, just as Washington leaned heavily on a counter-
insurgency mentality and the image of 'narco-guerrillas' for its Andean 
strategy, so too, in a curious inversion, did a 'decommunised' Central 
America present a muddled picture with a clear expansion of drug 
production, smuggling and even consumption in the early 1990s.116 
Panama, as has been indicated, remained exceptional, even by the 
standards of Latin America as a whole. According to some sources the trade 
in cocaine rose fourfold between 1990 and 1992. Seizures in this period 
amounted to 29,000 kilos, the courts identified 85 per cent of all arrests as 
being related to narcotics, and the country's 'historic' role of laundering 
Colombian 'narcodollars' seems to have been maintained without great 
inconvenience.117 Judging by the distinctly clumsy, but at least partly 
reliable, indicators for seizures of cocaine, Panama accounted for more 
activity than the rest of Central America combined, with 18,700 kilos in 
1992.118 Nevertheless, the increase elsewhere is notable, Guatemala 
becoming the world's third largest producer of opium (valued at $1.5 billion 
in 1989), with significant trade in marijuana ($38 million a year) and cocaine 
($192 million), even before the installation of the powerful US radar station 
at Trujillo (Honduras) enhanced the importance of many of the country's 
1,000 airstrips by more effectively scanning the Caribbean approaches to the 
USA.119 The DEA has been operating in Guatemala since 1986, not just to 
stage local operations - 3.7 tons of cocaine were seized in the first nine 
months of 1991 - but also to coordinate those in El Salvador (3,000 kilos 
seized in Acajutla in October 1991); Honduras (amongst several cases, the 
mistaken arrest by FUSEP of a DEA plant on a 'sting' in April 1991); and 
Costa Rica (the large joint 'Operation Talamanca' of June 1990).120 The 
rise in drug-related activity in Nicaragua may be attributed to the influence 
of exiles returning from Miami, the lifting of tight economic controls in 
general, or the repatriation of Contra enterprise, but as elsewhere it must also 
be explained in terms of Central America's location between the main 
production centres and the USA. This, together with the sharp increase of 
controls on the Mexican border, has made the region a natural entrepot. 
It has been said of Noriega that, 'drugs didn't corrupt (him); rather 
corruption led him to the drug dealers'.121 This is only partially true 
elsewhere, and there have been some notable cases of suspected smugglers 
being released by judges without outwardly persuasive cause. According to 
the Honduran Commission Against Drug Trafficking, 98 per cent of the 
suspects held in 800 cases in 1991 were set free by police or judges.122 In 
a similar vein, General Humberto Regalado was effectively vetoed by 
Washington from re-election as commander of the armed forces by revelation 
of accusations of embezzling US aid in October 1989, after he had avoided 
charges for trafficking drugs in 1988.123 Regalado's general political 
vulnerability was increased by the implication of several members of his 
family in drug-smuggling. This was also true of Guatemalan President 
Vinicio Cerezo, whose brother Milton was arrested for trading in dope and 
passports in March 1990, as had been Carlos Cabrera, brother of Vice-
President Alfonso Cabrera, whose candidacy on behalf of the Christian 
Democrats in the 1991 elections was greatly weakened by this association 
although he was never a strong contender.124 In both these instances the 
USA took a very public interest in the charges. By contrast, Washington's 
intervention in the extended and highly politicised scandal surrounding ex-
President Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica over his alleged receipt of campaign 
funds from US smuggler Lionel Casey - together with similar allegations 
made against Presidents Monge, Arias and Calderon - was conspicuous by 
its absence, perhaps because the accusations touched on Contra activities and 
US companies.125 In all events, Costa Rican politics have in recent years 
become prey to such charges although (or possibly because) legislative 
investigation has been markedly more efficient than elsewhere, not least, as 
Christopher Hitchens has wryly remarked, by declaring persona non grata 
Colonel Oliver North, General Richard Secord, Admiral John Pointdexter, 
Ambassador Lewis Tambs, and former San Jose CIA chief Joseph Fernandez 
for illegal activities conducive to drug-smuggling.126 
The exploitation of Costa Rica for asylum, money-laundering and 
relatively cheap pay-offs may have been the result of the country's solitary 
openness throughout the 1980s as well as its proximity to Panama. One 
should, though, be cautious in attributing to constitutional regimes a greater 
tendency to corruption when this may merely be broader in its reach and 
more readily publicised than under dictatorships. Moreover, there are a 
number of signs that reactions to and disputes over questionable conduct by 
public figures matter more now in Central American politics than for many 
years. In El Salvador the Christian Democrat (PDC) victory in the 1985 
legislative elections followed intensive publicity given by the party to the 
detention in Corpus Christi, Texas, of Francisco Guirola, a close friend of 
Roberto D' Aubuisson who was caught attempting to smuggle $5.8 million out 
of the USA to fund the ARENA campaign.127 However, the PDC's 
tightened control of government resulted in extensive accusations of 
corruption against them, despite the fact that President Duarte pointedly 
refused to allow the state to take responsibility for international assistance 
provided after the 1986 earthquake. Two factions developed within the party 
- and eventually split it - over the issues of personalism, malfeasance and 
lack of accountability. ARENA easily won the 1988 legislative elections, 
which it had contested on a platform that stressed the PDC's corruption 
almost as much as the need for neo-liberal reforms. Subsequently a 
congressional commission investigated charges against 15 members of the 
PDC (and three from ARENA) alleged to have stolen $43 million from public 
coffers, US AID, and funds destined for the Contras.128 Following 
ARENA'S capture of the presidency in 1989, Duarte himself was obliged to 
answer charges that he had misused C500,000 donated for earthquake 
relief.129 To some degree the tables were turned once again in the Autumn 
of 1992 when the government felt obliged to set up a new commission after 
the arrest of Heriberto Guerrero, director of the National Commission for 
Attention to the Displaced (CONADES), for malfeasance, and the existence 
of strong evidence of wrongdoing in the Supreme Court and the Rio Lempa 
Power Company (CEL).130 
In Guatemala, as we will see, non drug-related corruption was a key 
component in eroding the authority of the Serrano regime, dissolving the 
alliances upon which its survival depended, and sparking off the 1993 crisis. 
Equally, whilst the Sandinistas had for more than a decade resisted a 
formidable US propaganda offensive by dint of impressive ethical conduct in 
government, the reputation of the party leadership was only enhanced 
amongst the most diehard FSLN supporters by the awarding, after the 
electoral defeat, of expropriated houses to those - principally Sandinistas -
living in them on the day of the poll. Coming as part of a rapidly approved 
legal package - laws 85, 86, and 88 - that consolidated some 15,000 agrarian 
reform and other property titles, this measure was projected as part of a 
general effort to complete and protect the social gains of the 1979 
Revolution. However, it was almost immediately dubbed the 4pifiata ' (a doll 
filled with sweets to be burst open at childrens' parties) by the conservative 
press, and this image stuck. For some, such as Humberto Ortega, it was an 
overdue and justified retreat from idealism.131 For others, like his brother 
Daniel, the measure was initially defensible as a defiant 'last blast', whilst 
Comandante Bayardo Arce noted that the FSLN had previously donated 'its' 
property to the state.132 None of these presentations convinced a large 
sector of the Sandinista rank and file that the property seizures had improved 
the party's credibility - not least when Daniel Ortega's own large house was 
part of the deal - and the FSLN's conference at El Crucero in June 1990 
produced both criticism, led by the prominent militant Rafael Solis, and the 
establishment of a commission to investigate corruption amongst party 
officials and leaders.133 The pinata may perhaps be best seen as an 
expression of FSLN hubris insofar as the party had made no serious provision 
for defeat at the polls and had, therefore, to rush through compensatory 
measures that could otherwise have been implemented in a much more 
presentable manner. 
The experience of Honduras could not be more different, in that it has 
become positively characteristic of the political system that senior public 
figures extend irregular commerce in posts and influence to that in debt, 
lumber, coffee, cattle and precious stones.134 If the presence of the Contras 
- in significant numbers from 1983 to 1990 - provided some quite tough 
competition in terms of both contraband and access to US sources, the 
increased leverage this gave in bargaining with Washington provided 
appreciable compensation, as did the considerable 'spill-overs' and natural 
market distribution of US aid to the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries.135 
However, neither the windfall gains gleaned through the Contras nor the 
tensions caused by these greatly affected the traditional two-party system. 
After the 1985 poll one key mechanism through which this accommodated a 
variety of clientelist networks shifted from a multi-candidate party slate to the 
holding of primaries - a development that arguably increased the focus, if not 
the level, of muck-raking since only the Liberals held genuine contests in 
1988 and 1993. The 1989 campaign was marked by constant PN claims that 
the Liberals were funding their candidate Carlos Flores from state funds; the 
substantiated allegation by the Liberal daily Tiempo that leading PN figure 
Osmond Maduro had illegally received $7 million at preferential exchange 
rates from the Central Bank, then presided over by his brother Ricardo; and 
the no less persuasive charges, from the minority PINU and Christian 
Democrat parties, that $6.5 million of US AID funds paid to the North 
American firm Dual Associated to draw up a reasonably respectable electoral 
register had been, after three failed attempts, not only wasted but probably 
also spent to pad out the rolls.136 One other notable feature of Honduran 
politics in recent year has been the extremely flexible interpretation of 
constitutional ordinances with regard to high judicial office. Prior to the 
multi-candidate 1985 poll the Liberals had come badly unstuck over 
attempted congressional manipulation of the membership and powers of the 
Supreme Court by one faction of the party.137 In September 1991 the 
extreme right-wing PN leader Oswaldo Ramos Soto was removed by 
Congress as president of the Supreme Court for using it as a political 
platform in support of his campaign to become party candidate in the 1993 
presidential poll. Early in that year Ramos Soto finally achieved his ambition, 
without any formal contest, only for the PN members of Congress to remove 
their co-religionist Leonardo Matute Murillo as Attorney General in May 
because, it was claimed, the constitution prohibited him from simultaneously 
serving in the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). This was despite 
the fact that Matute had threatened corruption charges against those deputies 
who voted to remove him.138 The Liberals abstained from the vote, 
claiming that the PN was conducting its internal politics through the offices 
of the state, which at least had the merit of manifesting some transparency. 
Esquipulas 
By its very nature diplomacy is complicated and generally difficult to follow. 
This is certainly the case in the still partial settlement of the Central 
American conflict, but a few broad observations may still usefully be made. 
Perhaps the most obvious and important is that the various negotiations - but 
particularly those known as Esquipulas II - represented a significant setback 
for 'realism' or 'geographical fatalism', broadly understood as the acceptance 
of a static balance of forces and projection of optimum US armed capacity 
and influence as realpolitik.139 It is clearly not the case, however, that every 
phase of the settlement was achieved in the face of US opposition. We can 
contrast the nature of the Salvadorean negotiations of 1990-91 - when an 
essentially domestic treaty was brokered internationally and depended heavily 
upon Washington's conditional withdrawal of funds - with those for 
Nicaragua in 1987-89, which took the form of an international treaty that 
possessed important domestic implications, required direct internal 
agreements for its success, and was forced through with great difficulty since 
Washington (not a signatory) maintained funds to the rebels in open defiance 
of one of the treaty's core clauses. Nonetheless, the experience of the fiercely 
contested Nicaraguan settlement was in itself a factor in shifting the Bush 
administration's approach after 1990, not least because it had revealed the 
difficulties of sustaining an overt but informal international alliance against 
a protagonist that was far more flexible than had been anticipated. It was not, 
then, just the collapse of the Berlin Wall or the replacement of Reagan that 
permitted the region's main civil wars to be halted; the diplomacy had 
acquired a momentum of its own. 
The details of the Nicaraguan negotiations that lay at the heart of the 
Esquipulas process are laid out in Table Two. Whilst some on the left 
interpret this trajectory as one of virtually unconditional surrender by the 
FSLN, others have argued that it demonstrates considerable dexterity in the 
absence of any viable alternative.140 As has already been mentioned, 
diplomacy is scarcely heroic in the most tranquil of seasons, and it can easily 
appear cynical and capitulationist when conducted simultaneously with fierce 
fighting and acute human suffering. In the case of Central America, 
moreover, diplomacy had been seen through most of the 1980s as a futile 
activity because of the Reagan administration's effective veto of any serious 
negotiations with the Sandinistas or the Salvadorean rebels. This, it might be 
recalled, contrasted with the approach of the Carter government, which in 
1979 tried to resolve the Sandinista-led insurrection against Somoza precisely 
through mediation by an Organisation of American States (OAS) 
peacekeeping force. The Reagan shift was hardened by the Franco-Mexican 
recognition in September 1981 of the FMLN as a representative political 
force and the renewed Mexican effort in February 1982 to initiate talks on 
Cuba as well as Nicaragua and El Salvador.141 Nevertheless, the White 
House was obliged at least formally to address the initiatives opened early in 
January 1983 by the foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and 
Panama on the Panamanian island of Contadora, which subsequently lent its 
name to this group. 
The Contadora proposals, which first took form after a meeting of the 
group at Cancun in July 1983, rested on the laudable but then most 
impracticable of premises: on the one hand, the principle of equality of 
states, sovereignty and self-determination; and, on the other, that adherence 
to international rules of peaceful coexistence is infectious. Eschewing any 
direct attention to internal political matters - Mexico had fiercely resisted this 
over Nicaragua in 1979 - the Contadora group concentrated on control of 
arms supplies; removal of foreign advisers; creation of demilitarised zones; 
prohibition of activities destabilising neighbouring countries; and prohibition 
of any political or military intervention in another state.142 A list of 21 
proposals to these ends was formally presented to the region's foreign 
ministers in June 1984, together with a draft Act of Peace and Cooperation. 
However, only the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan governments reacted 
favourably; and by November only Managua declared that it would sign 
whilst Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras demanded more guarantees of 
Nicaraguan compliance, in line with Washington's view that Managua itself 
was the cause of the conflict. 
This alignment patently challenged the Contadora initiative, which now 
seemed destined to decompose into a forum where the regional allies of the 
USA could eternally amend worthy proposals without exercising any 
influence over the fighting. The US invasion of Grenada in October 1983 
gave force to the almost flippant opinion of the Kissinger Report, issued in 
January 1984, that, 'the interests of the four Contadora countries are not 
identical, nor coincidental to those of the United States, and hence the United 
States cannot use the Contadora process as a substitute for its policies'.143 
On the other hand, Contadora's identification of extraregional provocation 
as a major element in the conflict between Central American states was in 
keeping with the shift in Latin American political temper in the mid-1980s, 
and a support group comprising Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru was 
established in July 1985 to give the initiative some renewed energy. 
Table 2 
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1986 
May Esquipulas, Guatemala: presidential summit convened by Cerezo stalls after Arias-
Ortega argument over democracy; Contadora draft rejected by Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Honduras. 
1987 
Feb. 
June 
July 
August 
Nov. 
San Jose, Costa Rica: Arias calls presidential summit (excluding Ortega) to discuss 
plan balancing requirements for internal democratisation with ending of external 
support for rebels; this drops Contadora's focus on foreign bases, inter-state 
relations and formal sovereignty. Duarte and Ortega soon reverse their immediate 
rejection. 
Washington DC, USA: Arias visits Reagan, who criticises plan for indulging 
Nicaragua. 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras: twice delayed presidential summit presented with entirely 
new draft proposals; these withdrawn after Mexico pressures Hondurans; Arias 
proposals retabled; agreed that ceasefires be between governments and rebels; 
'suspension of military aid' to rebels becomes 'cessation of all aid', except for 
repatriation and resettlement. 
Washington: Reagan and Speaker Wright announce plan (5th) for 60-day Contra 
ceasefire but with rebels to continue receiving US aid. Esquipulas: presidents sign 
(7th) Arias plan as amended in July - known as 'Esquipulas II*; Wright supports this 
accord, which calls for five actions within 90 days:i) amnesty for irregular forces 
(who are to release their prisoners); ii) ceasefire; iii) promotion of pluralist 
democracy with freedoms of expression and association; iv) cessation of all aid to 
rebel forces, except for repatriation and relocation; v) prevention of use of territory 
by rebel forces attacking other states. 
Managua, Nicaragua (5th): Ortega reverses five-year policy and announces indirect 
talks with Contras. 
1988 
January 
Feb. 
March 
April 
May 
June 
Alajuela, Costa Rica (16th - 21st): presidential summit calls on USA to halt funding 
of Contras, for whom Reagan administration has requested $270 million from 
Congress; Ortega accepts lack of statement on role of Honduras in contravening 
clause on use of territory. 
Washington (3rd): House rejects reduced administration request of $36 million for 
Contras by a margin of eight votes. 
Sapoa, Nicaragua (21st): Government - Contra ceasefire for 60 days from 1 April 
whilst Contra troops relocate; many Contra prisoners amnestied; Contras permitted 
to join National Dialogue and political parties. 
Managua (17th): Government proposes permanent ceasefire, rejected by Contras, 
but Alfredo Cesar, rebel political leader, continues secret talks. 
Managua (26th - 28th): Government accepts direct talks on political conditions with 
Contras; Cesar backs off. 
Managua (9th): Contras demand right of conscripts to leave army when they choose, 
resignation of entire Supreme Court, and return of confiscated property whilst they 
retain arms until Jan. 1989; Government rejects demands and reveals talks with 
Cesar; Contras walk out. 
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Caracas, Venezuela (2nd): regional presidents (bar ailing Duarte) meet at 
inauguration of Carlos Andres Perez; Ortega agrees, with Castro's approval, to open 
elections, international observers and reform of electoral law in exchange for 
pressure over Contras from other states. Tesoro Beach, El Salvador (15th): 
presidential summit requests foreign ministers to liaise with UN over 
implementation of Esquipulas II within 90 days; Contras to be resettled under 
multilateral agreement, not bilateral accord between Nicaragua and Honduras; 
opposition to all aid to Contras reiterated; Nicaragua agrees to advance poll to Feb. 
1990. Washington (16th and 24th): Bush and Quayle cast doubt on Tesoro Beach 
agreements and reiterate support for Contras. 
Washington (24th): Bush announces agreement with Congress to provide Contra 
with aid until Nicaraguan elections as guarantee; Honduras requested to leave 
Contras unmolested; Esquipulas framework tacitly accepted on all other points. 
Managua (18th): electoral law reformed to enfranchise those who boycotted 1984 
poll; surprised parliamentary opposition claims this insufficient and walks out; US 
and regional governments cast doubt on FSLN motives. 
San Jose (14th): at meeting with Arias Ortega agrees to meet opposition collectively. 
Managua (3rd and 4th): Ortega holds 22-hour televised meeting with 20 opposition 
parties, which agree to participate in 1990 poll. Tela, Honduras (5th - 7th): 
presidential summit agrees disbanding of Contra forces by 5th December and calls 
on OAS and UN to establish bodies to observe (ONUCA) process and organise 
demobilisation (CIAV); Bush dismisses deadline but offers formal support; 
Nicaragua drops case against Honduras in World Court. 
Managua (21st): reinfiltrating Contras kill 18 reservists; Ortega cancels unilateral 
ceasefire to draw attention to continued clashes; US Senate votes 95-0 in 
condemnation of this. 
New York and Washington (9th - 21st): CIAV convenes Managua-Contra talks; 
Government accepts evacuation of only those Contra troops infiltrated since Tela 
agreement; Contras refuse to withdraw any forces. 
San Isidro de Coronado, Costa Rica (10th-12th): emergency presidential summit 
following rebel offensive in El Salvador; Ortega joins condemnation in order to gain 
support against Contra and agreement to demand that Contra aid is handed to CIAV; 
ONUCA mandate extended. 
This certainly required Washington to take seriously the hitherto 
underemphasised diplomatic side of its 'dual track' offensive against the 
Sandinistas, but it is perhaps unsurprising that the augmented group achieved 
little beyond ringing declarations, when Washington's surrogate war was 
achieving tangible results, thereby obviating the need for the direct 
intervention that preoccupied continental diplomats.144 
The shift in this scenario took place in 1986, with the election of Vinicio 
Cerezo as president of Guatemala, never a close Washington ally and so able 
1989 
Feb. 
March 
April 
July 
August 
October 
Nov. 
Dec. 
to operate more independently, and Oscar Arias as president of Costa Rica, 
emphatically a US friend and so able to grasp the importance of that element 
- internal political conditionality - which was scrupulously omitted from the 
Contadora proposals and yet would be crucial to Washington if it should have 
to settle for less than the complete annihilation of the FSLN. The possibility 
of such an eventuality was, of course, greatly increased with the breaking of 
the Iran-Contra scandal in November 1986, four months after the first 
meeting at Esquipulas which had closed acrimoniously because Arias had 
maintained Costa Rica's record of being the neighbour most openly critical 
of Nicaragua.145 
The Arias proposals of February 1987 shifted the diplomatic focus from 
interstate relations to establishing a linkage between greater internal reform 
and reduced external intervention. This change initially surprised and 
alienated Managua - which had been excluded from the meeting - as well as 
Washington and its local allies. However, the fact that it emanated from a 
state friendly to the USA, as well as echoing much of the rhetoric of 
conditionality employed by the Reagan administration in its negotiations over 
Contra funding with Congress, meant that the proposal could not be 
dismissed as readily as had been Contadora. Furthermore, the Iran-Contra 
scandal opened a critical fissure in the White House's relations with a 
Congress angry at having been cheated of its fiscal power in a matter that 
related to Central America. This much-televised rupture provided the 
governments of the isthmus with the unprecedented option of shifting 
diplomatic position and tentatively constructing a regional bloc whilst still 
retaining some support in Washington. The option, though, could only be 
properly realised in the detail, as a treaty was haggled over for real rather 
than simply postponed sine die at the behest of the USA. 
That process began in earnest on 7 August 1987, after two final efforts to 
sabotage the initiative (in Tegucigalpa the previous month, when Mexico 
prevented the bullied Hondurans from replacing the Arias draft entirely; and 
in Washington itself on 5 August, when House Speaker Jim Wright 
momentarily backed Reagan in trying to pre-empt the Central American 
accord with a poorly designed alternative that sought to give the impression 
of serious US concessions but offered many less than required by the Arias 
draft). Under such circumstances the mere fact that the Esquipulas II accord 
was signed is perhaps a more important achievement than for many other 
international treaties where signature bears a relatively low cost. However, 
as can be seen from Table Two, implementation was a sharply contested 
process in which Washington never surrendered its use of the Contras as 
security and as a bargaining chip for successive Sandinista concessions, 
which were often made against US expectations and to the bewilderment of 
a Contra leadership disorientated by insecurity to its rear in Washington and 
before it in Managua. 
Nicaragua lay at the heart of the Esquipulas process because its civil war 
had largely been generated by the USA and directly affected two further 
states (Costa Rica and Honduras). Equally, of course, the fact that 
Washington's opponents in Nicaragua controlled the national government 
meant that they could more easily enter into an international treaty. As we 
will see, the position in El Salvador was quite different, although 
undoubtedly influenced by the precedent established over Nicaragua as well 
as the broad framework given by Esquipulas. 
Refuge, Relocation and Return 
The experience of refuge is not new to Central America, but never, even at 
the time of the Spanish conquest, has it affected so many people as during the 
1980s.146 Most of the figures in Table Three are estimates, but even if we 
allow generous margins of error the impact of the regional civil wars and 
economic crisis is abundantly clear. Perhaps five per cent of the isthmian 
population perforce moved its place of residence between 1978 and 1993. 
With that movement those people underwent experiences far more exigent -
and generally traumatic - than those inferred by simple resettlement. 
Whether such movement entailed exile in a foreign country or not, it meant 
unsought departure from familiar surroundings and sources of economic and 
emotional support. In most cases this has been the result of fear of violence 
by military forces. In Guatemala, particularly, it has derived from a clear and 
detailed strategy by the army to destroy rural settlements and relocate their 
populations in strategic hamlets under its control. In other cases - notably in 
the USA - we might speak of 'economic refugees', but the 'push factor' is 
often far more complex and nasty than simple privation. 
The scale of the refugee experience in Central America outstrips that of 
South America a decade earlier, when the victims of dictatorship mostly went 
into foreign exile. Moreover, Southern Cone refugees were, with the possible 
exception of Uruguay, generally identifiable political opponents of the 
authoritarian regimes driving them out, rather than people 'in the way' of 
operations or occupants of combat or free-fire zones, which correspond much 
more to the rural and directly contested conflicts in the isthmus. In 
Guatemala, El Salvador and, to a lesser degree, the Atlantic coast of 
Nicaragua, the state's army often identified entire communities as 
'subversive', dealing with them en masse. One consequence of this has been 
refuge by community group, often across national borders to camps - mostly 
in Mexico and Honduras - run by the UNHCR. Government conviction that 
these communities are important political bodies, if not direct puppets of the 
rebels, is evident in their marked reluctance to permit resettlement on any but 
their own terms. 


In the case of Guatemala it took two years of negotiations before an 
agreement was finally reached in October 1992 for the return of 43,000 
refugees in camps in Mexico - a decade after the start of the counter-
insurgency operations that had driven these people from their predominantly 
highland homes. Until this agreement less than 8,000 of the estimated 
150,000 external refugees had returned over five years, most of them to a 
few villages in Huehuetenango.147 The October 1992 accord between the 
state and the refugees' organisation (CCPP) may be seen as indicative of both 
the form and the substance of the transitional period of Central American 
politics as new organisations negotiate preliminary rights for constituencies 
in limbo. In this case the CCPP secured state agreement to treat the returnees 
as civilians - no small achievement even under the tempered counter-
insurgency mentality prevailing within the military - and exempt from both 
military service and that in the civil patrols that had been so integral to 
military control in the countryside. Land and credit were promised, and 
implementation was subject to oversight and guarantees by the Church, the 
UN and the national Ombudsman for Human Rights. In August 1992, before 
such conditions could be secured, over 1,000 refugees who had re-entered the 
country on their own after ten years in Mexico were soon obliged to return 
there.148 In the Autumn of 1992 Rigoberta Menchu and other popular 
leaders had publicly advised against return on the grounds of insufficient 
guarantees, thereby drawing attention to the importance of this issue to the 
reconstitution of civil society and establishing the preconditions of 
citizenship. 
In a rather different vein, Richard Wilson has argued eloquently that it is 
mistaken to view the state - and especially the army - as simply 'alien' in 
highland Guatemala. At least with respect to the Q'eqchi' villages he has 
studied it is more than this, insinuating itself within the community and 
manipulating traditional customs and practices for political ends. As a 
consequence, the experience of violent upheaval and forced relocation on 
uncertain terms has been especially complex and noxious. Even very 
localised religious beliefs focused on mountain spirits have been prey to 
manipulation, and, of course, these are extremely difficult to sustain when 
communities are forcibly removed from their traditional (and thus sacred) 
homes.149 Yet here too one observes an exceptional resilience that should 
be weighed against the hardships endured by both internal and external 
refugees. Perhaps the most impressive examples of this are the Communities 
of Populations in Resistance (CPRs) representing perhaps 15,000 people who 
have been living an almost completely clandestine existence in northern 
Quiche for the better part of a decade. Many more people in the countryside 
have adopted a semi-nomadic life, fleeing the presence of the army in a 
manner similar to the 4guindas' undertaken by communities in the combat 
zones of northern and eastern El Salvador in the mid-1980s. All the evidence 
is that senior military commanders, particularly in Guatemala, are more 
aware than the politicians that the experience of these groups has altered their 
identity in a manner that is only partially recognisable in terms of orthodox 
European ideologies. 
The scale of repatriation and resettlement is not fully evident from Table 
Three because this largely occurred after 1990. Moreover, the ending of 
hostilities has been neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for return. 
Costa Rica, which has itself created no exiles to speak of, has some 100,000 
undocumented inhabitants, in large measure because of the parlous state of 
the Nicaraguan economy.150 On the other hand, El Salvador witnessed a 
significant flow of mass repatriations before the final ceasefire - in many 
cases against government instructions. Salvadorean resettlement began 
tentatively in October 1987, in the wake of Esquipulas, involving some 7,500 
people over the following year and 27,000 by 1991.151 By early 1992 almost 
all Salvadorean refugee camps had been closed, but by the same token some 
200,000 people in the country lacked official documentation, which, apart 
from complicating many aspects of life in a traditionally bureaucratic society, 
posed questions as to their ability to participate in formal political life. 
Nevertheless, both the flow and the initiative of returning Salvadorean 
refugees may be identified as key factors in the process of pacification, 
notwithstanding the sometimes sharp clashes over the place, timing and form 
of repatriation. Perhaps the most prominent example in this respect is the 
establishment of Ciudad Segundo Montes in the department of Morazan, 
where refugees returning from camps in Honduras founded a community that 
was embattled and somewhat artificial in its foreign funding but also 
possessed of exemplary qualities in the organisation of health, education and 
economy. Just as important was the exceptional manner in which Segundo 
Montes straddled the formal and informal states administered by the San 
Salvador government and the FMLN, providing a momentarily famous 
illustration of changes in outlook and conduct that were normally expressed 
in more surreptitious, even subterranean, manner. The point here is less that 
hundreds of thousands of people have been radicalised by being uprooted and 
subjected to duress for the better part of a dozen years; it is, rather, that such 
affiliations have not simply been neutralised by resettlement. It is not sensible 
to suppose that relocation will simply permit a spatially reordered return to 
the status quo ante, except, perhaps, in the case of Honduras, which has a 
substantially reduced refugee problem - largely managed and funded by the 
USA and the UN - and so few exiles of its own that their return from the 
Spring of 1991 made no economic and minimal political impact.152 
In Nicaragua many of those displaced by the war themselves participated 
in it as combatants. Their response to the failure of the Chamorro 
government to provide the land and credit promised from April 1990 onwards 
was, not unnaturally, renewed recourse to violence. Here the problems of 
military demobilisation overlap substantially with those of resettlement and 
'integration' - perhaps a perverse term to be used in this context given that 
Contra and Sandinista troops were at the heart of national politics during the 
1980s. As so often in such cases, there has been much exploitation of volatile 
conditions to engage in simple banditry, which has a long history in 
Nicaragua. Nonetheless, restitution of public order through 'exemplary' 
repression of the type meted out by the EPS against its own ex-comrades in 
Esteli in July 1993 is likely to yield a strictly Pyrrhic victory unless backed 
by finite concessions to demands of widely acknowledged reasonableness. 
The problem, predictably, has been that of funding resettlement 
programmes at a time of sharp economic recession. Moreover, erstwhile US 
largesse towards military supplicants was not only reduced by operational 
redundancy and formidable competition from elsewhere in the world; it was 
also succeeded by a new phase of congressionally-driven conditionality. This 
was most tightly counter-productive and vindictive in the case of Nicaragua, 
where by mid-1993 the position had become sufficiently severe for the 
freezing of relatively modest amounts of North American assistance to 
destabilise the national political system as a whole.153 However, elsewhere 
too the old saw that peace carries a lower price-tag than war and may be 
variably funded without undue risk in post-bellum conditions was being 
tested. Whilst there were few signs outside of Nicaragua of resumed or 
escalated hostilities, failure to address the economic consequences of the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people was as threatening in the 
long-term as it was plausible and cheap in the short. It is surely the case that 
Protestant evangelism has flourished amongst these sectors, the same right-
wing groups in the USA that subsidised the Contras in the 1980s now 
propagating a message of self-denial and subordination with rather more 
modulation, but the claims for the depth and extent of their influence have 
been made so forcefully as to encourage some caution, particularly in terms 
of the relation between formal subscription and profound commitment.154 
Neither local governments nor Washington can assume that war-weariness, 
hunger and deprivation have readily translated into ideological submission. 
Elections and the Rule of Law 
During the 1980s much of the comment on Central American elections was 
polarised between those who saw them as 'demonstration polls' designed by 
the USA to throw a veil over essentially dictatorial structures, and those who 
continuously celebrated them as manifestations of a burgeoning democratic 
culture. Apart from anything else, these approaches did little to develop the 
region's notably weak psephological skills, with the result that it was very 
hard to obtain solid evidence either to support such views or to substantiate 
the plausible hypotheses that even unfair elections produce some competition 
of consequence and that open polls may keep societies closed. It is, though, 
noteworthy that the mechanisms and culture of elections themselves became 
issues of sharp contention during the decade. With the exception of Costa 
Rica, this focus of controversy may be attributed to three main factors: the 
much greater use of liberal political procedures to legitimise authoritarian 
regimes than was the case in South America in the 1960s and 1970s; the 
holding of polls in the midst of civil wars; and the single-minded, but highly 
selective, attention paid by Washington to elections in presenting its regional 
policy. 
These distinct but complementary currents lie behind the significant change 
in Central America's formal constitutions, either through the introduction of 
completely new political charters (El Salvador 1983; Guatemala 1985; 
Nicaragua 1987) or through important reforms (Honduras in 1981 and 1982 
to the constitution of 1965, and Panama in 1978 and 1983 to the constitution 
of 1972). Between 1980 and the end of 1993 there were in the region 25 
separate electoral contests at national level (Appendix Ten). Since 1987 every 
country except Panama has kept to its formal (or in the case of Nicaragua, 
legally altered) electoral calendar. It is also of some importance that during 
this period each country witnessed at least one presidential victory by an 
opposition party, all of these victories being respected - again bar that in 
Panama in May 1989.155 
On the other hand, as indicated in Appendix Eleven, levels of popular 
abstention were sufficiently high as to cast serious doubt on the locally-
perceived meaningfulness of this conduct. Whilst there might be a presentable 
4contentment thesis' for low voter turn-out in some parts of the world - even 
the USA, despite notorious difficulties over registration - this is scarcely 
applicable to Central America; and in Costa Rica, the one consistently 
functioning liberal democracy, participation rates are complicated by 
mandatory voting since 1962 (still producing an average abstention rate of 19 
per cent).156 In the case of Guatemala, for example, blank votes topped the 
poll with 23 per cent of those cast in the constituent assembly elections of 
1984 which followed six years of extensive armed conflict and nearly 15 
years of regimes headed by army officers (four elections and two coups). 
Low popular identification with either the process - as participation - or the 
outcome - as contestation - of subsequent polls is fully evident in abstention 
rates that never fell beneath 37 per cent of registered voters and which rose 
to 70 per cent in the partial municipal elections of May 1993, which were 
flagrantly manipulated by the ruling MAS.157 In the case of Guatemala the 
argument that abstention derives from lack of representation is compelling 
since no authentically radical organisation has been permitted to contest a poll 
since November 1950, and the incentives for tactical voting for the centre 
were diminished by the depressing record of the Mendez Montenegro (1966-
70) and Cerezo (1986-91) governments. The introduction of a second, run-off 
round in presidential polls has done little to improve participation. This was 
also true in El Salvador, where an important current of the left that had 
engaged in electoral politics in the 1970s under military supervision 
attempted to contest the elections of 1989 and 1991 under extremely 
disadvantageous conditions. 
Gramsci once famously remarked that elections were only the end of a long 
process, and the left has traditionally stressed the process, usually at the cost 
of misjudging the skills and institutions required for elections (which are, of 
course, as much the start and middle as the end of any process, even if it is 
in their nature to be celebrated periodically and thus be subject to a 
particularly chronological reification). In this regard it is worth noting that 
even parties, such as the Guatemalan Christian Democrats (DCG), that have 
participated in deeply flawed electoral systems have thereby acquired 
operational skills and systems lacking in excluded organisations. Age and the 
attendant familiarity and loyalty have been core assets for established parties, 
even where failure to win office has precluded the distribution of rewards or 
threatened a sense impotence and exhaustion.158 This pattern is evident 
elsewhere in Latin America too, but it may be particularly strong in the 
immediate post-dictatorial period, when popular apprehension places a 
premium on 'safe' opposition rather than the qualitatively new. Certainly, 
some such features can be discerned in the initial advantage of the 
Guatemalan DCG over the neo-conservatives of the UCN; in support for 
Chamorro, rather than the ultramontane elements of UNO, in Nicaragua; in 
the resilience of Honduran Liberalism; and in the clear failure of ARENA to 
monopolise Salvadorean conservatism. 
Against this, the promise of change and the opportunities for a belligerent 
populism have clearly affected the character and outcome of Central 
American political contests since the late 1980s. Such a process manifestly 
began on the right of the ideological spectrum - ARENA; Mayor Aleman of 
Managua; a revived Rios Montt in Guatemala - but the conditions are little 
less propitious for the left where it is capable of staging a campaign 
(everywhere bar Honduras) and participating in the poll (everywhere bar 
Guatemala and Honduras) however poor the short-term prospects for success 
might be. Outside of Costa Rica, this experience - both of authentic 
campaigning and of different resulting governments and balances of official 
power - was by mid-1993 still very slight in terms of setting patterns of 
political custom and expectation. No significant new political force had 
appeared at all after a decade in Honduras. In Nicaragua the historic poll of 
1990 was the result of a negative vote that might prove either to be unique or 
the beginning of an 'exchange pattern' of administrative replacement. 
(Although it proved impossible to secure this between the Liberals and 
Conservatives between 1893 and 1936.) In El Salvador the artificial contest 
between the PDC and ARENA during the 1980s had yet to be altered by 
genuine participation on the part of the left. And in Guatemala neither the left 
itself nor the traditional institutions of the state were ready to hazard the 
entry of radicalism into formal competition. One must, therefore, talk of 
'pacification' in terms of political transition, rather than the consolidation of 
liberal democratic institutions and culture, the development of which will 
depend acutely upon the electoral calendar of the mid-1990s as well as deeper 
shifts in economy and society.159 
One often overlooked feature in this regard is the growing profile of local 
and regional electoral contests and politics. Although real controversy over 
the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) has not extended beyond 
Costa Rica, which traditionally fights shy of regional organisations and 
possibly contagious commitments, accelerated economic integration, 
international treaties that directly affect popular interests, and the tenuous 
hold of national identity and ideology suggest potential for an isthmian 
political forum.160 Of much more immediate concern to ordinary folk, 
however, was the redistributive resource and relatively modest demand-
performance gap offered by local administration, which also demonstrated 
occasional signs of balancing, rather than replicating, ideological tendencies 
on the national stage. Such a tendency in El Salvador during the 1960s and 
1970s developed into an especially strong national challenge by reformist 
forces, and it would not be exotic to imagine contemporary Salvadorean 
voters supporting the FMLN ticket for local government more extensively -
at least in the early stages - than for national office. Certainly, the FMLN 
itself recognised the importance of local politics and administration in the 
mid-1980s, its commanders expending much energy in attacking provincial 
mayors on the grounds that their offices served as counter-insurgency centres 
and were thus legitimate military targets. Although by 1989 the guerrillas had 
only killed 11 mayors, nearly half of those elected resigned their posts, and 
some 64 lived and worked away from their homes. 
In Guatemala a weaker but not dissimilar effort in the 1970s to forge a 
reformist challenge out of a foothold in local government was bloodily 
thwarted, and given the economic and political importance of services, 
particularly transport, in Central America's largest city, this may still be too 
dangerous for a power bloc with a keen memory of the riots of the late 1970s 
and the 1980s. All the same, local politics, especially in the capital cities, can 
no longer be expected to be a simple administrative echo of national 
government. 
The polls scheduled at all levels for the 1990s will undoubtedly test the 
tenuous stability and probity of electoral administration, and indeed the 
institutionalisation of the judiciary as a whole. Even in Costa Rica, where the 
electoral authorities have been genuinely independent since 1949, the office 
of Ombudsman was controversially created in 1993, and some members of 
the Supreme Court displayed distinctly suspect behaviour. Political 
manipulation of the courts has been most explicit in Guatemala, Honduras 
and El Salvador, where there was clear basis to opposition charges of a lack 
of division of powers.161 In the cases of Honduras and Guatemala, control 
of the judiciary has remained as overtly political in the constitutional period 
as under the dictatorships, leading to open conflict over spoils (Honduras 
1985; Guatemala 1993), extensive decay of the notion of impartiality, and 
need for wholesale reform. In El Salvador the FMLN succeeded in including 
in the peace settlement the removal of the government's control of a majority 
of the appointments to the Supreme Court, a more equitable system to be 
introduced in 1994. Yet the conduct of many trial judges in a period still 
dominated by fear and threats remained highly questionable and widely 
criticised, not least in the USA. According to a report submitted in 1983 to 
the US Secretary of State by US Judge Harold Tyler, 4A handful of 
inexperienced, undereducated and occasionally corrupt prosecutors represent 
a society that seems to have lost its will to bring to justice those who commit 
crimes against it. Intimidation and corruption of prosecutors, judges and 
juries are widespread.' 162 This position had not altered a great deal by the 
end of the 1980s, and prevailed to a similar degree in Honduras and 
Guatemala. On the other hand, we should note that in El Salvador (Jesuit 
case) and Honduras (Ricci Mabel Martinez case) a very few military figures 
have been successfully tried for murder, breaking a tradition of impunity that 
has either subsisted upon a fearful immobilism or been explicitly sanctioned 
by amnesty. The regional treatment of war crimes remains undeveloped and 
is likely to be distended, even if conditions vary significantly from those in 
South America, where the mechanisms for conducting and terminating 
judicial review of human rights violations by the armed forces continue to be 
contested and lie only partially within the realm of official justice. However, 
both those examples and that of El Salvador clearly indicate that the 
negotiation of the procedures for settling such matters lie at the very heart of 
the process of pacification. 
The breadth of formal possibilities in this regard is quite impressive, 
although in practice it is unlikely that any Central American model might 
replicate the experiences of Uruguay (popular plebiscite); Argentina 
(deadline for indictments, or 'punto final'); Chile (proposed hearing of 
evidence in camera); or Bolivia (escape of dictator in midst of trial). There 
is, though, a strong tendency to emulate the Southern Cone's emphasis on 
revelation of the facts ('truth' in the face of disappearance and silence) and 
a stress on acquiring and expressing knowledge of crimes that very frequently 
cannot be brought to court. It is possibly the case that this movement - most 
pronounced in El Salvador, evident in Honduras and likely to develop in 
Guatemala - has roots in customs engendered by Roman law, most 
particularly the denuncia to an investigating magistrate. However, it plainly 
also derives from a popular need for public judgement in the likely absence 
of punishment, through de facto or de jure pardon. Effectively absent from 
the Esquipulas accords, this issue has failed to come to the fore in Nicaragua, 
where the conservative opposition was not physically persecuted to any 
appreciable degree by the Sandinistas, except insofar as the FSLN came 
under pressure to release Contra and ex-National Guardsmen prisoners. By 
contrast, the Salvadorean FMLN placed the matter at the centre of their 
demands during the negotiations of 1990-91, and could hardly have 
acquiesced in the eventual amnesty introduced by the Cristiani government 
had there not been an investigation and publication of the major war crimes 
committed over the previous ten years by the (internationally staffed) Truth 
Commission (April 1993) and a review of the human rights and professional 
records of the members of the officer corps by the (Salvadorean) Ad Hoc 
Commission (September 1992). The appointment of a similar Ad Hoc 
Commission in Honduras was more surprising and a direct - albeit pre-
emptive -initiative on the part of the Callejas government, which rather 
adroitly shadowed popular sentiment on this matter. 
The experience of Guatemala has been both less and more developed, in 
the sense that during the eight years of civilian administration the military 
easily resisted even discussing any future treatment of the extensive violation 
of human rights in the 1980s - under Cerezo only one case of the 3,000 
reported went to court. And yet in the crisis of 1993 it was precisely the 
office of Ombudsman, virtually bereft of powers other than to receive 
allegations and evidence, that commanded greatest public respect, and its 
current occupant, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, who eventually became president 
of the republic.163 An apparently minor, 'safety valve' position initially 
adopted to produce a low conflict response to human rights pressure, had 
been progressively transformed by internal and external influence into a core 
catalyst for change. Yet even before this occurred the post was being adopted 
elsewhere in the region, including Costa Rica, as it became evident to 
governments that human rights questions were rapidly losing their ideological 
slant, and any form of injustice administered in the name of the state was 
liable to provoke complaint. 
It is a partial but still telling feature of Central American public life in the 
early 1990s that governments felt the need to legitimise themselves through 
such moves, even at the risk of their 'escalation' into mobilisation for civil 
rights, the rule of law and a genuine division of powers. At the same time, 
longstanding retention of the formal judicial apparatus, fetishisation of 
procedure, and the not unconnected conviction that only new legislation can 
harm vested interests may combine to offset the threatening or corruption of 
judges, the intimidation or absence of juries, popular fatalism, and the lack 
of resources. 
The final but crucial element in such a combination is external, in the form 
of international law as well as the mediation and arbitration provided by 
foreign and international bodies (UN, OAS, International Court of Justice 
etc.), as distinct from the variable political objectives but constantly partisan 
pressure exercised by the USA. The important role played by the UN after 
1990 - predominantly in El Salvador - also, of course, reflects a post-cold 
war global tendency. Since there has been a marked narrowing of the terms 
of peace-making and a corresponding increase in the importance of reciprocal 
compliance, the UN's particular strengths in observation and documentation 
are readily applicable. 
Yet as the crises of 1993 in both Guatemala and Nicaragua amply 
demonstrated, where there is either a major imbalance between the forces in 
contention (URNG and armed forces in Guatemala) or a collapse in trust 
between the parties in conflict (Recontras and UNO against government and 
FSLN in Nicaragua) other external agents are required to cajole them into 
productive exchange. The notion that this can only be done decisively by the 
USA is superficially compelling but not wholly convincing, if only because 
neither its skills nor its policy over the last fifteen years have been devoted 
to peace-making except via threat, veto and outright coercion. This, allied 
with a much diminished - indeed, an irresponsibly diminished - interest in 
Central American affairs in Washington under Clinton, suggests a 'long-stop' 
role whereby, as in the Nicaraguan kidnap affair, the USA signals a general 
limit to its tolerance but remains content to allow other agents - in this case 
the region's foreign ministers - to act as principal arbitrators for what are 
viewed as essentially 'tactical' transgressions. Where such matters are 
incremental and do not relate to any formal agreement, as in the case of 
Guatemala, it is very far from clear that there exists in Washington the 
political interest or will to go beyond intermittent criticism or the individual 
initiatives of concerned diplomats. 
Nicaragua 
More than three years after Violeta Chamorro defeated the Sandinistas at the 
polls Nicaragua appeared to be on the brink of civil war and seemed to be 
pacified only in the most tenuous and formal sense. In the first eight months 
of 1993 over 300 people were killed in armed clashes provoked by outlaw 
former members of the Contra and EPS, some 2,000 of whom roamed in the 
north and centre of the country.164 Moreover, the central political 
institutions of the post revolutionary state were sharply disputed: the National 
Assembly remained boycotted by the bulk of the parties that comprised the 
victorious UNO alliance of 1990, one of their major demands being the 
removal of General Humberto Ortega as chief of the EPS, which was much 
diminished but still very powerful. This was also the central demand of both 
the ex-Contras, who kidnapped 37 people in the northern town of Quilali in 
August 1993, and of US Senator Jesse Helms, who in June 1992 attacked the 
Chamorro administration for its tacit alliance with the FSLN and succeeded 
in freezing $104 million in US aid for the better part of a year. Helms's 
invectives against the centrist concertacion stitched up between the Chamorro 
team and the Sandinistas acted as a green light to the right-wing extremists 
in UNO as well as to the remnants of the Contra force, the senator's capacity 
to cut off finance to Managua having an effect not dissimilar to Colonel 
North's direct funding of Managua's enemies in the 1980s. The prospects for 
any authentic pacification seemed bleak in the extreme when individual US 
mavericks, even specimens as resolute as these, could exercise such an 
influence on the affairs of a nominally sovereign country. But the deeper 
cause for this corrosive and enervating instability was Central America's 
most profound economic crisis (Appendix Six), which Chamorro's 
administration could not alleviate even with such US aid as it did receive. 
This collapse in both production and employment was felt most acutely by ex-
combatants, very few of whom had received the land and credit - still less the 
severance pay - promised in numerous agreements but most particularly in 
the 'Managua Protocol' of 30 May 1990 between Antonio Lacayo, the new 
minister of the presidency, and the leading commanders of some 18,000 
Contra troops. Three years later the rump of this force was engaged in 
banditry - as were perhaps 1,000 of the 65,000 EPS troops demobilised over 
the same period - for which neither international diplomacy nor ideological 
abuse provided a practical response. At the same time, the acute social 
tension caused by the withering economic position obliged the FSLN to 
support popular demands and mobilisation against the government, as in the 
transport strike of September 1993. This too led to deaths and renewed 
polarisation, to all intents and purposes ending the very fragile truce upon 
which governability had hitherto rested. 
Such an image of political decay and collapse of public order in the midst 
of the pauperisation of the populace is not inaccurate. But neither is it the 
entire picture, and it may readily be distorted for the purposes of interested 
homilies about post-revolutionary chaos or subversive accords with 
Sandinismo. Even at a very high cost, the first three years of the Chamorro 
government did succeed in demobilising some 100,000 soldiers, removing the 
direct military threat to the post-1979 state. Whilst law and order remain 
extremely fragile in rural Nicaragua, conflict is in no sense comparable to 
that witnessed during the Contra war of 1981-89, when, according to the 
EPS, over 20,000 counter-revolutionary troops were killed.165 
Furthermore, the prospects for complete collapse into renewed civil war were 
markedly lessened for a substantial period by what amounted to a 
reconstitution of the 1978-79 anti-Somoza alliance between the FSLN (led by 
the Tercerista Ortega group) and a reformist sector of the bourgeoisie, known 
now as the 'Las Patinas' group, headed by Chamorro and largely staffed by 
closely related members of a technocratic elite to whom the loud revanchism 
of the UNO traditionalists was counter-productive and even unseemly.166 
This renewed accord was at no stage enshrined in a formal and 
comprehensive document, and it remained sharply contested both within the 
FSLN, which had perforce been opened to internal debate since February 
1990, and inside the government, which by September 1993 was ready to 
alter the leadership of the EPS and even to enter into open confrontation with 
Sandinismo. Nevertheless, one may clearly discern the importance of an 
earlier convergence in a number of encounters that suggest the commonly 
identified 'historical watershed' of the February 1990 elections to be rather 
less decisive than it initially appeared. Indeed, apart from strong elements of 
continuity between the deflationary Sandinista economic policy of the late 
1980s and that of the more sharply anti-populist Chamorro administration, it 
is also possible to detect an internal deepening of the Esquipulas process 
(outlined in Table Two) in which the election marked less a qualitative 
turning point than a practical consolidation, through a centrist concordat, of 
agreements previously struck between polarised antagonists. It is easy to 
over-emphasise this argument as a form of solace against the doleful reality 
of Nicaragua in the mid-1990s, but it should at least be rehearsed carefully 
as a counter-weight to the still fiercely ideologised perspectives inherited 
from the 1980s, sustained by necessary rhetoric, and fortified by memories 
of loss, heroism and suffering instilled by a decade of civil war. 
The differences between the Chamorro/Lacayo group and the right-wing 
of UNO were clear from the very start. On the day he handed office over to 
Dona Violeta, Daniel Ortega published a newspaper article in Spain in which 
he declared that UNO possessed 'an extremist faction, led by Vice-President 
Godoy, which sees our election defeat not as part of a normal transfer of 
power but as a victory for the counter-revolution. They want heads to fall. 
There can be no doubt that our position will be tough, intransigent and 
combative with anybody who wants to cut off our heads. Mrs Chamorro and 
her team, by contrast, believe that what has occurred is a popular vote within 
the framework of the Nicaraguan constitution. They approach the transfer of 
power as a means by which to strengthen democracy and to obtain the 
complete disarmament of the Contra'.167 This distinction was by no means 
shared within the ranks of the FSLN, some of whom saw the matter as a 
temporary tactical divergence of no real consequence.168 However, Ortega's 
position was clearly based on the highly controversial 'Transition Protocol' 
signed on 27 March 1990 between Lacayo (effectively Chamorro's prime 
minister) and Generals Humberto Ortega and Joaquin Cuadra (the EPS chief 
of staff and Lacayo's cousin). Although rather ignored as a result of the 
furore over the pinata and the general aftershock of the election result, this 
accord provided critical guarantees to both the FSLN, which committed itself 
to work with Chamorro to 'achieve lasting peace and democracy within a 
constitutional framework', and the government, which placed on paper its 
recognition of the 'integrity and professionalism' of the EPS and its guarantee 
of the 'existing structure and leadership' of the armed forces.169 Although 
Chamorro had made it plain that troop numbers would be drastically reduced, 
it was evident that she had no intention of replacing Sandinista officers with 
their old Contra foes, thereby removing a major preoccupation of the officer 
corps. Indeed, four days before the signing of the protocol, Lacayo entered 
into another agreement with the Contra leadership in Honduras under which 
the 9,000 troops outside Nicaragua and the 4,000 within it would be 
demobilised by the time Chamorro took office.170 This proved impossible, 
and a further agreement (19 April) stipulated 10 June as the (also insufficient) 
deadline, but the principal danger - that of a direct armed clash - was clearly 
being addressed seriously by the new government. 
The 'Transition Protocol' infuriated Godoy and the UNO traditionalists, 
who might not have been seeking quite the kind of pogrom intimated by 
Daniel Ortega but certainly wished to see a wholesale purge of the military. 
As a result, UNO split immediately after Chamorro assumed office, only two 
of the 16 members of her first cabinet being militants of the 14 mainstream 
parties of this highly fractious alliance.171 Nonetheless, with 51 deputies 
against the FSLN's 39 and more than three times the number of provincial 
mayors, neither effective exclusion from the cabinet nor the progressive 
decommissioning of the counterrevolutionary forces appeared to be an 
immediately critical development for UNO. It was between May and July 
1990 that the fault-lines became more starkly evident. 
As might be anticipated, the catalyst for open political conflict was the 
fiercely deflationary policy of the Chamorro government and the response of 
the Sandinista-dominated trade union movement, the FNT. The first 
encounter occurred in mid-May, when some 30,000 state employees staged 
a national strike in demand of a 200 per cent pay rise to compensate for 
successive devaluations. Offered only 60 per cent, the workers occupied eight 
of the state's 11 ministries, brought the capital's transport to a halt, and 
engaged in running battles with the police. Apprehensive about the 
Sandinistas' promise to 'rule from below', Chamorro and Lacayo backed off, 
settling at 100 per cent. However, the Contra leadership used this partial 
retreat as an excuse to put a brake on demobilisation, and in July the FNT 
returned to the fray. This time some 85,000 workers were involved in an 11-
day general strike in support of a $200 per month pay claim. The action 
rapidly led to street fighting and the cutting of telephone, electricity and 
water supply in Managua. Six people were killed and over 100 injured before 
the threat of a major incursion by Contra troops and government charges of 
a planned Sandinista coup produced a settlement.172 It was at this point that 
the FSLN leadership stepped back from encouraging popular mobilisation and 
made good its commitment under the protocol of 27 March. In fact, some of 
the more revisionist members of the party led by Rafael Solis perceived the 
July mobilisation as fundamentally irresponsible, and Humberto Ortega made 
much of the fact that the EPS had supported the police in restoring order. 
Godoy, by contrast, viewed Chamorro's settlement as the crossing of the 
Rubicon: 'She has caved in to the terror of the Sandinista front. She has 
abandoned all the people who backed her government. This is a process of 
suicide.'173 
Between the strikes of May and July the FSLN held an important assembly 
at El Crucero in which the election defeat was analysed and a process of self-
criticism and policy revision begun. This meeting did not unambiguously 
assist the FSLN's management of the dilemmas presented by opposition in 
that the predictable criticism of the party's vanguardism, led by Dora Tellez 
amongst others, implied a more open response to popular sentiment, which 
was at that time sharply inclined precisely to the anger and combativity that 
risked wrecking a centrist truce.174 Equally, however, the clear threat to the 
revolution's core achievements and a palpable lack of unity within the FSLN 
enabled the leadership to maintain the initiative, and the party's first congress 
was postponed from January to July 1991. This sense of embattlement was 
sustained over the last months of 1990 as Godoy and UNO focused their 
campaign on the reversal of the agrarian reform and the removal of both 
Humberto Ortega and Antonio Lacayo from their posts. The issue of the 
agrarian reform acted throughout this period as a token for property relations 
in general. It was, moreover, a matter about which the March 1990 protocol 
was silent, and over which the government remained uncertain in the face of 
heavy UNO pressure led by Alfredo Cesar, the former Contra political leader 
who was now president of the National Assembly. In June 1991 Cesar led a 
concerted legislative attempt to enforce an almost comprehensive restoration 
to the original owners of property confiscated under the Revolution. This 
provoked a not inconvenient Sandinista walkout from the Assembly, 
depriving it of a quorum on the eve of the party's congress. However, it was 
not until November 1991 that the issue came to a head after a series of land 
occupations designed to forestall the threatened restoration of reform 
properties to their former owners. A number of violent incidents, the 
destruction of the tomb of FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca Amador, and the 
renewed prospect of Contra attacks in a year when 60 people had been killed 
in the countryside prompted Chamorro and Lacayo into accepting a further 
agreement with the FSLN. Under this pact the government accepted clear 
restrictions on its privatisation programme in return for a Sandinista promise 
to demobilise party supporters and defuse popular tension.175 The FNT 
leadership was distinctly unhappy with this deal - now publicly dubbed 
concertacidn - which appeared to be deriving limited political reward from 
extensive rank and file resistance on economic and social matters. 
Nonetheless, the agreement was effectively enforced, and for the better part 
of the next year the Las Palmas-FSLN axis remained quite stable. Indeed, in 
February 1992 Rafael Solis felt able to revive an idea he had floated after the 
El Crucero assembly: a formal alliance between the Sandinistas and the 
governing group on a single slate for the 1996 elections. 
This proposal, heretical to an important sector of the FSLN rank and file, 
reflected the emergence of a small group of Sandinistas who sought to 
combine the pragmatism of the party leadership with the anti-authoritarian 
tendencies of many militants, who, however, rejected the initiative by the 
'Centre Group' as social democratic and capitulationist. Such contradictory 
currents were permitted by the compromise over both policy and organisation 
reached at the FSLN Congress of July 1991. There almost half the 581 
delegates opposed the idea of the National Directorate standing for re-election 
on a single slate, but this proposal was carried and the party's leadership was 
maintained unchanged (without a single woman) on the understanding that 
individual candidacies subjected to a secret ballot would be introduced in 
1995. In the words of the reformist Comandante Luis Carrion, 'a rupture too 
brusque with traditions, even when some of these need change, could have 
a negative effect on the cohesion and unity of the FSLN'.176 Such a 
resolution, together with what was recognised to be insufficient response by 
the 'Ethics Commission' established at El Crucero, introduced a note of 
marked dissension and disputation, but it did not provoke open division, and 
proposed limits on debate were successfully resisted at the cost of preserving 
the principle of democratic centralism. Although the party did predictably 
little to develop new substantive policies, criticism over vanguardism 
extended naturally to its statism and collectivism.177 
Such broad reconsideration of socio-economic strategy did not entail a 
diminished defence of the agrarian reform in the face of the Godoy-Cesar 
offensive. In September 1992 Cesar took direct executive control of the 
National Assembly whilst Sandinista deputies were on the Pacific Coast 
assisting in the relief effort following a major tidal wave. In response to thi& 
virtual coup within the legislature the FSLN deepened its alliance with the 
government by boycotting an Assembly that was now operating a form of 
dual power, aided and abetted by Jesse Helms and the increasingly 
pugnacious and influential Mayor of Managua, Arnoldo Aleman. Cesar's 
extraordinary ambush was assuredly encouraged by Helms's ability to 
persuade President Bush to freeze $104 million in aid in the midst of a hard-
fought US election campaign. Moreover, the UNO extremists must have felt 
emboldened by the publication just prior to the tidal wave of Helms's report, 
in which Republican party staffer Deborah de Moss opined that, 'Nicaragua 
is a country overwhelmingly controlled by terrorists, thugs and murderers at 
the highest level'.178 In addition to alleging nepotism by Chamorro and 
Lacayo, de Moss focused on the property question - she claimed with 
characteristic hyperbole that 450 of the owners of expropriated lands had 
been or become US citizens -and the issue of Sandinista control of the 
military. Whilst Lacayo repudiated the report as 'full of lies and slander', 
Chamorro herself sought to defuse the most threatening challenge yet from 
the right to her government by ordering some 5,000 claims affecting over 
16,000 properties to be settled forthwith. These, though, were not to include 
those of the Somoza family, and neither did the government permit this 
offensive to derail the 1991 concertacion agreement that had produced a 
perceptible modulation in its general privatisation programme. 
By early 1993 CORNAP, the corporation charged with transferring some 
351 public companies to the private sector, had processed 233 firms in what 
appeared to be a rapid and radical reversal of the Revolution. Moreover, over 
two years at least 30,000 workers had formally been laid off under this 
process.179 However, privatisation had not been halted by widespread 
resistance and neither had it provoked social violence since, following the 
strike wave of 1991, it had been largely undertaken in consultation with the 
unions and involved appreciable transfer of ownership to company 
workforces, which acquired a quarter of privatised firms.180 In the 
countryside 113 farms previously belonging to the state sector (APP) were 
transferred to some 18,000 members of the ATC union whilst 180 properties 
were restored to prior owners.181 In October 1992 much disparaged 
compensatory bonds were issued to those who failed to lodge a successful 
claim, and a government promise to review the legal status of property 
confiscated between February and April 1990 (the pinata) failed to dampen 
the widespread conviction that ownership would not be further revised to a 
significant degree under this government.182 Whilst, as elsewhere, the 
public sector was radically diminished, this process had not descended into 
mere asset-stripping or an open auction for holders of dollars. Such a 
measured response may be attributed in no small degree to the strikes and 
occupations of 1990 and 1991, and had these not forestalled repossession it 
is highly likely that this would have unleashed conflict far more violent and 
extensive than that which was eventually provoked by the excluded veterans 
of both armies in 1992-3. 
By the autumn of 1993 a similarly pragmatic solution prevailed with 
respect to the other major subject of controversy: the military question. 
Although the 'tit-for-tat' kidnapping crisis of August seemed to have 
succeeded in forcing Chamorro into announcing the eventual removal of 
Humberto Ortega as commander of the EPS - and this step was identified by 
the FSLN as resulting directly from US browbeating - it was by no means 
certain that such a move would constitute a violation of the March 1990 
protocol since the position of Ortega as an individual was seen as quite 
distinct from the alteration of any structures of command or organisation.183 
Furthermore, the high command itself was primarily concerned to secure 
legislative approval for its proposed military law - not least because this 
made proper provision for pensions, absent in the 1980s and inadequately 
patched over since 1990 by investing the proceeds of sales of equipment.184 
This necessitated the reincorporation of UNO into the Assembly, control of 
which had been returned by the Supreme Court to the Centrist-FSLN bloc in 
January 1993. As a result, it was now boycotted by 44 deputies from the right 
- the government had weaned a handful to its cause - and UNO declared 
itself to be in open opposition. 
Humberto Ortega was not alone in supporting harsh repression for his 
rebel ex-comrades in Esteli in July 1993; tension between cashiered and 
serving officers was extremely sharp. Nor, with 14 years in the post and an 
exceptionally high international profile, could he plausibly claim that his 
person was subordinate to his professional position. The strongest evidence 
following the repression in Esteli and the resolution of the kidnapping crisis 
the next month was that the high command led by Cuadra and Colonel 
Osvaldo Lacayo would accept the price demanded by Washington and UNO 
provided that it was neither publicly traded as such nor demonstrably the thin 
end of the wedge. As by far the most reduced army in the region they had a 
strong basis for holding such ground and silently withstanding the crowing 
over Ortega's removal or a change in the name of the EPS. 
The position of the FSLN as a political party was quite different insofar as 
it had to respond to the escalating social pressure caused by the economic 
crisis and government policies. By September 1993 this meant risking a 
complete rupture with the regime and pushing Chamorro back into the arms 
of the UNO ultras, who were now demanding the removal of the 1987 
constitution and the establishment of a constituent assembly. For this reason, 
at the height of the transport strike of September 1993 provoked by a 
precipitate increase in vehicle taxes, Daniel Ortega went firmly onto the 
offensive against the government, warning against a renascent somocismo and 
describing the Chamorro cabinet as 'murderous'.186 At the same time, the 
renewal of the US freeze on aid now seemed not so much 'more of the same' 
as a decisive and deliberate punitive act in support of the right-wing 
offensive. Manifest drift in the Clinton administration's handling of the crisis 
in Haiti and its severe difficulties over NAFTA seemed, from a Nicaraguan 
perspective, to presage a field-day for the revanchist North American right 
over their old foe, further encouraging UNO to increase the stakes. Under 
such circumstances the Sandinista centrists were hard-pressed to make the 
case for concertacion although UNO's targeting of Lacayo kept the option of 
a 1996 electoral pact within the realm of the possible. By contrast, the 
polarisation and violence of the September transport strike recalled that of 
July 1990, similarly pushing at least some of the FSLN leaders down the path 
of confrontation. 
By October 1993 the forces militating for a return to violent conflict and 
the dissolution of a manageable civil society were formidable. Vandalism and 
extremist aggression were fomented by both the appalling state of the 
economy and policy on the part of the radical right. On the other hand, 
popular exhaustion with violence and military affairs, the clear interest of the 
rest of the region in a lasting political settlement, and the inability of the 
North American campaign for a full counter-revolutionary solution to gain 
White House support represented brakes on polarisation. 
El Salvador 
As has already been highlighted, the Salvadorean peace settlement differs 
from that in Nicaragua in that, rather than flowing from an international 
treaty, it was at root a domestic agreement, albeit strongly brokered and 
invigilated by the UN. Other obvious differences rest in the fact that in El 
Salvador the government was supported by Washington and the left was in 
opposition. As a result, although the general weight of US influence was no 
less than in Nicaragua (in some respects it was greater), this took the quite 
distinctive form of qualified or withdrawn patronage as well as giving a 
fundamentally rhetorical and partisan defence of liberal democracy greater 
authenticity. The visit made to San Salvador by Vice-President Bush in 1983 
was essentially to secure diplomatically defensible conduct by the government 
and its army; that undertaken by Vice-President Quayle in February 1989 
required much more of the Salvadorean state, even before the collapse of 
Communism and the near-decisive offensive launched by the FMLN in 
November of that year. 
Rather like the Nicaraguan election of 1990, the undoubted importance of 
the rebel offensive both as a synthetic expression of developing trends and as 
an intrinsic crisis has resulted in it frequently being over-emphasised by 
commentators. However, because the Salvadorean civil war was far more 
evenly balanced than that in Nicaragua, specific operations and their logistics 
were of correspondingly greater consequence. Equally, whilst the timing of 
the offensive in the midst of the international collapse of Communism was not 
directly prompted by events in eastern Europe, neither was it entirely 
coincidental with external developments. It is a quite accurate reflection of 
the nature of the Salvadorean civil war that the marked autonomy from 
foreign influence of the FMLN as well as the changes in Washington meant 
that the USA was not provoked by the offensive into committing troops to 
forestall the collapse of its client regime. This would, in any case, have been 
made logistically impossible by the impending invasion of Panama - a fact 
that should remind us of the intensive activity and sense of crisis that 
prevailed in and around Central America at the end of Bush's first year in 
office. In fact, it was at the start of 1989, precisely on the day after the US 
president's inauguration, that the FMLN staged an entirely unexpected 
initiative - rather as it had done in 1981 just prior to Reagan's inauguration. 
This time, however, the rebel action was boldly political in character, and by 
offering to participate in the coming elections if these were postponed by six 
months (from March to September) and made subject to relatively innocuous 
guarantees, it appeared to represent a complete volte face, not least because 
the FMLN had expended much diplomatic and political energy in attacking 
the elections held since 1982.187 
In practice, the FMLN initiative was rather less adventurous, and not only 
because neither the extreme right-wing ARENA nor Washington was 
expected to respond favourably. (In the event, both they and the PDC treated 
the rebel proposal remarkably seriously through most of the election 
campaign, for the simple reason that popular desire for an end to the war was 
so central to the result.) Just as important as this preparedness to float daring 
proposals was the FMLN's continuing political development, which had gone 
through a number of broad phases since 1980.188 
The most public of these was the replacing in 1983 of the radical socio-
economic programme designed in 1980 for a regime based on a revolutionary 
seizure of state power. The 1983 platform provided in much more flexible 
form for a 'government of broad participation' (gobierno de amplia 
participation; GAP), which would include representatives of all major 
political forces and maintain elements of the existing state army, always 
provided these had not participated in the violation of human rights. At the 
core of the 1983 GAP proposal was the integration of the FMLN's forces into 
any post-settlement military apparatus. This remained a prominent feature of 
the January 1989 offer and would, indeed, be one of the main rebel demands 
until September 1991. The insistence upon expulsion and punishment of those 
responsible for war crimes was likewise constant and became a central 
element of the peace agreement that was finally signed. Of course, neither of 
these issues is inherently radical from an ideological viewpoint but both were 
of critical importance in the context of a civil war, and by maintaining them 
until the very last moment the FMLN was responding to a core constituency 
of fighters and supporters for whom guarantees of security and expression of 
justice were just as vital as radical economic policies. 
Although the 1989 offer represented a significant shift away from the GAP 
proposals, it did so largely by surrendering the idea of a prolonged 
provisional government rather than marking a shift of position over electoral 
competition per se. In fact, even the left's critique of the US-backed official 
electoral contests between the PDC and ARENA was unravelling as its non-
combatant, reformist allies mutated from the Frente Democratico 
Revolucionario (FDR) into the Convergencia Democratica (CD) and began 
with extreme caution to test the possibility of involvement in legal politics 
from late 1987. In the event this did not entail entering the 1988 local and 
legislative elections, but it clearly signalled the opening of a new political 
front as well as the prospect of CD participation in the 1989 poll. 
The predictable challenge from this quarter was complemented by the 
accumulating influence of the FMLN's military strategy on its political 
outlook. Here the key shift came slightly after the GAP proposal, in 1984-85, 
when it became obvious that the escalation of the guerrilla war into one of 
substantial military formations was not just problematic but decidedly 
dangerous. The central feature in this was the difficulty in protecting large 
numbers of unarmed civilian supporters who lived in 'liberated zones', 
openly expressed sympathy for the rebels, and were exceptionally vulnerable 
targets for any counter-attack by the notoriously brutal state army. In 
essence, by developing from the tactics of clandestine and highly mobile 
small groups into those which required the holding of territory, the FMLN 
was sacrificing its popular supporters since it remain incapable of 
continuously defending territory when attacked in strength. As a result, the 
guerrillas reduced the number of their troops, shifted their targets, and 
discouraged supporters from open acts of sympathy, instead urging them to 
engage in a doble cara (two-faced) existence whereby they were free to 
display support for the legal parties and participate in the comings and goings 
of official civil society. This inevitably instilled a less manichaean attitude 
and a greater sensitivity to tactical exigencies and requirements of ordinary 
folk. In very much the same mould, the FMLN had come to recognise the 
high social cost of its sabotage campaigns against public transport -which 
penalised the poor far more sharply than they did the rebels' 'natural' class 
enemy - even though these were exceptionally efficient from a military and 
propaganda perspective.189 
These factors produced a particularly confusing situation. On the one hand, 
some US advisers confidently opined that 'these guys' units are getting 
smaller. What more evidence do you want (of rebel decline)?'. On the other, 
the head of military intelligence confessed that he was unable to assess the 
FMLN's capacity for staging strategic operations.190 In fact, the guerrilla 
command considered its January 1989 offer to be opening a 'strategic 
counter-offensive', in which military operations would be necessary in order 
to force the regime to negotiate. This assumption appeared to be fully 
vindicated when Cristiani won the election so emphatically, the FMLN, still 
publicly at loggerheads with its semi-allies in the CD, failing either to halt 
the poll or to provide for subsequent initiatives. Moreover, whilst Cristiani's 
offer at his inauguration (June 1989) to enter into talks without any prior 
FMLN surrender - the constant demand made by PDC President Duarte -
seemed to open the possibility of a straight right-left negotiation without any 
complicating centrist mediation, the lack of official interest at formal contacts 
and then the death squad bombing of the FENASTRAS union office at the end 
of October convinced the guerrilla leadership that Cristiani had no real 
intention of talking and was merely adopting a different ruse to Duarte's. 
Consequently, longstanding rebel plans for a major offensive were set in 
motion, leading to the November assault on San Salvador and several 
provincial capitals.191 
The surprise caused in Washington and San Salvador by the FMLN's 
capacity to sustain this large-scale operation and retreat in good order after 
ten days' intensive fighting was matched by the widespread repudiation of the 
military's preparedness to cause civilian casualties in its counter-attacks. As 
in the past, this disposition became tragically enshrined in the murder of 
unarmed members of a religious body - in this case the six Jesuit priests and 
their housekeeper and her daughter executed on the night of 15 November -
who were considered by many in the armed forces to be closet rebels and 
legitimate targets. To a very appreciable extent, the cold-blooded 
assassination dominated the international perception of the November 
fighting, making this seem quite similar to the assaults being made on the 
tyrannies of eastern Europe, where clerics were also being persecuted, albeit 
by Communists and rarely at the cost of their lives. The damage caused by 
this made scare-mongering about an imminent radical takeover quite 
unproductive on the international plane, and the regime's immediate response 
in criminalising the expression of any political opinion other than that of its 
supporters signalled the price of rejecting talks. At the same time, whilst 
FMLN fighters in the thick of battle were understandably telling the world's 
press that they were fighting for 'revolution or death', the rebel leadership 
maintained a quite consistent attachment to the policy of negotiations, 
employing the term 'insurrection' far more flexibly than some allowed 
for.192 
The position of the right and the state was equally conducive to 
pacification. The November offensive may have failed to secure a 
revolutionary seizure of power, but it unambiguously signalled a rebel 
capacity to continue with a campaign of sabotage that had sorely damaged the 
economy and cut deep into profits. Moreover, it highlighted the futility of 
any effort to impose a 'Djakarta solution' - the killing of tens of thousands 
- which was touted by some as an alternative to selective death squad 
executions.193 The fact was, of course, that tens of thousands had already 
been killed, and whilst talk of massacres might still possess some cathartic 
property for those on the extreme right, such activity patently lacked 
deterrent effect at a strategic level. The prospect of a profitable peace began 
to compete with that of an extirpation of communists. There was certainly no 
public entrepreneurial pressure group for negotiations, but Central America's 
most aggressive mercantilists already had a large target in five years of 
Christian Democratic interventionism, which in many respects drew fire from 
the FMLN's putative collectivism. ARENA had long dubbed the PDC crypto-
communist, but now that the radical right finally held both executive and 
legislative power it needed to translate long-rehearsed free-trade rhetoric into 
tangible recovery. Without a solution to the war it stood in some danger of 
simply altering the proprietorial status of rebel targets. 
The position within the military was noticeably more rigid. The November 
offensive starkly revealed the inefficiencies of both the high command and its 
tactical operations. This was doubly important because in June 1988 what 
amounted to a coup had taken place within the armed forces with the major 
commands being occupied by members of the large 1966 graduating class of 
the military academy. This group was known as the tandona because of its 
fierce attachment to the culture and practices of the tanda (cohort) system 
excoriated by an extremely critical report on the Salvadorean military written 
by four US colonels in 1988: 
4Once each class or tanda is commissioned from the Salvadorean 
military academy, it moves upwards through the ranks together, 
the group advancing at intervals regardless of any evidence of 
individual competence or lack thereof. Whatever an officer's 
personal failings - stupidity, cowardice in battle or moral 
profligacy - his career is secure through the rank of colonel, after 
which he may depart, with his tanda, into honourable 
retirement'.194 
In November 1988 the tandona took complete control of the military 
command structure with the appointment as defence minister of General Rene 
Emilio Ponce, who had been denied a US visa for several years because of 
his involvement in human rights abuses.195 Although the tandona leaders 
espoused a more 'aggressive' prosecution of the war and possessed in 
ARENA a much more tractable political administration, the US 
Congressional Research Service had come to the same conclusion as the four 
colonels: 'the war is stuck. Unhappily, the United States finds itself stuck 
with the war'.196 One central and clearly identifiable reason for this 
incapacity was the corruption within the officer corps encouraged by the large 
amount of US aid. Amongst the most common forms this took was pay fraud, 
whereby a sizeable proportion of the 20,000 pay slots budgeted for soldiers 
each year were filled by phantom conscripts whose wages passed into the 
hands of local commanders. The fact that pay of n.c.o.s, key to the army's 
tactical capacity, was twice that of recruits meant that 'ghosting' these troops 
was far more profitable but also more detrimental to the war effort.197 The 
absence of a central roster and the clannish loyalties of the tanda system 
meant that general knowledge of such rip-offs and their cost was matched by 
total silence over individual instances and the absence of prosecutions or 
enforced retirement. Indeed, some US observers were convinced that the 
Salvadorean officer corps had become so locked into these lucrative scams 
that they did not wish to win the war and thus lose their North American 
source of income.198 
After November 1989 it was apparent that the army could not win the war 
even if it wished to do so. Overall, it had performed badly enough during the 
offensive to have lost prestige in its bargaining with the ARENA government, 
and yet its support was essential to Cristiani's own bargaining with both 
Washington and the FMLN. More important still, the question of the future 
role and organisation of the military was at the top of a rebel agenda now 
shorn of all major socio-economic demands. This, in fact, proved to be the 
most untractable item in the prolonged series of talks listed in Table Four. It 
was only in September 1991, nearly two years after the offensive, that the 
FMLN gave way on its requirement to form part of a new military apparatus. 
As a result of this concession the guerrillas, by progressively demobilising, 
would rapidly lose their military capacity to invigilate the peace agreement 
or provide themselves with guarantees of physical security. Its necessary 
corollary was not only a remarkably high profile given to the UN verification 
of the agreements but also government acceptance of extensive investigation 
of past human rights violations. Both these components were plainly going 
to damage the military institution as a whole and threatened grave punishment 
for some of its most senior members whose conduct over the past decade had 
been based on the confident expectation of impunity. Nonetheless, the army 
was unable to resist such accords, which were reached in April 1991, at a 
break-through meeting in Mexico City. By that stage US readiness to cut 
military assistance had been demonstrated (October 1990) and ARENA had 
suffered serious setbacks in the legislative and municipal elections (March 
1991). Full veto power - long an attribute of a military institution cajoled by 
the USA into accepting civilian government in the early 1980s - had been 
lost, opening a period of survivalist scapegoating, the pursuit of amnesties, 
and the revival of a pungent, antigringo chauvinism that would fuel the public 
and political careers of the most belligerent officers (Colonel Ochoa; General 
Bustillo; General Ponce). 
The final Salvadorean peace accord effectively amalgamated all the 
agreements reached over the previous two years. As a consequence, its terms 
were extensive and complicated.199 One of its most important features lay 
in the carefully designed demobilisation timetable outlined in Table Five. 
Complementary to this process, which would totally disarm the FMLN and 
reduce the army's establishment to around 30,000, was the disbanding of the 
three state security forces (Guardia Nacional; Policfa Nacional; Policia de 
Hacienda) and the establishment of a new National Civilian Police (PNC) 
completely separate from the army. The majority of the recruits for this force 
would not have participated in the civil war, but of those who had equal 
numbers were to be from the old Policia Nacional and the FMLN. 
The peace settlement also made important changes to state institutions in 
its provisions for the Supreme Court, which, as we have seen, had become 
heavily politicised and exercised rigid control over lower courts. In future a 
two-thirds majority of the legislature would be needed for the election of 
Supreme Court judges (instead of a simple majority), and length of service 
was increased to nine years, further distancing the Court from the political 
cycle. All political parties would now participate in the preparation of the 
electoral register, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal would also be elected 
by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly.200 
Table 4 
The Origins of the Salvadorean Peace Accord, 1989 - 1992 
January 1989 El Salvador - FMLN offers to contest and respect elections if these 
delayed for six months with military confined to barracks. 
21 March 1989 El Salvador - Cristiani offers talks; in response FMLN proposes new 
poll, withdrawal of US military aid, radical reduction of military and trial 
of those responsible for repression. 
I June 1989 El Salvador - At his inauguration Cristiani offers talks without prior 
FMLN surrender. 
4 April 1990 Geneva - Joint declaration of desire to end war, promote democracy and 
guarantee human rights; commitment to secret negotiations under 
mediation of UN Secretary General or his representative. 
21 May 1990 Caracas - Three-phase agenda established: political accords sufficient for 
a ceasefire; integration of FMLN into legal sphere; consolidation of 
peace. UN to verify all accords. Military represented for first time. 
26 July 1990 San Jose - Substantive agreement on human rights and establishment of 
ONUSAL, first UN verification body to oversee human rights at end of 
a civil war. 
27 April 1991 Mexico City - Major accord to amend 1983 Constitution, including 
alteration of role of military, dissolution of military intelligence 
directorate and three paramilitary bodies, to be replaced by civilian 
police; new non-partisan electoral tribunal and more broadly elected 
Supreme Court; Truth Commission to be set up to assess violation of 
human rights by both sides. 
26 July 1991 El Salvador - ONUSAL starts human rights monitoring under broad 
powers that preclude need for referral to New York. 
I I September 1991 El Salvador - New National Assembly ratifies constitutional reform 
required by Mexico accord of April. 
25 September 1991 New York - Rejection of phased ceasefire; FMLN agrees in secret annexe 
to drop all demands for inclusion of its troops in military in exchange for 
participation in new police force (PNC); establishment of National 
Commission For Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), comprised of parties, 
with powers to implement accords. 
23 October 1991 Washington - US Congress withholds half of military aid pending 
improvement in human rights and advances in peace process. 
31 December 1991 New York - Six-paragraph act ('New York II') ending the civil war is 
signed; calendar for implementation discussed until 14 Jan. 
16 January 1992 Mexico City - Formal signing at Chapultepec Castle of accord 
consolidating all agreements since April 1991 in presence of new UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and various heads of state. 
The settlement's treatment of the massive violation of human rights since 
1980 was two-fold in nature. Taking its lead from the Rettig Commission in 
Chile, a Truth Commission was set up to provide a selective - but still 
extensive - review of the worst abuses by all parties, and to make 
recommendations to prevent any repetition. However, the Commission, 
which was composed of three eminent non-Salvadoreans, possessed only 
limited powers of recommendation with regard to the punishment of 
identified individuals.201 This aspect came more directly under the purview 
of a second body, the Ad Hoc Commission, which was to review the personal 
records of military personnel. Unlike the Truth Commission, the findings of 
this body, composed of Salvadoreans, were not to be published and would be 
passed, via the UN, directly to the president for action202 
The accord called for the complete implementation of the agrarian reform 
programme begun in 1980, and the government agreed to recognise current 
tenure of land in conflict zones as well as favouring ex-combatants in the 
distribution of land under the National Reconstruction Plan (PNR) to be 
assisted by the UN. Longer-term socio-economic matters would be 
considered and debated in a new Forum for Economic and Social Consensus 
constituted by representatives of government, business and labour in equal 
numbers. 
The main organisation charged with overseeing the implementation of 
these agreements was the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace 
(COPAZ), comprising two representatives from the government, two from 
the FMLN, and one each from the parties or fronts with seats in the 
Assembly. However, COPAZ soon proved to be an inefficient and fractious 
forum, and the main impetus for implementation and verification came from 
ONUSAL, set up in 1990 with some 150 members from 29 of the UN's 
member-states. Indeed, had ONUSAL not possessed its unusually strong 
remit and rapidly established a firm reputation with both sides even the 
relatively modest progress over the first 18 months following the agreement 
would not have been possible. 
The first major difficulty was in mutual compliance over demobilisation, 
each side exploiting ambiguities in the formal treaty to test the other's nerve, 
but in November 1992 the FMLN won public UN support for its argument 
that it was not obliged to keep to a timetable if the government failed to 
respect complementary agreements. Thus, in April Cristiani attempted to 
circumvent the disbandment of the paramilitary forces by means of simply 
changing their names (rather as had Pinochet in Chile), and for a week at the 
end of October the demobilisation was halted in a tense stand-off requiring 
strenuous UN arbitration before an extended timetable (to 15 December) was 
accepted. The question of demobilisation was revived in no less critical a 
fashion when clandestine FMLN arms caches were revealed by the explosion 
of 23 May 1993 in Managua.203 The scale of stocks subsequently admitted, 
the embarrassment caused to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (who had 
publicly accepted the rebels' assurances of complete disarmament), and the 
damage done to the FMLN's reputation by its transgression all played into the 
hands of the San Salvador government and conservative forces. 
On the other hand, Cristiani conspicuously failed to fulfil his obligation to 
act on the Ad Hoc Commission report by the end of November 1992. 
According to most reliable sources, he was obliged to remove or reassign 
some 100 officers, including General Ponce and many of his senior 
colleagues, identified with specific violations of human rights.204 This move 
was only taken in March 1993, and then heavily qualified by the issuing of 
an amnesty for all those accused of crimes (except kidnapping and drug-
smuggling) during the war. 
Table 5 
El Salvador Peace Treaty : Formal Timetable for 1992 
Signing of formal accords 
Legal incorporation of COPAZ 
Military to provide ONUSAL with complete arms and troops inventory 
'D Day': formal ceasefire starts; end of forced conscription; tabling of legislation 
to guarantee security of FMLN, COPAZ and other commissions; start of transfer of 
farms over 245 hectares. 
FMLN to start demobilisation. 
Designation of Supreme Electoral Court. 
Deadline for FMLN inventory of land holdings in regions under its control. 
Dissolution of Guardia Nacional and Policia de Hacienda; creation of state 
intelligence department to replace DNI (to be dissolved by 15 June); designation of 
Human Rights Ombudsman. 
Start of submission of land requests by veterans of both armies. 
Start of demobilisation and reincorporation into civilian life of FMLN troops, to 
proceed at a monthly rate of at least 20% of fighters. 
Installation of Ad Hoc Commission to review records of military officers and 
recommend removal of human rights violators. 
Deadline for reform of electoral system. 
Deadline for dissolution of all paramilitary defence units. 
Legalisation of owndership of lands in zones of conflict. 
Start of demobilisation of army's five elite batallions. 
Start of purge from armed forces of human rights violators. 
End of FMLN demobilisation. 
r 
End of army's elite battalion demobilisation. 
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The amnesty announcement was made the day before the publication of the 
Truth Commission report, and it appeared to have the acquiescence of the 
guerrilla leadership although human rights organisations and the relatives of 
the victims expressed great anguish, the National Human Rights Commission 
petitioned the Supreme Court to rule the amnesty unconstitutional, and even 
the US State Department attacked it as a guarantee of impunity.205 In some 
respects the amnesty was made both inevitable and more provocative by the 
publication of the Truth Commission report (15 March 1993). This long and 
detailed document addressed cases involving the killing of some 23,000 
people, including the 1989 assassination of the Jesuits and the massacres of 
the early 1980s, the awful details of which were also being revealed at the 
time by teams of forensic anthropologists. The Commission attributed 85 
percent of violations to the state forces and only 5 per cent to the FMLN. In 
the same vein, it recommended the immediate dismissal of some 40 senior 
officers, who would be banned from holding public office for ten years, as 
would three FMLN Comandantes (Joaquin Villalobos; Ana Guadalupe 
Martinez; and Jorge Melendez of the ERP) of the 15 identified as having 
committed abuses.206 Whilst the FMLN accepted all the Commission's 
recommendations, the Supreme Court joined the high command in attacking 
it, and attempted (without success) to resist its provisions on the grounds that 
it had been set up under agreements between the FMLN and the executive 
branch - not the judiciary - and so its findings were not binding.207 A 
similarly clouded experience resulted from the peace agreement's plans for 
the new police force, which was woefully under-funded and very slowly 
assembled, and the distribution of land, which had been slow from the start 
and by May 1993 amounted to only 9,700 grants of the 47,500 agreed in 
December 1992.208 The erratic, under-funded and much disputed process 
of land titling provoked frequent occupations of rural properties which the 
government and landlords depicted as guerrilla attempts to destabilise the 
accords at the same time as Cristiani celebrated the allocation of plots as a 
major triumph for private property and popular capitalism.209 However, 
none of these insufficiencies, manipulations and interested interpretations 
amounted to a decisive challenge to the peace settlement, which by mid-1993 
appeared much more secure than that in Nicaragua. One factor in this was 
undoubtedly the proximity of the presidential election of March 1994, 
focusing the political attention of all parties. The differences that predictably 
opened up with both the right- and the left-wing alliances as a result of the 
cessation of hostilities did provoke a modicum of violence as old scores were 
settled.210 Nevertheless, the more important consequence of this was the 
extension of competition and reassessment of alliances that had been frozen 
for almost a dozen years and not subjected to authentic electoral challenge 
since 1972.211 
Guatemala 
The pattern of Guatemalan politics over the six years since the signing of the 
Esquipulas treaty was distinct from those in Nicaragua and El Salvador 
insofar as there was no formal peace agreement between the guerrillas and 
the government, not even a partial ceasefire. Moreover, the negotiations 
between the URNG and the state were not in themselves a central feature of 
public life, since the guerrilla challenge in Guatemala was far weaker than in 
El Salvador and lacked the powerful external allies possessed by the 
Nicaraguan Contra. Expectations that the administration established by 
Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de Leon Carpio in the wake of the crisis 
of May-June 1993 might reach a rapid truce with the URNG were misplaced. 
In the first place the undeniably important implosion of the system of civilian 
government set up in 1986 had only slight short-term repercussions on the 
military, and the officer corps was far more strongly placed than its 
Salvadorean counterpart in 1989. Secondly, the perceptible increase in 
guerrilla activity in 1990 that encouraged some abroad to imagine a scenario 
akin to that in El Salvador in November 1989 was, in fact, the prelude to a 
decisive campaign by the army, not the URNG, which had been reduced to 
a marginal force before the civic crisis of mid-1993. As a result, a sizeable 
portion of the military establishment considered the notion of negotiation 
thoroughly ignoble. On the other side, the URNG was patently too weak to 
countenance a rapid series of concessions of the type accepted by the FMLN 
late in 1991. 
Reactions abroad to the collapse of President Serrano's May 1993 
autogolpe ('self-coup') understandably registered hope that the initial 
momentum of the crisis might carry through into the new government's 
actions. When that failed to occur there was a noticeable over-reaction by 
commentators who now predicted sell-outs, oligarchic ambushes and a 
renewal of the culture of control set up in 1954. This view may well prove 
to be justified, but after nearly 40 years of a singularly autocratic regime 
Guatemalan civil society manifestly operated with enormous caution, 
especially since the advocates of revolution had been strategically subjugated. 
Political and cultural readjustment was always likely to be more prolonged 
and hesitant than in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and not only because of the 
weight of an indigenous population that had borne the brunt of the massacres 
of 1978-83. This profound lack of trust, and the suspicion prompted by even 
the most modest overtures or opportunities is most evident on the left in the 
reaction of the popular movement to the collapse of Serrano's autocratic 
endeavour. For a number of days the leadership of the country's human rights 
and trade union organisations proved unable to move beyond formulaic 
denunciation of the feverish attempts by the political and military elite to 
extricate itself from the crisis. Much of the polemic simply identified these 
efforts as a military counter-coup and failed to pose plausible alternatives that 
might have positively exploited the tangible distress of traditional antagonists. 
De Leon Carpio was eventually able to take office, but the lack of initiative 
from his supporters bore all the hallmarks of two generations of repression 
and two episodes (1966-70; 1986-93) of defrauded promises of constitutional 
propriety. Popular political skills were as slight as the resilience of the 
masses was deep. 
Such reticence was reciprocated by the right, which was able to use 
continued guerrilla actions as an excuse for avoiding genuine concessions. 
Guatemala, it should be recalled, had been a very early and immediate victim 
of the Cold War. The counter-revolution of 1954 was no medium-distance 
influence but a major watershed in the nation's life, armouring an elite 
culture of anti-communism that predated the revolution in Cuba, let alone that 
in Nicaragua, and even displayed some of the traumas caused by Mexican 
radicalism in the 1930s. In its own view the right also had historic experience 
of 'pseudo-democracy' under the reformist Arevalo and Arbenz (1944-54). 
Moreover, its nationalist reflexes had been fully exercised from the mid-
19708 by Carter's criticism and withdrawal of aid because of human rights 
abuses, and then by the US Congress's refusal to restore to Guatemala the 
support so energetically championed by Reagan. Far more accustomed to 
pariah status than were the Salvadorean and Nicaraguan ruling classes, and 
with far more to show for its scorched earth policies, the Guatemalan elite 
was exceptionally difficult to budge, if not absolutely intractable. 
One element of flexibility was given, as we have seen, by economic change 
in the form of maquila, a shift away from traditional exports and the rigid 
plantation cultures that upheld them, and the challenge presented by NAFTA. 
Another was the price paid for possessing constitutional government since the 
mid-1980s: the promotion of unevenly skilled politicians, many of whom 
lacked publicly acceptable ethics or a capacity to modulate their greed 
according to circumstances. A third feature was the experience of 
unexpected, spontaneous rioting in the capital (1978; 1985; 1990) caused by 
economic policy, especially with regard to bus fares and electricity prices. 
In both cases this reflected a longstanding resistance to increased funding 
through taxation, but now maladministration and cavalier pillaging threatened 
to transform a serious recurrent problem into an irreversible crisis. The 
habitual response to this - unhampered repression - was precisely what the 
artifice of constitutionalism was designed to avoid. The attendant 
degeneration of the legitimacy of the 'new democrats' - principally the 
Christian Democrats and Serrano's MAS but also elements of the decrepit 
Partido Revolucionario (PR) and the neo-conservative Union Centrista 
Nacional (UCN) - plainly required some reconsideration of the historic 
options open to the power bloc. 
The failure of the URNG on the battlefield makes it unlikely that any 
eventual Guatemalan peace settlement will go much further than the rebels' 
demobilisation, reincorporation into the legal sphere, the legitimacy of which 
they would recognise in exchange for an amnesty and, if conditions were 
propitious, some judicial consideration of the violation of human rights since 
the late 1970s. Any concessions beyond this on the government side were 
more likely to stem from its own initiative or accumulating pressure from the 
popular movement than from rebel bargaining.212 At the root of such a 
balance of forces was the success of the military's scorched earth policies of 
the late 1970s and (when its blanket terror proved counter-productive in 
1981-82) the introduction of a more considered system of free-fire zones, 
strategic hamlets, civic action and civilian conscription (the Patrullas de 
Autodefensa Civil; PAC). In the words of General Hector Gramajo, army 
commander and defence minister for much of the 1980s, 
'Before, the strategy was to kill 100 per cent ... But you don't 
need to kill everybody to complete the job ... There are more 
sophisticated means ... We instituted civil affairs (in 1982), 
which provides development for 70 per cent of the population 
while we kill 30 per cent.'213 
The candour of Gramajo's statement shocks, but the abundant 
documentation that has been accumulated over the last dozen years strongly 
suggests that, at least with respect to the central highlands of the country, he 
was not boasting without cause.214 Although the figures are necessarily 
provisional and partial, we may talk without fear of exaggeration of 30,000 
people killed during the 1980s, 150,000 displaced within the country, and 
50,000 taking refuge in Mexico. The most sober estimates refer to 30,000 
widows, 38,0J30 children completely orphaned, and 90,000 losing one 
parent.215 In addition, one must take into account the traumatic impact on 
some 50,000 people of resettlement in one of the two dozen closely vigilated 
model villages, and the frequently coerced conscription of at least 725,000 
men into the PACs - subject as much to the whims of local caciques and 
military commanders as to URNG attacks.216 
Such numbers make plausible references to the militarisation of 
Guatemalan society, particularly in the countryside, where most of the 
fighting has taken place and where most of its victims live or lived. The army 
has undoubtedly succeeded in altering the outlook and attitudes of many rural 
Guatemalans, whether indigenous or ladino; and over the last ten years the 
scale of its organisational activity as well as more directly military operations 
raise doubts as to the accuracy and usefulness of depicting it as simply 
murderous and repugnant to local people.217 Its success has taken time -
civic action programmes rarely yield results rapidly - but it is manifestly 
based on more than coercive control. For this reason all the substantive 
proposals of the URNG, which has no more than 2,000 guerrilla fighters, 
focus on the dismantling of the institutions of the counter-insurgency strategy 
- far more extensive and autonomous than those in El Salvador - as well as 
investigation of human rights violations. 
The first step in the fragile process of negotiation came in September 1987, 
under the Esquipulas agreement, which provided only a loose framework 
since neither the URNG nor the military received significant external support 
and were therefore not very susceptible to the treaty's provisions in that 
respect. The establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) 
under the presidency of the Bishop of Esquipulas, Monsignor Rodolfo 
Quezada, was obligatory under the terms of the treaty but also a step 
willingly taken by the Christian democratic administration of Vinicio Cerezo, 
who had come to office 18 months earlier. Although Cerezo was disarmingly 
direct about his very modest ambitions for this first civilian administration, 
and he could not countenance presenting the high command with a major 
challenge, the president needed at least to be seen to be taking a different 
approach to his military predecessors.218 In the event, Cerezo was not faced 
with a taxing dilemma because when, in October 1987, the URNG met the 
CNR in Madrid the rebel proposals were palpably unacceptable to the army, 
which responded by imposing an effective veto on further contacts until 
March 1991. Most of the guerrillas' demands were radical only in the context 
of the Guatemalan civil war, which by that stage had mutated into a very one-
sided conflict. The most obvious demands were for the abolition of the PACs, 
model villages and 'development poles' run by the army; unrestricted 
movement within the country; full respect for human rights and freedom of 
speech and association; application of the Geneva Convention; and a formal 
dialogue between the major social and economic forces in the country. 
However, the proposals that most directly antagonised the officer corps were 
for the institution of a 'Truth Commission' and the establishment of 
demilitarised zones. Although Quezada proved a highly energetic president 
of the CNR and, rather like Cardenal Obando y Bravo in Nicaragua, 
possessed sufficient understanding of the rebels to retain their trust, neither 
military nor political forces favoured his cause. 
What may be seen as a prolonged second attempt to settle the Guatemalan 
war is sketched in Table Six. This process began with the Oslo meeting 
between the URNG and the CNR in March 1990, nearly two years after their 
last public encounter. There was little sign of a shift in the high command's 
position at this time, but external factors had now changed considerably. Less 
than a month earlier the Sandinistas had been voted out of office, and 
Washington, influenced by both that development and the earlier FMLN 
offensive in El Salvador, was now seeking in earnest to secure a solution in 
Guatemala, which not only formed part of the conflictive Central American 
arena but also bordered on Mexico, and thus the projected North American 
Free Trade Area. 
The principal problem for the USA was the limited purchase it had on a 
military establishment to which it issued virtually no cash, which it had not 
trained in significant numbers for 15 years, and which now possessed a 
markedly autonomous disposition. Clearly, Washington could not hope to 
secure a resolution either at a comparable speed to those in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador or with corresponding expectations of its own interests being met. 
In December 1989, in the immediate aftermath of the Salvadorean offensive, 
US Ambassador Thomas Stoock signalled in unusually blunt language the 
need for improvement in the human rights position. 
Table 6 
The Guatemalan Peace Process, 1987-92. 
Guatemala - Establishment of National Reconciliation Commission 
(CNR) under presidency of Bishop of Esquipulas, Rodolfo Quezada. 
Madrid - First public contact between rebel and state representatives for 
27 years ends without accord. 
San Jose - First URNG-CNR talks. 
Oslo - Second URNG-CNR meeting under auspices of World Lutheran 
Federation; general accord to resolve conflict by political means and set 
up mechanisms for resolving basic problems of Guatemalan society; 
Quezada to act as 'Conciliator' and UN Secretary General invited to 
observe. 
Madrid - 'Agreement of Escorial' signed by URNG and main political 
parties envisages legalisation of rebels, who pledge not to disrupt 
November poll. 
Ottawa - URNG talks with business confederation CACIF; no accord or 
joint communique on rebel economic demands for increased production, 
wage rises, land reform; more jobs and agricultural diversification. 
Quito - URNG-Church agreement to support constitutional reform, 
respect human rights and condemn economic and social marginalisation. 
Metepec/Atlixo, Mexico - URNG meets representatives of 23 popular 
organisations and academics. Declarations support direct talks with 
government; establishment of constituent assembly to remove repressive 
state apparatus; role of CNR as principal mediating body. 
Mexico DF - First official URNG-government talks agree 11-point 
agenda for negotiations, including socio-economic issues. 
Queretaro, Mexico - Second round of talks; general agreement on first 
agenda item - democratic principles for state and civil society. 
Mexico DF - Failure to agree on human rights. 
Mexico DF - Failure to agree on human rights. 
Mexico DF - Failure to agree on human rights. 
Guatemala - New URNG proposals omit points 8-11 of April 1991 
agenda (on mechanisms for demobilisation and legalisation) and focus on 
refugee resettlement, reform of constitution, indigenous rights and 
economic change as prerequisites for talks. 
Mexico DF - URNG - government agreement for freezing of PACs and 
investigation of their conduct; existing PACs to remain; new ones 
permitted in event of rebel offensive. 
9 Sept. 1987 
9 Oct. 1987 
23 Aug.1988 
30 March 1990 
1 June 1990 
1 Sept. 1990 
26 Sept. 1990 
27 Oct. 1990 
26 April 1991 
22 June 1991 
24 Sept. 1991 
21 Oct. 1991 
25 Jan. 1992 
15 May 1992 
7 Aug. 1992 
In February 1990, immediately after the Nicaraguan election, Stoock 
declared, 4it is impossible for the US to maintain stable and enduring 
relations with a government that violates human rights'.219 A few days later 
he was officially withdrawn because of the continuing failure of the military 
and the death squads to curb their activities, just as Ramiro de Leon Carpio 
(appointed in December 1989) began to make the office of Ombudsman 
politically important with his detailed reports and direct language. The 
European Community had already made improvements in human rights a 
condition of aid, and for several years this issue had caused much publicised 
embarrassment for the government in the UN. The unambiguous signal from 
Washington early in 1990 that it would no longer accept weasel words 
encouraged the Cerezo regime to authorise a further meeting with the 
guerrillas by the CNR, although it would not itself hazard a repetition of the 
Madrid encounter. 
This stand-off continued for the next twelve months. Washington's 
pressure was maintained by very public protests at the lack of action over the 
murder of US citizen Michael Devine by soldiers in the Peten in June 1990. 
The massacre in December by troops of some 20 unarmed villagers in 
Santiago Atitlan hardened the resolve of the US Congress to cut economic 
aid, which was much greater than that to the military, and this decision was 
ratified early in 1991. Furthermore, the election of Jorge Serrano in January 
1991 to replace Cerezo as president did not have the same effect on 
Washington as had that of Cristiani in El Salvador in 1989; there was a much 
more cautious reaction beneath the expressions of goodwill. Further fierce 
and public criticisms of the human rights situation by the UN (February 
1991) and the US State Department (January 1992) ensured that this would 
remain central to outside pressure on the regime to treat with its enemies and 
to the substance of any negotiations. 
For its part, the URNG, which lacked the confidence and dexterity of the 
Sandinistas and FMLN, registered some political success by exploiting the 
Cerezo government's reluctance to talk and holding international meetings 
with representatives of major social groups. That, with the entrepreneurs' 
confederation CACIF in September, promised to erode the military veto and 
government timidity, but the rebels continued to insist upon a full set of 
economic demands which were plainly unacceptable to the capitalists. This, 
it might be remembered, was before the FMLN had entered into serious talks 
with the Salvadorean regime and reduced their focus to transitional political 
arrangements and the question of human rights. By contrast, the Guatemalan 
guerrillas insisted throughout on retaining a set of substantive economic 
demands on their agenda despite their weak position. Nonetheless, the 
meetings of1990 enabled Serrano to address the peace question rapidly upon 
coming to office, and for the first few months of his presidency it appeared 
that Guatemala was about to undergo a version of the Salvadorean experience 
whereby a conservative regime that replaced a Christian Democratic 
administration felt able to talk directly with the rebels. 
It is the case that by mid-1991 US pressure, developments elsewhere in the 
region, and its containment of the URNG had combined to reduce the army's 
aversion to negotiations. Although much of the commentary on different 
currents within the military is speculative - and sometimes more an 
expression of imagination than firm evidence - it seems clear that a good 
portion of those younger officers who had spent much of the 1980s fighting 
the guerrillas was not inalterably opposed to formalising an end to 
hostilities.220 Indeed, insofar as the counter-insurgency doctrine represented 
by Gramajo possessed a strong Clausewitzian strain - albeit through 
inversion: politics as war by other means - negotiation was not anathema per 
se. Some senior officers evidently disagreed, but they could no longer 
enforce their view. 
The passage of negotiations in mid-1991 did not, however, give grounds 
for great optimism after the first round in Mexico, where it proved possible 
to agree a broad agenda, including socio-economic issues, for future 
discussions.221 A second meeting at Queretaro reached a consensus over the 
broad principles of liberal democracy without undue difficulty. It was, 
though, once again the issue of human rights which provided the major 
stumbling-block throughout the Autumn, even after the Salvadorean peace 
agreement had been concluded. For over a year the URNG remained 
intransigent on its core requirements in this regard: a Truth Commission; 
reversal of the 1985 amnesty; abolition of the PACs, obligatory military 
conscription and the paramilitary agencies; government payment of 
compensation to the victims of repression; and the effective removal of the 
fuero militar, with most crimes committed by military personnel to be 
assigned to civilian jurisdiction. None of these requirements was acceptable 
to the military or deemed worthy of serious debate by the government 
negotiators. 
In May 1992 the URNG proposed reducing the scope of discussions by 
postponing negotiation over the details of a ceasefire, demobilisation and 
legalisation of the rebel forces. This initiative succeeded in circumventing the 
often arid exchanges over preconditions that combined profound rebel fears 
over security with military insistence upon surrender. At the same time, it 
laid the basis for an agreement over refugee return in October that, despite 
much criticism from the popular organisations at the time of the awarding of 
the Nobel Peace Prize to Rigoberta Menchu, was important insofar as it 
opened channels of exchange between the state and the mass movement, 
compelling both to engage in a modicum of manoeuvre. On the other hand, 
the URNG's insistence upon a range of economic demands appeared counter-
productive. It is the case that the FMLN had been able to include in the 
Chapultepec accords precise clauses on land distribution together with 
arrangements for subsequent debate over economic policy. Yet the 
Salvadorean left had much greater bargaining power, and the land question 
had offered Cristiani a forum for displaying the merits of 'popular 
capitalism', whereas talk of agrarian reform was tantamount to heresy for the 
bulk of the Guatemalan elite. Moreover, it appeared that the URNG was 
insisting on the issue more for propaganda purposes than as an item for 
genuine negotiation, possibly as part of a 'maximum programme' over which 
concessions could subsequently be made.222 The impression of a 
misguidedly prolonged conflation of substantive programme and negotiating 
platform was reduced somewhat by the URNG's clear concession in accepting 
the freezing rather than the abolition of the PACs in August 1992. However, 
such shifts proceeded more slowly than developments within legal public life, 
which became increasingly important after Serrano's election and which took 
on a decisive character in the late Spring of 1993. 
The crisis opened by Serrano's suspension of the constitution on 25 May 
1993 had as its immediate cause the miscalculations made by a populist 
politician of limited skill and very slight mass following. Both shortcomings 
distinguished him from the Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, whose own 
autogolpe in April 1992 against an obstructive congress and judiciary Serrano 
sought to emulate. In the case of Guatemala, though, the conflict between the 
executive, legislature and judiciary had little to do with ideological matters 
or an authentic political impasse, instead having its roots in the collapse of 
a spoils system that had become impossibly stressed. 
This degeneration of the constitutional regime was discernible even under 
Cerezo in that public administration was widely treated as a source of funds 
by those who belonged to or now joined a party that had never previously 
held power in its 30-year history.223 After 1991 the problem became much 
sharper because although Serrano readily beat Jorge Carpio (UCN), winning 
68 per cent of the run-off vote, his own MAS party held only 18 of 
Congress's 103 seats. As a result, Serrano had to enter into alliance with both 
the DCG and the UCN. In practice this meant ceding control of the Supreme 
Court to ex-UCN deputy Juan Jose Rodil, who became its president in 
January 1992 after secret congressional election of the nine justices.In 
November 1992 controversial internal congressional elections, in which the 
MAS/DCG/UCN alliance presented a single slate, were won by the DCG 
deputy Fernando Lobo Dubon, who assumed the presidency of the chamber 
and thereby became a key - and competitive - broker of power and 
patronage. 
Serrano was, then, not quite the unencumbered individualist he liked to 
project. In January 1991 nearly a million Guatemalans had voted for him in 
a second-round contest against Carpio, but in the first round of November 
1990 Serrano had won less than 400,000 votes. Moreover, his candidacy had 
benefited enormously from the withdrawal of the populist autocrat General 
Efrain Rios Montt, who was obliged to step down shortly before the poll 
because he had led a de facto regime in 1982-83. In April 1990 - when Rios 
Montt was still in contention -Serrano's standing in the opinion polls was at 
between one and two per cent. Once Rios Montt was out much of his support 
went to Serrano, who had served in the General's earlier dictatorship, was 
backed by the same fundamentalist Protestant sects, and struck a similar pose 
as an honest outsider prepared to assail the vested interests. Instead, once he 
reached the presidency, Serrano was obliged to join those interests, creating 
tangible disenchantment. Owing his election in large measure to 'negative 
voting', he was far more vulnerable than it seemed to popular assessment of 
his performance as well as to continued backing from his informal allies in 
the UCN and DCG. Both these factors swung decisively against him in mid-
May 1993. 
The MAS won the municipal elections of 9 May by a margin so great that 
charges of vote-buying and fraud seemed highly plausible. Furthermore, 
these accusations were made not only by the small extreme right-wing parties 
that had earlier protested at the MAS/DCG/UCN triad's carve-up of 
congressional power. Now they were also levelled by the UCN, which lost 
nearly 100 mayoralties, and the DCG, which lost almost 50 while the MAS 
increased its share from 13 to 100. Serrano responded by turning against the 
two main parties the charges of corruption they had raised, in both the 
Supreme Court and Congress, against him and his closest associates. His 
'end-game' in this respect was to close Congress down, but the problem was 
that after nearly two years of collaboration all these groups were involved in 
overlapping spoils systems, provoking popular repugnance in roughly equal 
measure. 
The details of malfeasance in contemporary Guatemala are distinctly lurid, 
corruption almost constituting a political economy of its own. However, for 
our purposes it will serve to note that Serrano and his Vice-President Gustavo 
Espina were publicly identified in March 1993 as having acquired property 
worth at least $20 million since their election. At that time the governor of 
the department of Izabal fled into exile, having accused Serrano's cousins of 
taking over a state farm, and it transpired that the deeds to the president's 
two new farms were irregular.224 Naturally, such matters played directly 
into the hands of his opponents. They, though, were little less vulnerable. In 
the case of Congress, one of the principal sources of wealth had become the 
acquisition of cars stolen in Texas and irregularly provided with 
congressional plates that provided immunity. This highly profitable activity 
was closely associated with the veteran PR deputy Obdulio Chinchilla, who 
dominated the department of Chiquimula, but most other parties were 
involved too.225 It was, moreover, one of several cases being pursued with 
unusual zeal by the Attorney General, Acisclo Valladares Molina. The 
deputies involved naturally invoked their constitutional rights to immunity 
from prosecution that could only be removed by a vote of two-thirds of the 
Congress. However, it was not long before Valladares himself became the 
target of accusations - that he was attempting to bamboozle his 91 year-old 
aunt into letting him control her $5 million fortune.226 The attorney general, 
who was himself protected by immunity clauses but kept true to his prior 
invectives against impunity, requested that he be investigated and was 
promptly removed from office by congressional vote. Early in 1993 his 
replacement, Edgar Tuna, issued strong declarations in favour of the amnesty 
for the military and attempted to cut back the powers of Ombudsman de Leon 
Carpio. 
Full details of corruption at Rodil Peralta's Supreme Court were not 
publicised until after the failure of Serrano's coup, although the Court's 
election in January 1992 was widely attacked as being a purely political 
exercise. Moreover, the Court's reputation was not enhanced either by 
Rodil's appointment of his nephew as a 'special adviser' or his payment to 
some 20 secretaries of salaries of over $3,750 a month - more than the basic 
pay of a congressional deputy.227 The fact that the Supreme Court had spent 
$51,000 on weaponry was rather more sinister than Rodil's $4,000 per month 
petrol bill, but these and other revelations contributed to a general ambience 
of dishonesty, greatly weakening the charges Rodil and his associates sought 
to make against the president. In sum, all the main institutions of the state 
had become badly tarnished and lacked legitimacy. 
This fact undoubtedly gave impetus to the popular mobilisation against 
Serrano's announcement of price rises for electricity, fuel and transport 
immediately after the municipal elections. Although the UCN and DCG 
(which had earlier helped Serrano evade a congressional debate over the 
budget) opportunistically attacked these measures, the level of mass protest 
was quite remarkable for a country so long subjected to violent repression. 
The demonstrations soon turned into riots with school students burning buses 
and giving the strong impression that the capital's youth had made a 
generational turn against the culture of caution and survivalist acquiescence. 
Its eruption into the streets in mid-May 1993 and the resulting police 
repression provided Serrano with the justification for his coup attempt, but 
his stock was so low that, even within the military, arguments over public 
order were now placed in a wider context of economic policy and public 
propriety. This was also true of the response of CACIF, which had often 
criticised the management of the state electricity corporation INDE, held 
responsible for frequent interruptions of supply and for price rises, although 
the entrepreneurs were far from enthusiastic about paying the taxes to finance 
the $30,000 daily subsidy needed to keep the capital's bus fares within reach 
of schoolchildren and the poor.228 
The failure over 15 years of both military and civilian governments to 
manage the provision of fuel, power and transport without provoking riots 
(1978; 1985; 1990; 1993) might be seen as vindication of the URNG's policy 
of insisting upon the inclusion of economic policy in the peace negotiations. 
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the price of insubordination in 
the countryside was markedly higher than in Guatemala City, and the land 
question clearly had lost none of its edge. It would, though, be misconceived 
to see the crisis of May and June 1993 predominantly in this light. Whilst, of 
course, the moral economy of the urban poor related powerfully to the issue 
of the legitimacy of even a quasi-authoritarian state such as that in 
constitutional Guatemala, this was more directly affected by the question of 
violence, especially by the army, the police and the death-squads associated 
with them and the groups of the extreme right. For this reason alone a 
conservative member of the political establishment such as Ramiro de Leon 
Carpio was able to become a popular champion because, as Ombudsman, he 
represented both honest conduct and the repudiation of violence. 
The collapse of Serrano's dictatorial experiment and the installation of de 
Leon Carpio's ad hoc technocratic administration may herald the advent of 
modernity to Guatemalan politics. This was evident, for example, in the 
Ombudsman's use of a cellphone to organise opposition as he hid from 
Serrano's goons. It may also be seen in the style and approach of 
Guatemala's newest daily Siglo XXI, and it may yet prove to be a facet of the 
army officers who filled the senior military appointments once the new 
administration found its feet and flushed away the generals who first tried 
clumsily to hem it in. The obstacles, however, remained formidable. At the 
Supreme Court Rodil clung to his post and attempted to dodge a purge by 
presenting his own, self-serving, plans for reform. Lobo Dubon's Congress 
likewise held out against a popular campaign - led by the unprecedentedly 
broad Instancia Nacional de Consenso (INC) - for mass resignations, and in 
the midst of that dispute the UCN leader Jorge Carpio was assassinated, quite 
possibly by forces of the right.229 
The historical foundations for pessimism were strong and deep. Yet history 
also provides a countervailing example in that although Guatemala was the 
Central American country most emphatically affected by the Cold War, this 
had been as a result of the overthrow of a decade-long reformist enterprise 
(1944-54) that had been begun by strongly legalist popular mobilisation and 
had only been destroyed with powerful assistance from the USA. The 
memory of the governments of Arevalo and Arbenz had been dimmed by age 
and the wrenching brutality of nearly four decades. Contemporary historians 
have also revealed enough to puncture any easy depiction of a golden 
age.230 Nonetheless, that experience together with the events of mid-1993 
must be pitted against the bleak determinism encouraged by the long counter-
revolution. 
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Appendix 1: Select Political Chronology, 1987-1993 
Pres. Arias announces peace plan focused on ending Contra 
campaign in return for FSLN concessions over internal 
Nicaraguan regime. 
Arias calls presidential summit, excluding Daniel Ortega, to 
discuss his plan; Ortega initially calls CR a 'neocolony' but 
later (18th) accepts plan's outline; others express shock at anti-
Contra provisions. 
4 killed in Contra attack on rural co-op. 
Initiation of URNG radio station La Voz Popular 
Pres. Duarte rejects FMLN proposals for talks. 
Third anniversary of Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) 
Gen. John Galvin replaced by Gen. Fred Woerner as head of 
US Southern Command (SouthCom). 
Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera, 2nd. in command of Defence 
Forces (FDP), removed from officer accuses Gen. Noriega of 
rigging 1984 poll and ordering murder of Dr Hugo Spadafora. 
FMLN temporarily occupy Jiquilisco. 
Establishment of business-led National Civic Crusade (CCN) 
opposition movement. 
Duarte talks with Philip Habib, US Special Envoy for Central 
America. 
Duarte cancels regional meeting due on 25th over Arias plan. 
Reagan tells Arias his plan is too lenient towards Nicaragua. 
Foreign Minister Rodrigo Madrigal requests US explanation 
for training of Contras on Costa Rican territory. 
Arias tours region to lobby for his plan. 
Government-FMLN agreement for evacuation of 98 wounded 
rebels. 
Commercial and school strikes called by CCN against Noriega. 
OAS passes resolution calling on USA to cease interference in 
internal Panamanian affairs, as guaranteed under 1977 treaties. 
Reports of meeting in Mexico between Pres. Cerezo and 
URNG; Cerezo declares guerrilla surrender is pre-requisite to 
talks. 
15 demonstrating social security workers wounded by police. 
Col. Diaz arrested after assault on his house; formally retracts 
allegations against Noriega. 
UNHCR appoints Hector Gross as Special Rapporteur. 
Under Mexican pressure, Honduran government withdraws 
'spoiling' draft amendment to peace plan at presidential summit 
in Tegucigalpa; agreement that ceasefires to be between 
governments and rebels and that all external aid to rebels 
should be halted. 
82 year-old Gonzalo Menendez de la Riva appointed human 
rights Ombudsman, without power to bring cases to court; 
Cerezo meets GAM. 
Reagan and Speaker Jim Wright issue peace plan to pre-empt 
regional proposal. 
Central American presidents sign peace accord at Esquipulas, 
Guatemala. 
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Select Political Chronology, 1987-1993 
Six US soldiers injured by bomb, Comayagua. 
US aid suspended. 
Political prisoners attacked in Mariona prison. 
Anti-Noriega strike movement fizzles out. 
End of three-month strike by 15,000 social security employees. 
FMLN attacks coffee-processing plants. 
Return of Monsenor Bismark Caballo and other pro-Contra 
priests. 
National Assembly approves new tax law, attacked by business 
front CACIF 
La Prensa permitted to resume publication; government 
promises to reopen Radio Catolica, closed in Jan. 1986. 
Government declares unilateral ceasefire in provinces of 
Jinotega, Nueva Segovia and Zelaya until 7 Nov. deadline set 
at Esquipulas; Contras reject this. 
Government-FMLN talks at Papal Nunciature. 
Contra commander Uriel Vanegas and 100 troops sign peace 
treaty. 
First official government-URNG talks end in Madrid after two 
days. 
Government withdraws tax reform after CACIF strike threat. 
Oscar Arias awarded Nobel Peace Prize. 
Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo (FDR) return after seven 
years. 
FDR-FMLN withdraw from talks after murder of human rights 
leader Herbert Anaya. 
FMLN starts three-day traffic stoppage. 
Duarte amnesties 400 political prisoners and declares 15-day 
ceasefire. 
Airforce breaks ceasefire, bombing Los Dubones, 
Chalatenango. 
All political parties except governing PDC withdraw from 
National Reconciliation Commission established under terms 
of Esquipulas. 
Zamora (MPSC) and Ungo (MNR) join Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) to form Convergencia Democratica (CD), 
expressing tactical differences with FMLN. 
leaders of 11 peasant movements form Confederation Nacional 
Campesina (CNC) to press for land reform. 
15,000 march in capital against electricity price rises. 
Presidential summit at Alajuela, Costa Rica, includes 
Nicaragua whilst Reagan requests US Congress to approve 
$270 million for Contras. 
At Alajuela Ortega accepts requirement of Arias plan to talk 
directly with Contras; Reagan reduces Contra aid request to 
$36 million. 
Congress votes against Contra aid. 
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Select Political Chronology, 1987-1993 
US grand jury indicts Noriega on narcotics and racketeering 
charges. 
Jose Blandon, former consul in New York, makes detailed 
testimony against Noriega to US Senate Sub-Committee. 
Severe deflationary programme introduced; direct government-
Contra talks start in Guatemala. 
After talks with US ambassador, Pres. Erick Delvalle tries to 
remove Noriega as FDP Commander and is himself promptly 
deposed by National Assembly; Manuel Soil's Palma appointed 
in his stead, but USA continues to recognise Delvalle as legal 
head of state. 
Army opens dry-season offensive against Contras. 
USA withholds payments to Canal Commission. 
News of abortive police coup provokes anti-Noriega riots and 
two week general strike; FDP purged. 
State of emergency declared; banks closed (for nine weeks); 
'Dignity Batallions' formed by Noriega, who holds secret talks 
with US envoys. 
Elections: ARENA wins effective control of National 
Assembly and nearly three-quarters of municipalities. 
US Secretary of State Shultz publicly urges Noriega to go into 
exile in Spain. 
Noriega offers to resign but insists on choosing his own time. 
Agreement at Sapoa for 60-day ceasefire from 1 April to allow 
talks and relocation of Contra troops into designated zones. 
Anti-Noriega strikes fizzle out. 
ARENA claims electoral fraud deprives it of clear control of 
Assembly. 
1,300 US troops sent to bolster 10,000 already in Canal Zone. 
Riots follow extradition of citizen to USA for narcotics 
offences; US consulate burnt and four protestors killed by 
guards. 
Reagan uses 1977 Emergency Powers Act to install economic 
boycott. 
Contras reject government proposal for permanent ceasefire; 
private talks between government and Contra leader Alfredo 
Cesar. 
CUC leadership (including Rigoberta Menchu) return for 
week-long visit; temporarily arrested. 
Local elections: DCG win over half of 271 municipalities; 
seven-party right-wing alliance wins only 34. 
Soils appoints leftist cabinet; Church calls for lifting of US 
sanctions. 
Junior officers in highlands combat zones accuse high 
command of drug-smuggling and profiteering. 
USA disowns plans to remove Noriega and suggests 
compromise. 
Military helicopters drop propaganda on 20,000-strong march, 
which passes without violence. 
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Banks reopen; US Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak 
holds talks with Noriega offering to drop charges if he leaves 
country. 
Comandante 'Fernando', leader of mutiny against Contra 
military chief Enrique Bermudez, detained by Honduran army. 
Abortive coup attempt in garrisons of Jutiapa and Retalhuleu. 
PDC leaders Julio Rey Prendes and Fidel Chavez Mena hold 
separate conventions. 
Ambassador to Panama, Col. Rigoberto Regalado, arrested at 
Miami airport with 11 kg of cocaine in bags. 
ARENA secures majority in new Assembly. 
At Managua talks with Contra leadership government drops 
insistence on negotiating political questions exclusively with 
legal opposition; Cesar retreats from agreement. 
Fifth round of talks fail when Cesar introduces new demands 
(right of conscripts to leave ranks at any time; return of all 
confiscated property; removal of Supreme Court judges); 
government reveals existence of talks with Cesar. 
Closure of weekly La Epoca after offices bombed. 
Price and wages controls lifted. 
Congress declares amnesty for perpetrators of political crimes. 
PDC leadership backs Chavez Mena's candidacy. 
Police break up opposition rally at Nandaime and arrest 38. 
US Ambassador Richard Melton and seven of his staff expelled 
for 'orchestrating destabilisation'. 
12 Nicaraguan diplomats expelled. 
Election of Enrique Bermudez to civilian Contra leadership 
threatens schism in movement. 
Government extends ceasefire to 30 August. 
Reagan announces that covert destabilisation of Noriega regime 
has been authorised. 
Three civilian rightists arrested for plotting coup. 
US Congress approves $27 million 'humanitarian' aid to 
Contras, and rejects payment of $16.5 million military aid 
frozen since 1986. 
1,300 refugees return from Mesa Grande camp in Honduras. 
Ten unarmed peasants killed by army at San Francisco; Duarte 
promises investigation. 
Major strike against price rises. 
URNG meets National Reconciliation Commission, which 
lacks powers to negotiate, in Costa Rica. 
According to FECMAFAM (mothers of disappeared and 
political prisoners), 139 people have disappeared since 
Esquipulas Accord. 
Julio Rey Prendes formalises split in PDC by forming MADC. 
Attack on Father Andres Giron, leader of agrarian reform 
movement. 
First public appearance of CONVIGUA widows' association. 
FMLN successfully attacks El Paraiso HQ of 4th Infantry 
Batallion. 
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1988 cont. 
Sept 
October 
Nov 
Dec 
1989 
January 
Miami judge restricts information on charges against Noriega 
during US election campaign. 
Capital paralysed by 48-hour FMLN public transport boycott. 
Government unilaterally extends ceasefire for fifth time. 
Government requests UN to provide peacekeeping force for 
border. 
Gen. Pinochet loses plebiscite; poll now to be held in Dec. 
1989. 
Agreement with UK and Belize to drafting of treaty 
recognising Belizean independence. 
Government desists from further efforts to gain aid for Contra 
whilst Reagan in office. 
Hurricane Joan hits Nicaraguan coast, killing 116 and leaving 
200,000 homeless; El Salvador less severely affected. 
FMLN leaders Joaquin Villalobos and Leonel Gonzalez make 
first diplomatic appearance meeting Pres. Arias in Costa Rica. 
Chief of Staff Gen. Adolfo Blandon replaced by Col. Rene 
Emilio Ponce, CO 3rd Brigade and graduate of 1966 
('Tandona') class. 
Government rejects FMLN talks offer; FMLN attack National 
Police HQ. 
Currency devalued by 72 %. 
Vice-President George Bush wins presidential election. 
OAS meeting in San Salvador; Secretary of State Shultz 
criticises lack of support for US measures against Managua. 
50,000-strong march demands peace negotiations. 
22 people killed by army at El Aguacate, Chimaltenango; 
according to Americas Watch state forces responsible for 621 
killings in 1988. 
Sixth devaluation (by 72%) of New Cordoba, introduced in 
Feb. 
End of successful 10-day SITRATERCO strike against United 
Brands over company recognition of parallel unions. 
Primary elections: Rafael Leonardo Callejas wins PN 
nomination; Carlos Flores leads PL field of four. 
According to Prensa Libre, 39 people killed and 12 
disappeared between 27 Nov. and 3 Dec. 
Pres. Azcona demands departure of Contras from national 
territory. 
30th anniversary of the Revolution 
According to the Church, 1,369 soldiers, rebels and civilians 
killed in 1988. 
Over 70 killed when ferry capsizes off Caribbean coast. 
Vice-Pres. Ramirez rules out further talks with Contra. 
Encouraged by USA, opposition decides to contest May poll. 
Government admits that 52 mayors have resigned following 
FMLN threats. 
FMLN mortars Policia de Hacienda HQ. 
Cerezo rejects URNG offer of talks in Caracas. 
Pa 
El S 
Nica 
Hon 
Chile 
Guate 
USA 
Region 
El S 
El S 
El S 
Nica 
USA 
Region 
El S 
Guate 
Nica 
Hon 
Hon 
Guate 
Hon 
Cuba 
El S 
Guate 
Nica 
Pa 
El S 
El S 
Guate 
15 
19 
30 
4 
6 
8 
13 
22 
25 
31 
2 
14-19 
15 
24 
27 
3 
4 
7 
1 
2 
3 
13 
Select Political Chronology, 1987-1993 
23 
25 
1 
2 
3 
13 
15 
17 
21 
24 
8 
10 
14 
17 
19 
24 
30 
3 
8 
13 
18 
FMLN offers to participate in elections if postponed until Sept. 
Assassination of former army chief Gen. Alvarez Martinez. 
New austerity measures aim to reduce public spending by half, 
ending foodstuff subsidies and reducing army by 35,000. 
FMLN suspends actions against non-military US personnel 
after 'positive reaction' by Washington to its proposals. 
Presidents (except ailing Duarte) meet at Caracas for 
inauguration of Carlos Andres Perez; Ortega agrees to open 
elections with international obervers; others promise 
diplomatic pressure on Contras. 
34-year dictatorship of Gen. Stroessner overthrown in coup. 
Visiting US Vice-Pres. Quayle warns military to improve 
human rights record. 
Defence Minister Vides Casanova warns of military coup if 
poll delayed. 
Five presidents meet at Tesoro Beach, El Salvador; agree to 
demobilise Contras in Honduras; Nicaragua agrees to reform 
constitution and advance elections to Feb. 1990. 
PDC convenes meeting of parties to discuss FMLN offers. 
Government talks with opposition parties on poll arrangements. 
US Vice-Pres. Quayle sharpens Bush's criticism (16th) of 
Tesoro Beach accords and reaffirms support for Contra. 
45th session of UNHCR condemns human rights abuses but 
desists from sending Special Rapporteur. 
10,000-strong march supports FMLN demand for poll delay. 
After visit by US Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmit, 
government supports humanitarian aid for Contra whilst 
redeployment underway. 
1,900 ex-members of National Guard released and ten expelled 
priests admitted under Esquipulas accords. 
Elections: ARENA'S Alfredo Cristiani wins 53.8% of 
presidential vote. 
Pres. Bush announces agreement with Congress to provide 
Contra with $41 million 'humanitarian' aid until Feb. 1990; US 
requests Honduras to leave Contra unmolested until then. 
End of four-day uprising and siege at El Pavon prison; 10 dead 
and 60 wounded. 
Visit by Soviet leader Gorbachev amidst rumours of rift 
between Havana and Moscow. 
Amoco ends three years of oil exploration in Huehuetenango 
and El Quiche on grounds of EGP harassment. 
President-elect Cristiani, in USA, rejects FMLN demands for 
fresh poll as condition for talks. 
US Congress formally approves $49.8 million of 'non-lethal' 
aid to Contras for period up to Feb. 1990 after new Secretary 
of State James Baker arranges controversial bipartisan accord 
to keep the Nicaraguan rebels 'armed but inactive'. 
Electoral law reformed to enfranchise those who boycotted 
1984 poll; surprised Congressional opposition walks out 
claiming insufficient guarantees; US and regional governments 
openly doubt Sandinista goodwill. 
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Pres. Ortega accuses Pres. Arias of 'flagrant violation' of 
Esquipulas accords at February Tesoro Beach meeting. 
Oliver North found guilty of charges of deceiving Congress, 
shredding evidence and taking a bribe. 
Thatcher rebukes Ortega for failing to introduce 'genuine 
democracy'. 
Elections: widespread allegations of fraud to deny victory of 
opposition ADOC candidate Guillermo Endara. 
Defence Minister Gen. Gramajo suppresses coup attempt by 
retired officers backed by airforce units. 
USA dispatches extra 2,000 troops and armour to Canal Zone. 
OAS foreign ministers condemn poll-rigging and send 
investigative mission; opposition protest strike rapidly 
collapses. 
OAS formally condemns electoral fraud and attempts to 
negotiate. 
Inauguration of Cristiani amidst widespread power-cuts by 
FMLN; Gen. Humberto Larios named defence minister after 
conflict in ARENA. 
Massacre of pro-democracy students in Tianamen Square. 
Foundation of opposition front UNO, which immediately 
exhibits divisions. 
Elections: Solidarity wins 99 of the 100 parliamentary seats it 
is permitted to contest. 
Assassination of Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth, minister to the 
presidency; FMLN denies responsibility. 
'Black Monday': 100% devaluation; fuel prices doubled and 
prices of food rise by up to 80%; new electoral tribunal 
appointed in which FSLN surrenders the majority permitted by 
its 1984 poll result. 
Senate confirms Bernard Aronson as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, a post vacant since the 
resignation of Elliott Abrams in January. 
Commission for Human Rights reports 197 extra-judicial 
killings and 41 disappearances between January and April 1989. 
US House of Representatives approves $9 million military aid 
on condition that human rights abuses are investigated. 
Government introduces severe anti-terrorist measures into 
penal code. 
Security police (FUSEP) kill cement workers' leader Jose 
Danilo Martinez. 
200 protesters block entrance to US Fort Clayton infantry base. 
US tanks and helicopters manoeuvre around Noriega's office 
at Fort Amador. 
50,000 rally in support of teachers' strike. 
Teachers' supporters paralyse centre of capital; subsequent 18-
day hunger-strike obtains meeting with Cerezo. 
Execution of Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa and others for drug-
smuggling. 
Ortega agrees in San Jose to open dialogue with combined 
opposition. 
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Select Political Chronology, 1987-1993 
US House of representatives approves $433 million economic 
and $85 million military aid. 
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional the January 1980 
decree nationalising coffee export industry. 
Washington stages strong public lobby of regional governments 
to oppose further Contra demobilisation at forthcoming Tela 
summit. 
On eve of regional summit Ortega holds remarkable 22-hour 
televised meeting with 20 opposition parties, which agree to 
participate in Feb. 1990 poll. 
Presidential summit at Tela, Honduras, agrees disbanding of 
Contras by 5 Dec. and calls on OAS and UN to form an 
International Commission of Support and Verification (CIAV); 
despite its opposition to Contra demobilisation the Bush 
administration offers formal support for agreement and openly 
criticises only the deadline; Nicaragua drops its case against 
Honduras over the Contra in the World Court. 
DCG selects Alfonso Cabrera as 1990 presidential candidate 
despite bitter opposition from Rene de Leon Schlotter. 
GAM offices destroyed by bomb. 
Extensive US military manoeuvres. 
Three-month teachers' strike ends without pay-rise but with 
back-pay awarded and charges against activists dropped. 
Solidarity forms government. 
Council of State dissolves National Assembly and names 
provisional government headed by former Attorney General 
Francisco Rodriguez; OAS mediation abandoned. 
People's United Party, led by George Price, wins 13 of 15 
seats in poll. 
Bombs in central Guatemala City prompt USA to issue 
'advisory warning' to tourists. 
FMLN declares ten-day ceasefire from 13th as goodwill 
gesture over negotiations. 
10,000 leave GDR through Hungary for West in 72 hours. 
FMLN-government talks in Mexico City end without result. 
UN delegate Peter Kooijmans declares human rights position 
'very serious and worrying'. 
US Senate votes $90 million in military aid without conditions 
over talks or human rights. 
Nine wounded by FUSEP in land occupation, San Pedro Sula. 
FMLN launch post-truce attacks in ten out of 14 provinces. 
Gen. Maxwell Thurman takes command of US SouthCom. 
Abortive coup attempt by Major Moises Giroldi (later shot); 
US forces offer only limited support for rebels. 
Visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, who proposes 
end of Moscow's military aid in return for halt to Contra 
activity. 
46 wounded rebels leave for Cuba after a month's asylum in 
the capital's cathedral. 
Second round of talks in San Jose produces little progress. 
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Select Political Chronology, 1987-1993 
US Senate approves $9 million for the National Endowment for 
Democracy (established 1983) in order to finance UNO, now 
united under candidacy of Violeta Chamorro. 
Multi-party politics legalised. 
Contras kill 18 reservists; Ortega cancels unilateral ceasefire; 
US Senate votes 95-0 to condemn this and fails to implement 
legal provisions suspending Contra aid in event of agression. 
Large bomb destroys office of FENASTRAS union, killing 
nine and wounding 40. 
Ortega ends 18-month ceasefire and calls for UN arbitration. 
FMLN suspends participation in talks, accusing army of 
responsibility for FENASTRAS bomb. 
Kidnap, rape and torture of US Ursuline nun Diana Ortiz by 
police. 
Quetzal deregulated, floats to 3.10 to dollar; sharp rises in 
price of beans and bread. 
UN Security Council votes unanimously to deploy 625-strong 
ONUCA peacekeeping force staffed by Canada, W. Germany 
and Spain. 
Berlin Wall ' falls ' . 
FMLN launches largest offensive since 1981 in San Salvador, 
occupying 30 barrios and attacking presidential palace and 
residence. 
State of siege declared; fighting in seven urban centres outside 
capital; Colapa international airport closed; some 200 killed. 
FMLN seizes large part of San Miguel; US Secretary of State 
Baker warns USSR that its support for Central American 
revolution is biggest obstacle to superpower detente. 
Airforce strafes poor neighbourhoods of San Salvador and San 
Miguel with high loss of life; 
Execution of Ignacio Ellacuria, Rector of University of Central 
America (UCA), five other Jesuit priests, their housekeeper 
and her daughter by government troops. 
FMLN moves into wealthy barrios of capital and traps 12 US 
'Green Beret' experts in Sheraton Hotel; US House of 
representatives votes 215 - 194 against making portions of 
1990 $85 million military aid conditional on investigation of 
UCA killings. 
Peace talks broken off when Contras refuse to withdraw 2,000 
troops recently deployed. 
FBI interrogate Lucia Barrera, witness to UCA killings, in 
Miami and openly disparage her implication of state forces in 
the crime. 
National Assembly formally approves comprehensive anti-
terrorism law that outlaws virtually every manifestation of 
public dissent. 
Election won by National Party candidate Rafael Leonardo 
Callejas. 
SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles found in crashed Cessna aircraft 
in Usulutan; diplomatic relations with Nicaragua broken; 
FMLN completes withdrawal from capital. 
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USA repatriates 282 citizens; FMLN declares unilateral 
ceasefire to facilitate the evacuation. 
New US Ambassador Thomas Stroock attacks human rights 
abuses and openly accuses Cerezo acquaintance Col. Hugo 
Moran of narcotics offences. 
Government prohibits official US team from observing Feb. 
1990 poll, but those of UN, OAS and the Jimmy Carter 
Institute permitted. 
Cerezo accuses Salvadorean ARENA of complicity in 9 May 
coup attempt. 
Contra demobilisation deadline agreed at Tela summit in 
August passes without progress. 
Ramiro de Leon Carpio named human rights ombudsman. 
One killed and 30 injured at UNO meeting in Masatepe. 
Establishment of government with non-communist majority. 
Presidential summit at San Isidro de Coronado, Costa Rica, 
calls for demobilisation of guerrillas in both Nicaragua and El 
Salvador as demanded by Cristiani as condition for attendance; 
Ortega criticised by FMLN and left abroad for this; presidents 
also insist that all Contra aid be handed to CIAV. 
Elections won by Patricio Aylwin and 17-party opposition 
Concertacion alliance led by Christian Democrats. 
National Assembly declares war on USA and names Noriega 
'maximum leader of the struggle for national liberation'. 
24,000 US troops invade in 'Operation Just Cause'; resistance 
is short-lived; Endara sworn in as president on US military 
base; opposition estimates 1,000 civilian casualties. 
OAS formally censures US invasion as breaking international 
law. 
Ceausescu overthrown. 
Noriega seeks asylum in Papal Nunciature. 
Two nuns, one a US citizen, executed by Contras. 
Noriega, exhausted by highly sophisticated heavy metal sonic 
barrage, surrenders to US forces. 
URNG claim to have caused 2,370 army casualties in 1,680 
actions in 1989. 
Assassination of Hector Oqueli, leading figure in Salvadorean 
FDR, and Guatemalan lawyer Hilda Flores. 
Nine military personnel formally charged with UCA killings. 
Regional tour by Vice-Pres. Quayle radically reduced by Latin 
American protests at invasion of Panama. 
US Assistant Secretary of State Aronson publicly backs talks 
with FMLN. 
Cristiani flies to USA to lobby Congress. 
Presidential elections won by Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier 
(PUSC). 
US Senators Edward Kennedy and John Kerry introduce bill to 
halt military aid. 
UN commends impartiality of Supreme Electoral Tribunal. 
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Gen. Maxwell Thurman, CO US SouthCom, tells US Senate 
Armed Services Committee that the FMLN cannot be beaten. 
Government releases 1,000 accused of Contra activities and 39 
ex-National Guard officers. 
Nelson Mandela released. 
Jose Napole6n Duarte dies of cancer, aged 64. 
Violeta Chamorro (UNO) wins elections with 54.9% of the 
vote; UNO wins 51 of National Assembly's 93 seats; FSLN 
takes 39. 
Temporary withdrawal of US Ambassador Stroock in protest 
at failure to prosecute human rights violations, especially those 
of US citizens. 
Lt. Jose Fernando Minera Navas, held on drugs charges, 
accuses president's brothers of involvement. 
Endara ends 13-day hunger strike in cathedral protesting delay 
in US aid. 
Callejas government austerity measures include devaluation, 
dismissal of 2,000 public employees and proposed 
privatisations. 
Bishop of San Marcos declares that 70 peasants have 
disappeared in the province since June 1989. 
Outgoing FSLN government passes laws legalising property 
confiscations since 1979, protecting minimum wage and 
university autonomy. 
Occupation of El Rosario church, San Salvador, in protest at 
sacking of 11,000 public employees accused of supporting 
FMLN's November offensive. 
Ex-president Rios Montt proclaimed candidate for Frente 
Republicano Guatemalteco. 
Contra agreement with UNO to disarm and occupy security 
zones by 15 April. 
Establishment of Ciudad Segundo Montes by returned refugees 
in Morazan. 
CNR and URNG open talks in Oslo. 
US begins transmission of counter-revolutionary TV Marti. 
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and FMLN agree basis 
for negotiations in Geneva. 
Defence Minister Gramajo receives military delegation 
demanding new economic policy. 
New ceasefire; Contras to disarm by 10 June; Humberto 
Ortega to remain army commander. 
Independent banana growers (CAGSA) sign favourable sales 
agreement with UK firms provoking conflict with United 
Brands, which claims exclusive contract still in force. 
Chamorro government installed. 
US House Foreign Relations Committee votes 50% cut in 
military aid, to be restored only if FMLN fails to negotiate. 
Vice-Pres. Virgilio Godoy declares UNO split over 
Chamorro's immediate overtures to defeated FSLN; Contras 
repudiate agreement of 19th. 
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Large union demonstrations; fierce FMLN attacks in elite 
zones. 
Capital and much of Escuintla, Chimaltenango and 
Sacatepequez blacked out by URNG pylon attacks. 
Senate approves aid of $420 million for Panama and $300 
million for Nicaragua, restoring sugar quotas cut in 1988 and 
1984. 
New government-Contra pact confirms 10 June deadline for 
disarming. 
Sabotage of CAGSA banana shipments, allegedly by pro-
United Brands forces. 
18 of capital's 20 bus companies halt service, demanding 100% 
price rise. 
School students demonstrate against bus companies, are fired 
on; many schools closed. 
Chamorro concedes demands of striking civil servants and 
sacks labour minister. 
Vice-Pres. Roberto Carpio refuses to allow state intervention 
in bus crisis. 
Replacement of Gen. Gramajo as defence minister. 
Talks in Caracas mediated by UN's Alvaro de Soto agree broad 
agenda and calendar for negotiations. 
Cerezo orders army to provide transport assistance in capital. 
Cristiani confirms theft of log book central to investigation of 
UCA killings. 
Government-company talks over bus crisis collapse; Cerezo 
orders seizure of vehicles, but only 12 of hundreds named are 
arrested. 
URNG talks with nine political parties in Spain following Oslo 
accord in March. 
Bus service resumed at old fares; students attack several 
vehicles. 
URNG renounces sabotage of November elections. 
US House Appropriations Committee reduces military aid by 
70% due to human rights abuses. 
Death of ex-President Jose Figueres. 
US citizen Michael Devine killed at Poptun, El Peten. 
'Banana War' ends with help of EC mediation. 
Government announces plan to cut army by 50% by 3 August. 
Summit in Antigua promotes regional trade plan. 
Six days of talks at Oaxtepec; FMLN insist on structural 
changes in armed forces. 
US Congress votes aid of $15.7 million for military in 1991, 
50% to be cut if talks halt or no progress made on UCA case. 
Surrender of 100 Contra leaders, including Israel Galeano. 
Strike on United Brands plantation. 
8,000 public employees strike for pay rise and against decrees 
returning property confiscated under FSLN rule. 
USSR announces economic aid to be phased out. 
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1990 cont. 
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Government offers public sector workers 43% rise and 
withdrawal of decrees privatising state farms after 11-day 
general strike and riots. 
Five days of talks in Costa Rica; FMLN calls for replacement 
of armed forces high command. 
Talks halt with deadlock on military question, now at the core 
of negotiations. 
24-hour strike by 170,000 public employees protesting 
austerity measures. 
Agreement for UN commission (ONUSAL) to monitor human 
rights abuses. 
Pres. Callejas offers to mediate between FESINTRANH and 
United Brands. 
URNG announces sabotage campaign to be resumed because of 
renewed army repression. 
Invasion by Iraq. 
43-day banana strike ends after military intervention. 
Removal of airforce commander Col. Javier Pichardo Ramirez, 
alleged to be favourable to a leftist coup. 
Chamorro pardons four men serving 30-year sentences for 
murdering her husband in 1978. 
12 alleged Cinchonero guerrillas killed in abortive bank raid at 
El Zamorano. 
Return of Luis Somoza, nephew of dictator Anastasio, to 
reclaim family land and revive the Liberal party. 
Talks in Costa Rica collapse over military question after four 
days. 
500 police participate in DEA raid on poppy fields, San 
Marcos. 
Rios Montt's candidacy ruled unconstitutional by Supreme 
Election Board because he previous led a de facto regime. 
Judge Ricardo Zamora orders arrest of four members of 
Atlacatl Batallion accused of perjury in UCA case. 
Troops surround house of Gen. Juan Jose Marroquin, who is 
replaced as chief of staff. 
Assassination of sociologist Myrna Mack. 
Supreme Court orders Election Board to restore Rios Montt's 
candidacy. 
New talks collapse. 
IMF approves $50 million loan - first for eight years. 
FMLN publicly proposes state and rebel armies be replaced by 
single civilian police force. 
After intense US pressure, four soldiers charged with murder 
of Michael Devine; URNG meets Church representatives in 
Quito. 
US military adviser Col. Eric Buckland testifies to Salvadorean 
judge that involvement of Col. Guillermo Benavides in UCA 
killings was known to high command. 
Diplomatic relations established with USSR. 
Daniel Ortega halts FSLN civil disobedience campaign after 
talks with Antonio Lacayo. 
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24-hour general strike by 90,000 workers against austerity 
measures. 
FSLN deputies vote in Assembly for 'concertacion' between 
government, labour and parties. 
Supreme Court upholds banning of Rios Montt candidacy. 
Ten killed as army removes 200 Contras attempting to occupy 
co-ops in Waslala and Matagalpa. 
FMLN stages three-hour attack on Ilopango air-base. 
US and Soviet governments issue joint declaration calling for 
UN-sponsored peace talks. 
US Senate halves military aid by vote of 74 to 25. 
Central Bank President Francisco Mayorga sacked, as 
demanded by FSLN. 
Chamorro signs 'concertacion' agreement with FSLN-backed 
FNT union. 
Rios Montt supporters seek injunction to halt elections. 
Noriega's defence lawyers demand all charges be dropped after 
Justice Department revealed to be tapping his phone. 
Elections led by Jorge Carpio (UCN) with 25.72%, ahead of 
Jorge Serrano (MAS) with 24.21 %; second round to be held on 
6 Jan.1991. 
Ex-Contras killed by police in protest for land. 
FMLN launches extensive attacks on anniversary of 1989 
offensive; over 100 government soldiers killed. 
Chamorro agrees to retire 500 officers and set up fund for ex-
Contras, 50 of whom occupy border village of Macuelzo. 
Government is refused membership of UN Social and 
Economic Council on grounds of human rights abuses; over 
400 political killings in last month. 
Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB) reorganises 
prior to establishment of single European market. 
Enforced resignation of military chief Gen. Arnulfo Cantarero 
Lopez. 
FMLN alleges military are preparing 'Plan Djakarta' involving 
execution of leading opposition figures. 
20 villagers killed by garrison of Santiago Atitlan. 
Endara requests US troops to suppress mutiny by 150 police 
who control national HQ. 
Cerezo orders removal of Atitlan garrison and promises 
prosecutions. 
Judge Zamora orders trial of three officers, two NCOs and 
three soldiers for UCA murders. 
Ninth presidential summit, Puntarenas, Costa Rica. 
FMLN declare unilateral Christmas truce until 1 Jan. 1991. 
Arrest of four officers and 11 Salvadorean residents for selling 
Soviet weapons to the FMLN. 
Helicopter carrying US servicemen shot down by FMLN 
missile; two US soldiers summarily executed by rebels. 
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Serrano wins second electoral round with 68 %; abstention rate 
of 55%. 
FMLN detains two of its fighters for murder of US soldiers. 
Supporters of Vice-Pres. Godoy removed from cabinet. 
Presidential summit at Tuxtla, Mexico, agrees establishment of 
free-trade zone by 1996 in collaboration with Mexico, 
Colombia and Venezuela. 
Serrano promises social pact at his inauguration. 
Bush unfreezes $42.5 million military aid after execution of 
soldiers. 
Iraq expelled from Kuwait by US-led 'Coalition' offensive 
from Saudi Arabia. 
Repatriation of 229 refugees from Panama. 
GAM alleges total of 4,332 assassinations and 4,495 
disappearances during Cerezo presidency (1986-91). 
Opposition parties win elections for five out of nine Assembly 
seats. 
Serrano refuses US military aid subject to human rights 
conditions. 
Under observation of foreign press and diplomats at Perquin, 
FMLN hands over 17 missiles illegally bought from 
Nicaraguan army. 
Ex-Contra leader Enrique Bermudez assassinated in Managua. 
Talks in San Jose; government continues to resist purge of 
military demanded by FMLN. 
Assassination of left-wing congressional candidate Heriberto 
Robles and his wife. 
300 refugees attempt to return from Nicaragua without 
UNHCR support and against government's wishes. 
Death of Guillermo Ungo (MNR/FDR/CD) in Mexican 
hospital. 
Devaluation of the Cordoba de Oro and further economic 
adjustments provoke series of strikes. 
USA cuts aid to Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala; raises 
it to Panama, Honduras and Belize. 
Start of FMLN pre-election ceasefire. 
National Assembly and municipal elections: in Assembly 
ARENA (44% vote) loses majority, taking 37 of 84 seats ; the 
PDC (31 % vote) 27 seats; CD (12% vote) eight seats; ARENA 
claims 135 victories in 262 municipalities, but allegations of 
fraud are widespread. 
Bush administration releases military aid. 
Talks in Campeche, Mexico, over return of 40,000 refugees. 
Government-FNT talks end strike. 
UN representative Alvaro de Soto opens three weeks of talks, 
Mexico. 
Resignation of Finance Minister Irma Raquel Zelaya following 
death threats linked to anti-corruption campaign 
Endara fires five PDC ministers, breaking ruling ADOC's 
alliance with the party. 
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US General Colin Powell, in Honduras, supports Salvadorean 
talks but says Gulf War offers alternative solution. 
Antonio Cardenal, FMLN field commander and participant in 
Mexico talks, killed by army in Chalatenango; surprise visit by 
US Undersecretary of State Bernard Aronson. 
Violeta Chamorro is first Nicaraguan president to visit US 
Congress since Somoza senior in 1939. 
Free trade agreement with Venezuela. 
Mexico accords propose establishment of 'Truth Commission'; 
Human Rights Procurator's Office; military subordination to 
civilian authority; reduction in official control over Supreme 
Court appointments; reform of electoral law. 
Three-day URNG-government negotiations agree agenda for 
future talks. 
Outgoing National Assembly approves draft of Mexico Accord 
as prerequisite for reform of Constitution (which has to be 
approved by two successive assemblies to be valid). 
FMLN rejects amendments to Mexico Accords; CD leader 
Ruben Zamora elected vice-president of National Assembly 
after nomination by Roberto D'Aubuisson; large May Day 
march. 
Government withdraws recognition of intermediary 
commission negotiating return of refugees. 
FMLN cuts power supplies across country. 
Cinchonero leadership finally announces armed struggle. 
Nine opposition politicians and union leaders flee country after 
receiving death threats. 
Four peasants squatting land at Agua Caliente killed by 
vigilantes. 
Talks in Caracas fail to reach agreement. 
Police prohibit 300 from attending regional human rights 
conference in Morazan. 
Government reveals existence of 1,000 're-Contras' grouped 
on Costa Rican border. 
Strikes against austerity measures. 
Protest marches against conscription. 
Jinotega police chief killed by re-Contras. 
Cristiani visits Bush requesting more aid. 
Diana Ortiz files suit against ex-Defence Minister Gramajo. 
Talks collapse in Mexico after a week. 
FMLN attacks Mariona prison, freeing 400 detainees. 
Legislative Assembly formally abolishes Defence Force. 
15,000 march commemorating National Day against Forced 
Disappearance. 
Second round of URNG-government talks in Mexico. 
National Assembly receives list of Sandinista leaders who 
benefited personally from the 'pihata' - the final FSLN law 
confirming revolutionary property expropriations. 
Bush administration releases half of previously frozen $42 
million military aid. 
General strike against austerity measures. 
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Congress approves amnesty for political crimes. 
Presidential summit, San Salvador, approves free trade and 
agricultural agreements. 
FMLN kidnaps ARENA leaders Guillermo Sol Bang and 
Gregorio Zelaya. 
First summit of Latin American presidents, Guadalajara, 
Mexico; Fidel Castro is sharply criticised. 
FSLN holds first national congress. 
Murder in San Pedro Sula of human rights activist Marco Tulio 
Hernandez. 
FSLN congress retains 9-person directorate. 
US Senate delays military aid vote until September. 
80 re-Contras attack Quilali. 
UN observer mission (ONUSAL) starts human rights 
monitoring. 
US grand jury indicts FMLN fighter 'Porfirio' for executing 
two US soldiers on 2 January. 
100 ex-Contras contracted for construction work in Kuwait. 
Government closes Institute for Regulation of Basic Goods 
(IRA), firing 1,200 employees. 
Widespread protest at electricity price rise of 42 % with further 
increase of 48% slated for December. 
Murder of Jose Merida, head of national CID, apparently by 
military. 
Arrest of commander of First Batallion, Col. Angel Castillo 
Maradiaga, for rape and murder of 17 year-old Riccy Mabel 
Martinez. 
11 people shot in head, Escuintla. 
Arrest of seven soldiers for Escuintla killings. 
Five plantation workers, including a US AID employee and a 
Costa Rican citizen, murdered in Alta Verapaz; San Jose 
demands investigation. 
55,000 public employees strike against IRA closure. 
PRI wins 290 of 300 congressional seats in poll called 
fraudulent by opposition. 
Private meeting in Costa Rica between Shafik Handal (FMLN) 
and Defence Minister Ponce to revive peace talks; rising 
incidence of cholera. 
GAM begins occupation of Congress; lasts nine days. 
Collapse of Stalinist coup against Gorbachev. 
USA cancels $260 million debt. 
Noriega goes on trial in USA 
National Assembly ratifies constitutional amendments required 
by Mexican accord of April. 
Full diplomatic relations established with Belize; 600 cases of 
cholera reported; Department of Forensic Medicine announces 
discovery of 108 clandestine cemeteries. 
Gorbachev announces removal of remaining Soviet troops; 
Havana criticises this decision. 
Chamorro vetoes UNO bill to annul legal property transfers 
favouring individual Sandinistas amongst others. 
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Extensive six-day strike against economic policy. 
Talks restored in New York under mediation of UN Secretary 
General Perez de Cuellar; ONUSAL report criticises both 
sides. 
Withdrawal from World Court of suit against USA for 1984 
aggression. 
Earthquake kills 53 and leaves 30,000 homeless. 
Fourth round of peace talks in Mexico; resignation of Foreign 
Minister Arzu over recognition of Belize. 
New York talks end with compressed agenda and establishment 
of civilian-dominated National Commission for Consolidation 
of Peace (COPAZ). 
Col. Guillermo Benavides and Lt. Yusshy Mendoza convicted 
of Nov. 1989 murders in the UCA. 
Coup by army commander Gen. Raoul Cedras overthrows 
elected Pres. Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 
Serrano visits Bush to sign trade deal. 
US waives $434.6 million debt. 
Eight officers arrested for coup plot. 
Opening of fourth congress of Communist Party. 
'Columbus Day* meeting at Xelaju (Quezaltenango) of 
continental 500 years Indigenous and Popular Resistance 
Campaign; Danielle Mitterand attends. 
Formal renunciation of armed struggle by FPRH. 
40,000 students march against privatisation of education. 
US Congress approves military aid, withholding half subject to 
human rights improvements. 
Inauguration of Central American Parliament. 
Resignation of police chief Mario Enrique Puiz, charged by 
Ombudsman de Leon with torture. 
Resumption of peace talks. 
US Federal court in Boston finds ex-Defence Minister Gramajo 
guilty of human rights offences in civil case. 
Offices of mayor of Managua and conservative organisations 
ransacked in riots following bombing of Carlos Fonseca's 
tomb. 
FMLN declares unilateral truce on second anniversary of UCA 
murders. 
Government declares truce. 
Talks in Mexico on establishment of civilian police force; 
murder of former judge Francisco Jose Guerrero whilst 
carrying papers naming intellectual authors of UCA killings. 
Troops break electricity workers' strike. 
High command altered 'to facilitate peace talks'; CUC and 
GAM protest their exclusion. 
100,000 at peace rally, San Salvador. 
UN appoints ex-president of Colombia Belisario Betancur, ex-
foreign minister of Venezuela Reinaldo Figueredo and Prof. 
Thomas Buergenthal to Truth Commission, charged with 
investigating acts of political violence since 1981. 
Presidential summit, Tegucigalpa. 
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11 Honduran soldiers killed when their helicopter shot down by 
FMLN over Morazan. 
Club of Paris waives $623 million of debt. 
Military suspend all offensive activity. 
1991 Ombudsman's report notes 6,295 denunciations received 
(incl. 218 political killings; 45 disappearances); 1,932 
violations notified. 
Government accord with re-Contras and re-Compas for 
disarming by 3 Feb. 
Formal and definitive peace treaty signed in Mexico City. 
National Assembly approves general political amnesty. 
Gen. Humberto Ortega awards military decoration to US 
military attache Col. Dennis Quinn; many Sandinistas protest. 
Supreme Court rules that those sheltering from forced 
conscription in Central America are not entitled to political 
asylum. 
Col. Benavides and Lt. Mendoza sentenced to 30 years for 
UCA murders. 
US State Dept. issues report critical of human rights position. 
Ceasefire comes into formal effect. 
Police kill six on bus, Pochuta, Solola; start of extensive 
counter-insurgency offensive in north and on Pacific coast. 
Publication of platform by 'centrist' FSLN faction supporting 
privatisation and structural adjustment. 
Endara alleges police coup thwarted. 
Miskitos belonging to YATAMA group seize Waspan, 
demanding removal of local authorities. 
Death of Roberto D'Aubuisson from throat cancer. 
Disarmament programme has cost $2.5 million and yielded 
10,000 weapons; an estimated 80,000 still remain in the public 
domain; government offers $100-200 per weapon. 
Government announces redistribution of 42,300 acres to 
former rebels. 
Government formally disbands Guardia Nacional and Policia 
de Hacienda under January accord timetable, but many former 
members are transferred to Policia Nacional. 
Congress approves neo-liberal Agricultural Modernisation 
Law, effectively ending agrarian reform. 
Over 1,000 re-Contras and re-Compas occupy Ocotal, 
demanding land. 
FMLN announces that two fighters accused of murdering US 
advisers in Jan. 1991 will be handed over to the courts. 
Presidential summit in Antigua agrees to align tariffs within 90 
days. 
USA denies visa to FMLN leader Joaquin Villalobos. 
Inter-American Development Bank announces $1 billion in 
credits. 
Daniel Ortega cancels trip to World Bank to mediate threatened 
FNT strike. 
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World Bank 'rewards' peace process with $800 million over 
two years. 
Re-Contras kill five in dispute over land. 
Government-FSLN talks on 'social crisis'. 
Police evict over 1,000 Cakchiquel people squatting abandoned 
finca they claim to be ancestral land. 
Final group of 850 refugees from Mesa Grande returns; PCS 
and UDN formally end alliance of 24 years. 
MNR withdraws from Convergencia Democratica; reported 
remittances by Salvadoreans in USA and Canada in 1991 
amount to $435 million (in 1979: $49 million). 
Diana Ortiz testifies about her torture by military in 1990. 
Eruption of Cerro Negro destroys 3,000 homes. 
Police fire on student parade, killing one. 
FMLN unilaterally delays demobilisation on grounds of slow 
land distribution and bad faith over police reorganisation. 
Airforce bombs El Quiche. 
Re-Contra and re-Compa troops blockade Panama highway in 
north. 
Government sponsors Consejo Nacional Campesino (CNC) as 
peasant confederation to support new agricultural law opposed 
by COCOCCH. 
National Assembly breaks peace accord by reforming - rather 
than repealing -1933 decree establishing Guardia Nacional and 
Policia de Hacienda. 
150 minors arrested after three days of student demos 
demanding more resources for schools. 
70,000 commemorate labour day - largest demonstration in 
years. 
In unprecedented overturn of appeal, court sentences four 
police officers to jail for beating street child Nahaman 
Carmona to death. 
Frente Morazanista de Liberation Nacional formally abandons 
armed struggle. 
Police clash with secondary students; 150 arrests and two 
deaths. 
UDN joins Convergencia Democratica (CD). 
US extends Temporary Protective Status (TPS) to refugees for 
12 months beyond June deadline. 
URNG issues new peace platform. 
Army starts eviction of occupations of fallow land in 10 
departments by COCH members demanding tenure under old 
agrarian reform law. 
EC rejects requests to alter new banana tariff. 
FMLN declares itself a political party. 
Justice Department starts investigation of 1981 El Mozote 
massacre. 
US Congress freezes $104 million in aid after right-wing, led 
by Sen. Jesse Helms, demands changes in control of military 
and return of appropriated property. 
ANDES teachers' union strikes. 
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UN Security Council criticises government and FMLN for non-
compliance with peace accords. 
UNO leadership attacks Chamorro as anti-democratic in her de 
facto alliance with the FSLN. 
Government announces closure of National Housing Bank. 
Congress reforms penal code, increasing sentences for rape, 
and placing sodomy on the same legal basis. 
Visit by Pres. Bush; demonstrations oblige him to abandon 
speech. 
Death in Coban of wealthy entrepreneur Edgar Galvez Perla, 
allegedly involved in narcotics. 
Arnaldo Aleman, conservative Mayor of Managua, announces 
relocation to countryside of 55 of 180 squatter communities in 
capital. 
Public sector strike. 
Congress approves constitutional reforms, including abolition 
of the military. 
One-fifth of FMLN troops demobilised. 
Serrano rebuffs URNG's proposals. 
40 families evicted from Matagalpa plantation by troops 
enforcing reversal of agrarian reform that has affected 4,000 
peasants in last 12 weeks. 
Application of 7% VAT on wide range of basic goods and 
services. 
48-hour public sector national strike. 
ANDES strike ends after 34 days following government 
agreement with oficialista FMS union. 
48-hour general strike against VAT, for pay rises and 
participation of private sector (ANEP) in Economic and Social 
Forum. 
Police break up legally authorised peasant demonstration with 
violence; Interior Minister Fernando Hurtado resigns; 
according to the Archbishop's human rights office the first six 
months of 1992 saw 190 disappearances. 
Discovery in Colomancagua of mutilated body of Juan 
Humberto Sanchez, seized by army two weeks earlier. 
FMLN suspends demobilisation following assassination of 
union leader Ivan Ramirez. 
Peace talks reach partial agreement over freezing civil patrols. 
Attempted assassination of Reyes Tomas Martinez, FMLN's 
Director for Reconstruction in eastern zone. 
Truth Commission opens offices. 
Release of soldiers charged with 1991 Escuintla killings 'for 
lack of evidence'. 
UN Secretary Adjunct Marrack Goulding declares indefinite 
extension of ONUSAL mandate. 
Budget for 1993 15% lower than current year, but defence 
spending increased (by $1.7 million); 3,000 confirmed cases of 
AIDS - highest in region. 
Human Rights Commission reports 1,111 violations, incl. 373 
extrajudicial killings, over last eight months. 
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1992 cont. 
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Central American and Mexican governments sign free trade 
accord. 
Large demonstration in Solola against civil patrols. 
Joint march by ex-combatants of FMLN and state armies 
demanding land and jobs. 
Electricity prices rise 50%. 
FMLN becomes legal party. 
Tidal wave on Pacific coast kills 160 and damages 20,000 
homes. 
Majority of deputies leave to assist in relief effort; Pres. of 
Assembly Alfredo Cesar calls in replacement deputies and 
proceeds to table series of controversial bills. 
Chief of Police Rene Vivas and 12 commanders replaced in 
apparent deal with USA. 
Economic and Social Forum, established under peace accord, 
opens five months late. 
World Court settles longstanding territorial dispute with El 
Salvador, awarding two-thirds of contested land to Honduras. 
Secretary General opens UN official evaluation of peace 
process. 
Series of bomb explosions precede arrest of ex-FDP members. 
Army disarms 950 re-Contras in north. 
FMLN demobilises second fifth of troops. 
Agreement on terms for return of refugees from Mexico. 
Ad Hoc Commission presents findings to UN Secretary 
General. 
Congress passes hastily drafted bill repealing legislation that 
prohibits army commander for holding office for more than 
three years; Gen. Discua Elvir's term falls due in Jan. 1993. 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed by 
USA, Canada and Mexico. 
US government passes 'Cuba Democracy Act' extending trade 
embargo to US companies based in Europe; EC protests. 
US Congress makes 1993 aid appropriation of $30 million 
conditional on improvements in human rights. 
FMLN commander Pablo Andino severely wounded in 
assassination attempt. 
GAM offices bombed. 
Rigoberta Menchu awarded Nobel Peace Prize. 
UN proposal rescheduling peace agreement to 15 Dec. deadline 
accepted by FMLN, rejected by government. 
Deportation of Salvadorean death squad defector Cesar 
Vielman Joy a despite threats. 
Cristiani accepts UN proposal to extend deadline from 31 Oct. 
to 15 Dec. 
Forensic investigation of 1981 El Mozote massacre reveals 58 
cadavres of children under 11 years; FMLN demobilises third 
fifth of troops. 
Bill Clinton wins presidential election. 
Agreement on year-end deadline for purging human rights 
violators from armed forces. 
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1992 cont. 
Nov 
Dec 
1993 
January 
Six police officers charged with killing students in April. 
Unexpected two-day visit by US Chief of Staff Gen. Powell. 
'No* majority in referendum on constitutional reform, 
including abolition of military. 
Jesuit order requests freedom for those jailed for UCA killings. 
Remains of over 100 children now excavated at El Mozote. 
Two UCA students murdered. 
FMLN starts demobilisation of fourth fifth of troops. 
Airforce bombs El Quiche. 
Assassination of Arges Sequiera, president of rightist 
Association of Expropriated Nicaraguans. 
FMLN halt demobilisation until Cristiani complies with UN 
requirement for suspension of 150 officers suspected of 
violating human rights. 
UN General Assembly votes 59 to 3 for a repeal of new US 
embargo. 
Supreme Court rules null and void actions of Assembly since 
Sept. takeover by C6sar. 
Country again refused membership of UN Social and Economic 
Council. 
Independent Human Rights Commission publishes list of 239 
army officers accused of crimes; UN Security Council extends 
ONUSAL mandate until May 1993. 
FMLN begins to destroy its weapons. 
US releases half of $104 million aid frozen since June. 
Atlacatl Battalion - responsible for El Mozote massacre and 
UCA killings - disbanded. 
Assembly approves judicial and electoral reforms; FMLN gains 
legal authority to broadcast. 
USA waives three-quarters of $615 million debt to federal 
agencies. 
Nobel Laureate Rigoberta Menchu 'temporarily' deposits her 
medal for safe-keeping in Mexico. 
Outgoing Pres. Bush pardons Iran-Contra affair principals. 
Pres. Chamorro rules Cesar in contempt of court and convenes 
Assembly for 9 January. 
Government fails to meet deadline for purging human rights 
violators from military. 
Human Rights Commission declares 500 extrajudicial killings 
and disappearances occurred in 1992. 
FMLN suspends destruction of anti-aircraft missiles in protest 
at government failure to purge military. 
Gen. Discua appointed to second term; civilian control of 
military eroded. 
Atonal Battalion disbanded. 
Chamorro appoints former Communist and UNO centrist 
Gustavo Tablada as new president of national Assembly; 
UNO split is formalised with 12 of 14 parties now in 
opposition to government. 
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URNG presents new peace plan. 
UN reports that Cristiani has accepted need for dismissal of 87 
officers named by Ad Hoc Commission; 15 cases pending. 
Serrano presents new peace plan; first group of 2,500 returning 
refugees, accompanied by UNHCR, met by Rigoberta Menchu 
at border. 
URNG rejects Serrano's 90-day limit on peace talks. 
SITRATERCO ends three-week strike affecting 7,000 United 
Brands workers after company agrees to maintain plantation. 
Report by Ombudsman de Leon Carpio notes allegations of 387 
extrajudicial killings and 99 disappearances (compared with 
553 and 112 respectively in 1991). 
Establishment of Central American Integration System (SICA). 
US State Dept. report criticises human rights abuses by 
military; 2,000 troops deployed in San Pedro Sula. 
Eight Latin American banana-producing countries condemn EC 
import quotas. 
Noel de Jesus Beteta, formerly of presidential military staff, 
sentenced to 25 years for murder of Myrna Mack in Sept. 1990. 
First Central American drug summit, Belize. 
First direct, secret ballot, single candidate elections to National 
Assembly; Castro hints at retirement. 
Callejas establishes Ad Hoc Commission for reform of 
judiciary and DNI police. 
Ultra-rightist 'Yolaina' commando seizes embassy in San Jose 
for 13 days, demanding new command for EPS and money for 
re-Contras. 
Presidential minister Antonio Lacayo urges UNO to talk. 
Defence minister Gen. Ponce presents resignation. 
Publication of 600-page Truth Commission report on political 
crimes since 1981; leading military figures named. 
Assembly approves by 47 votes to nine (13 abstentions; 15 
absent) a general political amnesty for all those involved in 
political crimes committed during the civil war, including those 
named in Truth Commission report. 
Last hostages leave San Jose embassy; Ambassador Alfonso 
Robelo attacks government of his old ally Chamorro. 
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher appoints commission 
to investigate US involvement in civil war under Reagan 
administration. 
Presidential press spokesman Fernando Muniz threatens media 
with censorship. 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras sign 'Northern Triangle' 
integration agreement, allowing free transit of goods and 
persons from 1 April. 
Defence minister Ponce describes Truth Commission report as 
'unethical and disrespectful' and an insult to the armed forces. 
Divided Congress agrees to present Attorney General with 
evidence of extensive public sector corruption, including 
important Serrano associates. 
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Supreme Court rules unconstitutional article 373 of labour code 
which requires payroll deductions of union dues; extensive 
labour mobilisation over wages. 
Conflict within PLN over candidacy of Jose Maria Figueres for 
1994 poll. 
Supreme Court attacks Truth Commission report for 'damaging 
the dignity of the justice system'. 
Callejas, pre-empting Ad Hoc Commission, announces transfer 
of DNI to civilian control. 
Closed FSLN assembly reflects sharp criticism of party 
leadership. 
Assembly approves, after four months' delay, budget for 1993 
at $423 million - a reduction in real expenditure. 
Mediator Bishop Quezada Toruno declares government-URNG 
talks at an impasse. 
Col. Benavides and Lt. Mendoza released under amnesty. 
Judge Eulalio Gonzalez Amaya gravely wounded in 
assassination attempt, prompting controversial Supreme Court 
decision to transfer entire Court of Jalapa to capital. 
USA releases $50 million aid frozen for ten months; Club of 
Paris agrees $630 million package. 
Assembly votes 32 to 15 for Rodrigo Carazo Zeledon to 
become first holder of post of People's Defender 
(Ombudsman). 
Two-day riot at Pavoncito prison; seven killed; Noel de Jesus 
Beteta escapes. 
Endara administration opposes broad amnesty proposed in 
Assembly by PRD for supporters of ousted Noriega regime (60 
jailed and 40 in exile). 
Ad Hoc Commission report recommendations include 
establishment by Jan. 1994 of an independent Public Ministry 
to oversee constitutional guarantees; replacement of DNI by 
civilian DIC; extensive reform of FUSEP. 
Sixth report on human rights by ONUSAL indicates 
improvements over period June 1992 to Jan. 1993 despite 106 
killings and 165 death threats amongst the 1,480 denunciations 
made to the mission. 
Legislative commission set up to investigate child-trafficking 
following campaign by deputy Rosario Godoy de Osejo and 
revelation of several harrowing cases. 
Campaign to prolong for 18 months the Temporary Protective 
Status (TPS) introduced by USA in Sept. 1990 for illegal 
immigrants and due to end on 30 June. 
Assembly approves three laws to depoliticise judicial 
appointments and professionalise legal system. 
UNO agrees to participate in 'National Dialogue'; its team to 
be led by Managua mayor Arnaldo Aleman. 
Episcopal conference in Quezaltenango sharply criticises 
government and offers support to Communities of Populations 
in Resistance. 
FSLN presents 18-point economic programme to government. 
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Government joins 'Northern Triangle* agreement, liberalising 
movement of people from 1 May and of goods from 1 June. 
Five men hold for five days 26 Supreme Court judges and 
employees, puporting to be Colombian narcotraficantes and 
demanding $20 million in ransom; captured at airport and 
revealed to be ex-policemen. 
Controversial government-organised 'Summit of Latin 
American Intellectuals' in Antigua shunned by leading figures. 
ARENA convention elects Armando Calderon Sol as 1994 
presidential candidate. 
Ten people massacred, San Pedro Jacopilas, Quiche; 
Ombudsman de Leon Carpio orders investigation. 
URNG close five days of attacks in San Marcos, Retalhuleu, 
and Quiche; 50,000-strong May Day march, including 
policemen demanding union rights, demonstrates against 
electricity, transport price rises and forced recruitment. 
Government opens four days of talks with main parties and 
civic bodies as part of 'National Dialogue'. 
Shafik Handal declares that FMLN will not present candidate 
for 1994 presidential election. 
Appeal Court dismisses charges against six soldiers for 
Escuintla killings of August 1991 on grounds of lack of 
evidence. 
Government-URNG talks in Mexico collapse after 20 minutes; 
mediator Bishop Quezada criticises intransigence on both sides 
over conditions for ceasefire. 
Elections in 276 of 330 municipalities (84% of national 
electorate) produce good results for ruling MAS but with very 
low turn-out; government proposals for withdrawal of 
subsidies of transport, fuel and electricity prices draws open 
opposition from DCG and UCN in Congress. 
Teenager killed by congressional bodyguards during 
disturbances in capital centre caused by protests against 
enforcement of school uniforms and ID cards for free public 
transport. 
Bus services in capital shut down, with 35 destroyed over last 
fortnight; Capt. Hugo Roberto Contreras, jailed for murder of 
Michael Devine, escapes from Mariscal Zavala Brigade two 
days after being sentenced to 25 years. 
Attorney General Leonardo Matute Murillo unconstitutionally 
removed from office by PN deputies - PL abstains - on 
grounds of conflict of interest. 
Chamorro suspends constitutional guarantees for 30 days in 
north and centre of country, where more than a dozen armed 
bands are operating. 
Riot police battle with 800 students ouside USAC campus; 
influential Chiquimula deputy Obdulio Chinchilla wounded in 
assassination attempt. 
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National Police kill at least one person in repression of 
demonstration by disabled veterans of army (ALFAES) and 
FMLN (ASALDIG) demanding release of land and benefits due 
six months earlier. 
Large explosion destroys FMLN arms cache in Managua. 
Serrano announces establishment of new anti-riot squad; 
10,000-strong rally in capital demands his resignation. 
Serrano suspends 46 articles of the Constitution, dissolves 
Congress, Supreme Court and Court of Constitutionality, 
charging their control by corrupt interests and the mafia; 
announces elections for a new constituent assembly in 60 days. 
Court of Constitutionality formally annuls and declares 
criminal Serrano's autogolpe; president of Supreme Court Juan 
Jose Rodil Peralta and president of Congress Jose Lobo Dubon 
placed under home arrest; Ombudsman Ramiro de Leon Carpio 
goes underground; US, EC and Japan halt aid. 
Troops break up protest against coup by court employees; 
censorship imposed; open opposition voiced by Church, 
CACIF and Amigos del Pais as well as popular organisations. 
Cronica distributed by hand, police take no action; 
Ombudsman de Leon Carpio breaks cover formally to close his 
office in front of international press. 
Serrano meets high command after talks with OAS Secretary 
General Joao Baena Soares over sanctions tabled for 
ratification in three days; appears on TV accompanied by 
defence minister Gen. Jose Domingo Garcia Samayoa to deny 
resignation rumours. 
Gen. Garcia declares that Serrano has resigned along with Vice 
President Gustavo Espina Salguero; Court of Constitutionality 
will choose a successor; demonstrations against coup 
unmolested by police. 
Serrano flees to El Salvador; Espina denies any resignation, 
declares himself president and is endorsed by Gen. Garcia; 
Espina calls on Congress to ratify his position but after five 
hours (at 11 pm) only 44 of the quorum requirement of 79 
appear; USA emphatically denies claims Espina has its 
support. 
Military spokesman Capt. Julio Alberto Yon refuses to endorse 
Espina as demontrators and CACIF demand his removal; police 
do not intervene. 
Espina continues to seek congressional support, splitting DCG; 
general strike; Archbishop Penados de Barrio reiterates article 
186 of Constitution, which prohibits coup authors from holding 
executive office; Rigoberta Menchu proposes Church 
mediation; army describes her as 'irresponsible'. 
Court of Constitutionality declares Espina incompetent and 
calls on Congress to choose the new president; Gen. Garcia 
promises military will not interfere. 
In second round of congressional voting Ramiro de Leon 
Carpio is elected president, after withdrawal of 81 year-old 
president of Electoral tribunal Arturo Herbruger. 
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Select Political Chronology, 1987-1993 
1993 cont. 
June 7 Guate De Leon fires Gen. Garcia and alters high command; USA 
restores aid. 





Appendix 7 
US Economic Aid to Central America, 1980-1993 (Fiscal years; $mnf 
Costa 
Rica 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Central 
America 
1980 14.0 57.8 11.1 51.0 37.1 171.0 
1981 13.3 113.6 16.6 33.9 59.7 237.1 
1982 51.7 182.2 15.5 80.7 6.3 336.4 
1983 214.1 245.6 29.7 106.0 - 595.4 
1984 169.9 215.9 20.3 95.0 0.1 501.2 
1985 220.0 433.9 106.9 229.0 - 989.7 
1986 148.0 315.4 105.5 124.0 - 692.9 
1987 116.8 508.9 116.4 128.7 - 870.8 
1988 105.4 314.1 137.3 156.8 - 713.6 
1989 113.6 307.0 146.2 80.2 - 647.0 
1990 83.0 245.2 117.5 188.2 300.0 933.9 
1991 48.2 215.0 85.1 101.7 193.2 643.2 
1992b 38.0 207.8 82.1 108.4 204.0 667.4 
1993b 28.0 245.0 55.8 81.6 189.2 599.7 
Notes: 
a Includes development aid; PL480 (subsidised food sales and grants); 
Peace Corps; narcotics control; disaster relief; Economic Support Funds 
(ESF). 
b Executive request to Congress. 
Sources: Caution should be taken with the precision of these figures, which 
have been rounded to the nearest decimal point. Figures for 1980-87 are 
disbursed, but even these vary somewhat between secondary sources since 
contemporary reports issued by the State Department (and usually relayed 
through the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress) are often 
subject to amendment, not least by executive or congressional decision to 
freeze or withdraw funds. 
Sources employed here are as follows: for all countries 1980-87: R. Fagen 
et al, Forging Peace: The Challenge of Central America, New Haven 1987, 
pp. 149-151; Costa Rica, 1988-90: Central American Report (CAR), 
30/vii/91; Guatemala, 1988-90: CAR, 26/vii/91; Honduras, 1988-90: CAR, 
14/vi/91; El Salvador, 1988-90: Americas Watch, El Salvador's Decade of 
Terror, New Haven 1991, p. 141; all countries, 1991: WOLA Briefing, 
4/ii/91; all countries, 1992: CAR, 8/iii/91; all countries, 1993: CAR, 6/v/92. 
Appendix 8 
US Military Aid to Central America, 1980-1993 (Fiscal years; $mnf 
Costa 
Rica 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Central 
America 
1980 - 5.9 - 3.9 9.8 
1981 - 35.5 - 8.9 44.4 
1982 2.1 82.0 - 31.3 115.6 
1983 4.6 81.1 - 47.3 133.0 
1984 9.1 196.6 - 77.4 283.1 
1985 11.2 136.3 0.5 67.4 215.4 
1986 2.6 121.7 5.4 61.1 190.8 
1987 1.7 116.0 5.4 61.2 184.3 
1988 0.2 81.5 9.4 41.2 132.3 
1989 0.2 81.4 9.4 41.4 132.1 
1990 1.8 81.0 3.3 21.3 107.4 
1991 0.2 85.0 2.4 23.1 110.7 
1992b 2.6 86.4 2.4 20.2 111.6 
1993b 1.2 41.4 0.4 9.7 53.4 
Notes: 
a Includes International Military Education and Training (IMET); Foreign 
Military Sales (credit); Military Assistance Program (MAP). 
b Executive request to Congress. 
Sources: As for Appendix 7. It should be noted that Fagen et al, Forging 
Peace, assign Economic Support Funds (ESF) to military aid whereas here 
ESF funds are treated (as in almost all texts) as economic aid. 
Appendix 9 
The Military in Central America 
1977/801 19852 19913 
COSTA RICA 
troops4 5,000 9,800 8,000 
vehicles5 - - -
aircraft6 - - -
mil budget ($m) 39.0 
mil budget (% total) 2.7 5.4 2.7 
social budget (% total)7 56.3 26.0 31.9 
EL SALVADOR 
troops 7,130 51,150 56,000 
vehicles 32 73 
aircraft 68 155 
mil budget ($m) 145.5 
mil budget (% total) 8.7 27.3 17.8 
social budget (% total) 30.3 24.5 23.2 
GUATEMALA 
troops 14,300 51,600 60,000 
vehicles 41 71 
aircraft 35 83 
mil budget ($m) 91.0 
mil budget (% total) 8.6 19.4 8.0 
social budget (% total) 14.0 20.9 20.0 
HONDURAS 
troops 14,200 21,700 27,000 
vehicles 59 
aircraft 44 90 
mil budget ($m) 40.0 
mil budget (% total) 8.7 6.5 7.3 
social budget (% total) 25.4 27.5 28.7 
NICARAGUA 
troops 7,100 61,800 28,000 
vehicles 50 195 
aircraft 8 75 
mil budget ($m) 70.0 
mil budget (% total) 13.0 38.0 8.6 
social budget (% total) 40.9 20.1 37.9 
Notes to Appendix 9 
1 Troop strengths are for 1977; all other entries for 1980. Source: Ricardo 
Cordova, Los Efectos Economicos de la Militarization en la Region 
Centroamericana (1979-86), Occasional Paper No. 20, March 1987, Latin 
American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University. 
2 Source: as for note 1. 
3 Source: troop strengths and gross budget for all countries: Central 
America Report (CAR), 15 November 1991; budget percentages: El 
Salvador - CAR, 9 November 1991; Costa Rica - CAR, 21 September 
1990; Honduras - CAR, 11 October 1991; Guatemala - CAR, 20 December 
1991; Nicaragua - CAR, 23 April 1993. The budget for the Ejercito 
Popular Sandinista was cut from $104 million in 1990 to $71 million in 
1991, $42.9 million in 1992 and $36.5 million scheduled for 1993. CAR, 
16 April 1993. 
4 Includes all forces in regular army, airforce, navy, coast and frontier 
guards and paramilitary police employed by the state. Except for Costa 
Rica - where figures relate to all police and security functionaries -
civilian police are not included in these figures. In 1991 total police forces 
were as follows: Costa Rica, 8,000; El Salvador, 15,000; Guatemala, 
17,500; Honduras, 14,000; Nicaragua, 11,000. CAR, 15 November 1991. 
Civilian militias and patrols organised by the state are excluded from the 
above figures; these organisations were of consequence in Nicaragua 
(approximately 60,000 in 1985) and Guatemala (c. 100,000 in 1985). 
5 Includes all tanks, armoured and transport vehicles but excludes artillery 
pieces. Source, Cordova. 
6 Includes all military aircraft, helicopters, trainers and reconnaisance 
aircraft. Source: Cordova. 
7 Expenditure on education, health and (in the case of Costa Rica) social 
security. 
Appendix 10 
Elections in Central America, 1980-1993 
Costa El Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama 
Rica Salvador 
1980 
1981 Const (iv) 
Pres (xi) 
1982 Pres + 
Leg (ii) 
Const 
(iii) 
1983 
1984 Pres 
(iv + V) 
Const (vii) Pres + 
Const (xi) 
Pres + 
Leg (v) 
1985 Leg (iii) Pres 
(xi + xii) 
Pres + 
Leg (xi) 
1986 Pres + 
Leg (ii) 
1987 
1988 Leg + 
Mpl (iii) 
Mpl (iv) 
1989 Pres (iii) Pres + 
Leg (xi) 
Pres + 
Leg (v) 
1990 Pres + 
Leg (ii) 
Pres + 
Leg (xi) 
Pres + 
Leg (ii) 
1991 Leg + 
Mpl (iii) 
Pres (i) Leg (i) 
1992 
1993 Mpl (v) Pres + 
Leg (xi) 
Key to abbreviations 
Const3 - Constituent Assembly 
Leg - Legislative 
Mpl - Municipal 
Pres - Presidential 
a 'Const' is used to denote constituent assembly, regardless of whether that body continues 
with legislative functions subsequent to ratifying a constitution. Municipal elections are only 
shown for El Salvador and Guatemala, where their introduction in the 1980s was a matter of 
political significance. In both Guatemala and El Salvador presidential elections may be held 
in two rounds (as in 1990-91 and 1984 respectively) if no candidate wins an absolute majority 
of the vote in the first round. The legislative elections of January 1991 in Panama were partial. 
Appendix 11 
Central American Elections, Synoptic Results 1987-931 
COSTA RICA General, February 1990 (Abstention Rate2: 21%) 
Presidential Candidate/Party Votes % Vote Cong. Seats 
Rafael Angel Calderon (PUSC) 687,967 51.4 29 
Carlos Castillo (PLN) 623,239 47.3 25 
Source: CAR, 23 February 1990 
EL SALVADOR 
(i) Legislative and Municipal, March 1988 (Abstention Rate: 55%) 
Party Votes % Vote Cong. Seats 
ARENA 447,696 48.1 30 
PDC 326,716 35.1 23 
PCN 78,756 8.5 7 
(ii) Presidential, March 1989 (Abstention Rate: 57%) 
Candidate/Party Votes % Vote 
Alfredo Cristiani (ARENA) 505,370 53.8 
Fidel Chavez Mena (PDC) 338,369 36.0 
Rafael Moran Castaneda (PCN) 38,218 4.0 
Guillermo Ungo (CD) 35,642 3.8 
Source: CAR, 31 March 1989 
(iii) Legislative and Municipal, March 1991 (Abstention Rate: 52%) 
Party Votes % Vote Cong. Seats 
ARENA 466,091 44.3 39 
PCD 294,029 27.7 26 
PCN 94,531 9.0 9 
CD 127,855 12.2 8 
MAC 33,971 3.2 1 
UDN 28,206 2.7 1 
Source: CAR, 5 April 1991 
GUATEMALA 
(i) General, November 1990 (Abstention Rate: 37%) 
Presidential Candidate/Party Votes % Vote Cong. Seats 
Jorge Carpio (UCN) 399,777 25.7 41 
Jorge Serrano (MAS) 375,165 24.1 18 
Alfonso Cabrera (DCG) 271,933 17.5 27 
Alvaro Arzu (PAN) 268,796 17.3 12 
Ernesto Sosa (MLN) 74,825 4.8 4 
Rene de Leon Schlotter (PSD) 55,819 3.6 1 
Source: CAR, 16 and 23 November 1990 
(ii) Presidential, second round, January 1991 (Abstention Rate: 55%) 
Candidate/Party Votes % Vote 
Jorge Serrano (MAS) 936,389 68.1 
Jorge Carpio (UCN) 438,990 31.9 
Source: CAR, 11 January 1991 
(iii) Municipal, April 1988, November 1990, May 1993 
(Abstention Rate: 58%, 37%, 70%) 
Party Mayoralties: 1980 1990 1993 
DCG 140 86 40 
UCN 55 132 37 
MAS 2 13 100 
PAN - 16 33 
MLN 12 10 1 
PSD 1 9 4 
Civic Committees 12 20 
Source: CAR, 23 November 1990 and 14 May 1993 
General, November 1989 (Abstention Rate: 24%) 
Presidential Candidate/Party Votes % Vote Cong. Seats 
Rafael Callejas (PN) 917,18 51 55 
Carlos Flores Facusse (PL) 776,983 43 71 
Enrique Aguilar Cerrato (PINU) 33,952 2 2 
Efrain Diez Arrivillaga (PDC) 25,453 1 2 
Source: CAR, 12 January 1990 
NICARAGUA 
General, Fenruary 1990 (Abstention Rate: 15%) 
Presidential Candidate/Party Votes % Vote Cong. Seats 
Violeta Chamorro (UNO) 777,552 54.7 51 
Daniel Ortega (FSLN) 579,886 40.8 39 
Erick Ramirez (PSC) 11,136 0.7 1 
Moises Hassan (MUR) 16,751 1.1 1 
Source: Barricada International, 11 March 1990 
PANAMA 
General, May 1989 (annulled immediately by Gen. Noriega) and January 
1991 (partial). (Abstention Rates: 1989: uncertain due to widespread 
fraud; 1991: 49%)3 
Party May 1989 January 1991 
ADOC: PDC 26 28 
MOLIRENA 14 16 
PA 7 7 
PLA 4 4 
COLINA: PRD 7 10 
PALA - 1 
PL - 1 
TOTAL 58 67 
Source: CAR, 8 February 1991 
Notes to Appendix 11 
1 Main contestants only; percentage of votes rounded to the nearest decimal 
point. 
2 Percentage of registered voters who cast no vote at all. This figure 
significantly under-represents the 'real' abstention rate because of low 
levels of registration, except in Costa Rica (where voting is compulsory 
but abstention punished lightly, if at all, with a modest fine) and, to a 
lesser extent, in Nicaragua. 
3 The 1991 poll in Panama was held for nine congressional seats and 160 
municipalities, the number of congressional seats occupied rising from 58 
to 67. 
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